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FOREWORD

The Florida Law Revision Commission was created by the 1967
Legislature (§§13.90 - 13.996 Florida Statutes). In terms of the
Statute the Commission is to:
" ( l) examine the common law, constitution and statutes
of the state and current judicial decisions for the purpose of
discovering defects and anachronisms in the end and recom
mending needed reforms; (2) recommend, from time to time,
such changes in the law as it deems proper to modify or elim
inate antiquated and inequitable rules of law, and to bring
the law of the state into harmony with modern conditions;
(3) conduct such surveys or research of the law of Florida
as the Legislature may request."
The Commission presents to the Bench and Bar of Florida, for
consideration and suggestions for improvement, the following recom
mendation and report on a proposed statute on the subject of death
by wrongful act.
The Commission requests that all suggestions be submitted as soon
as possible, and in any event before January 30, 1970, to any Com
mission member or to the Commission office in Gainesville.
December 20, 1969
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wrongful deaths acts throughout the United States are in a state
of disarray. Florida's is no exception. Some of the results that are
possible under the wrongful death legislation of Florida can only be
fairly described as deplorable. The Florida courts have increasingly
called attention to these defects, and some of the recent judicial calls
for legislative help have had a plaintive and desperate quality.
An impressive effort to answer the calls for help occurred in 1957
with the publication of "The Florida Death Acts" by Leo M. Alpert,
Esq., in 10 University of Florida Law Review 153 ( 1957). Mr. Alpert
concluded his article with a bill introduced in the 1957 Legislature
by Messrs. Sweeny and Karl of Volusia County, which would have
completely rewritten F.S. Section 768.02 in order to eliminate some
of the defects. It was killed in committee. It is hoped that this cur
rent effort will meet a better fate.
Another very valuable study entitled "Florida's Wrongful Death
Law: Time for a Change" was written by David K. Deitrich, Esq.,
when he was a law student at the University of Florida. It may be
found in 18 University of Florida Law Review 637 ( 1966).
There are several things wrong with the wrongful death situation
in Florida, but suffice it to say here that Florida's current position
seems to be to minimize recoveries when there are many dependents
left by the deceased and to maximize recoveries when no one is left
dependent on the deceased. It takes no expert in the law to realize
that this policy is diametrically opposed to what one would expect
to be the objective in this area. Further, dependents of the deceased
sometimes most deserving and needful of support are occasionally left
without any recovery at all. As if these horribles were not enough,
the present state of our law encourages a multiplicity of litigation
and a great deal of uncertainty about the damages recoverable.
In submitting this proposal for change, the reporter is not naive
enough to think that there will not be some objection. This is a fairly
sensitive area of the law where legal fees are often measured by the
amount of recovery, and so anything that tends to minimize or maxi
mize amounts currently recoverable may generate some opposition
from lawyers who are deeply committed to the cause of plantiffs or
defendants. We have endeavored in drafting a statute to ignore this
approach and consider only the valid objective of such legislation.
This objective is to allow a full recovery on behalf of those who were
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dependent on the deceased and who have sustained demonstrable
losses of support and services by the wrongful death. In drafting
with that objective constantly in mind, this proposal will increase
damages in some instances and decrease them in others as compared
to the present law. Such result is unavoidable.
If those interested in such legislation approach it from the stand
point of only favoring those aspects that favor their own position in
such law suits, then we will probably have another stand-off and
there will be no reform in 1969 just as in 1957. It would be most
gratifying if the approach would be instead to consider that the
pluses and minuses strike an approximate balance in the end, and that
this proposal has the supreme virtue over the present law in that it
assures that the recovery will go to those who really need it and not
as windfalls to distant relatives. No affront is intended when it is
suggested that all concerned view this proposal from a statesmanlike
point of view.
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II. RECOMMENDED WRONGFUL DEATH ACT
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A bill to be entitled
An act relating to wrongful death action; amending
chapter 768, Florida Statutes, by adding sections
768.16, 768.17, 768.18, 768.19, 768.20, 768.21, 768.22,
768.23, 768.24, 768.25, 768.26, and 768.27; providing
for a right of action on behalf of the survivors
and the estate by the personal representative of a
decedent whose death is caused by the wrongful act,
negligence, default, or breach of contract or warranty of any person; repealing sections 768.01, 768.02,
and 768.03, Florida Statutes; providing an effective
date.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1. Chapter 768, Florida Statutes, is amended by
adding sections 768.16, 768.17, 768.18, 768.19, 768.20, 768.21,
768.22, 768.23, 768.24, 768.25, 768.26, and 768.27 to read:
768.16 Short title.-Sections 768.16 through 768.27 may be
cited as the "Florida wrongful death act."
768.17 Legislative intent.-It is the public policy of the
state to shift the losses resulting when wrongful death occurs
from the survivors of the decedent to the wrongdoer. Sections
768.16 through 768.27 are remedial and shall be liberally construed.
768.18 Definitions.-As used in section1- 768.16 through
768.27:
( 1) "Survivors" means the decedent's spouse, minor children, parents, and, when partly or wholly dependent on the
decedent for support or services, any blood relatives and adoptive brothers and sisters. It includes the illegitimate child of a
mother, but not the illegitimate child of the father unless the
father has recognized a responsibility for the child's support.
( 2) "Minor children" means unmarried children under
twenty-one ( 21) years of age.
( 3) "Support" includes contributions in kind as well as
money.
( 4) "Services" means tasks, usually of a household nature, regularly performed by the decedent that will be a necessary expense to the survivors of the decedent. These services
may vary according to the identity of the decedent and survivor
and shall be determined under the particular facts of each case.
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( 5) "J\'et accumulations" means the part of the decedent's
expected net business or salary income, including pension bencfits, that the decedent probably would have retained as savings
and left as part of his estate if he had lived his normal life
expectancy. Net business or salary income is the part of the
decedent's probable gross income after taxes, excluding income
from investments continuing beyond death, that remains after
deducting the decedent's personal expenses and support of survivors excluding contributions in kind.
76S.19 Right of action.-When the death of a person is
caused by the wrongful act, negligence, default, or breach of
contract or warranty of any person, including those occurring
on navigable waters, and the event would have entitkcl the
person injured to maintain an action and recover damages if
death had not ensued, the person or watercraft that would have
been liahk· in damages if death had not ensued shall be liable
for damages as speeified in this act nothwithstanding the death
of the person injurPd, although death was caused under circumstance� constituting a felony.
76S.20 Partics.-The action shall be brought by the decedent\ personal rPpre�entatin', who shall recover for the benefit of the decelknt's �un i,·or� and estate' all damages, as specified
in thb act, camcd by the injury re�ulting in death. \Vhen a
personal injury to the decedent results in his death, no action
for the personal injury shall survive, and any such action pending at the time of death shall abate. The wrongdoer's personal
rcpre�entative shall be the defend.mt if the wrongdoer diPs before or pending the action. A defeme that would bar or reduce
a survi,·or·� recovery if he were the plaintifl may be asserted
against him, hut shall not affeet the recovery of any other
survivor.
76S.21 Darnages.-All potential beneficiaries of a recovery
for wrongful death. including the decedent's estate, shall be
identified in the complaint and their relationships to the decedmt ,hall be alleged. Damages may be awarded as follows:
( 1) Each survivor may recover the value of lost support
and ,er\'ices from the date of the decedent's injury to his de,tth,
with interest, and future loss of �upport and services from the
date of death and reduced to present value. In evaluating loss
of support and serdces, the survi\·or's relationship to the
decedent. the amount of the decedent's probable net income
arnilable for distribution to the particular sun-ivor, and the re-

1 placement value of the decedent's services to the survivor may
2 be considered. In computing the duration of future losses, the
3 joint life expectancies of the survivor and the decedent and the
4 period of minority in the case of healthy minor children may be
5 considered.
6
(2) The surviving spouse may also recover for loss of the
7 decedent's companionship and protection and for mental pain
8 and suffering from the date of injury.
9
(3) Minor children of the decedent may also recover
10 for lost parental companionship, instruction, and guidance and
11 for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.
12
(4) Each parent of a deceased minor child may also re13 cover for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.
14
(5) Medical or funeral expenses due to the decedent's
15 injury or death may be recovered by a survivor who has paid
16 them.
17
(6) The decedent's personal representative may recover
lS for the decedent's estate the following:
19 ;,, /i1rt (a) Loss of earnings of the deceased from the date of
20 ittt'}ttiry to the date of death, less lost support of survivors ex21 eluding contributions in kind, with interest. If the decedent's
22 survivors include a surviving spouse or lineal desccndents, loss
23 of net accumulations beyond death and reduced to present
2-1 value may also be recovered.
25
(b) Medical or funeral expenses due to the decedent's
26 injury or death that have become a charge against his estate or
27 that were paid hy or on behalf of decedent, excluding amounts
28 recoverable under subsection (5).
29
(7) All awards for the decedent's estate are subject to
30 the claims of creditors who have complied with the require31 mcnts of probate law concerning claims.
32
768.22 Form of verdict.-The amounts awarded to each
33 survivor and to the estate shall he stated separately in the
34 verdict.
35
768.23 Protection of minors and incompetents.-The court
36 may put in trmt or provide othn protection for any amount
37 awarded for the benefit of a minor child or an incompetent.
768.24 Death of a survivor before judgment-A survivor's
38
:39 death before final judgment shall limit the �urvivor's recovery
40 to lost support and services to the <late of his death. The
41 personal representative shall pay tlw amount recovered to the
42 personal representative of the deceased survivor.
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768.25 Court approval of settlements.-While an action·
under this act is pending, no settlement as to amount or apportionment among the beneficiaries which is objected to by any
survivor or which affects a survivor who is a minor or an incompetent shall be effective unless approved by the court.
768.26 Litigation expenses.-Attomeys' fees and other expenses of litigation shall be paid by the personal representative
and deducted from the awards to the survivors and the estate
in proportion to the amount awarded to them, but expenses incurred for the benefit of a particular survivor or the estate shall
be paid from their awards.
768.27 Effective date.-Sections 768.16 through 768.27 shall
take effect on January 1, 1971, and shall not apply to deaths
occurring before that date.
Section 2. Sections 768.01, 768.02, and 768.03, Florida
Statutes, are repealed when this Act takes effect.
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III. DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT AT COMMON LAW
A. Lord Ellenborough's dictum in Baker v. Bolton (1808). The
common law rule recognized in the United States denies recovery in
a civil action for the death of a person caused by the neglect or
wrongful act of another. This rule descends directly from Lord
Ellenborough's famous dictum to the effect that "... in a civil court,
the death of a human being could not be complained of as an
injury". 1 This proposition became the basis for the common law rule
as adopted by practically all subsequent cases.
B. Historic origins of the rule against recovery. History provides
a plausible explanation for Lord Ellenborough's statement. Anglo
Saxon England treated all homicides as private (civil), not criminal
wrongs.2 As in many societies, the existence of the blood feud was
relied upon to keep the peace. Every killing brought vengence upon
the head of the wrong-doer at the hands of the deceased's kinsmen
down to the sixth cousin.3 Eventually the conflict between the loyalty
of the kin and their desire for a quiet life resulted in frequent efforts
to end the feud by the payment of just compensation. This punitive
payment was paid directly to the kinsmen, the amount depending
upon the decedent's social rank. 4
Further transition, partially caused by expansion of the notion of
the "King's Peace," resulted in combining this "wergild" with a fine
to the Crown for each homicide. 5 By the 13th century the change
was complete with every homicide, no matter how caused, treated
as a criminal offense. 0 Accidental or involuntary homicides were not
treated as felonies since they lacked the necessary mental element,
but the defendant's property nonetheless was forfeited to the Crown. 7
Homicides of this nature were called killings per infortunium8 and
were not considered crimes but misfortunes.0 "Yet, because the king
hath lost his subject, and that men should be more careful, he (de
fendant) forfeits his goods. . . ."10
There was no action for damages by the deceased's survivors
mainly because his goods being forfeit, the defendant was left "judg
ment proof." The merger doctrine, that a tort merges into a felony,
is no doubt derived from this situation.
It is generally agreed that the Baker v. Bolton decision was the
product of Lord Ellenborough's confusion between two separate legal
doctrines, that expressed by the maxim actio personalis moritur cum
persona ( personal actions die with the person) and that of merger.
13

The first was certainly not applicable since the plaintiff was suing in
his own behalf and not as the decedent's personal representative.
The merger doctrine was also a poor basis for denying plantiff his
remedy since merger operated only where the act causing death was
of a criminal nature. 11 But as pointed out by Dean Prosser, Lord
Ellenborough's "...forte was never common sense".12
C. The rule in America. Baker v. Bolton, with its rule based
neither upon precedent nor logic, was accepted by nearly all American
courts though there is much evidence of hesitation.13 Baker was
followed in Massachusetts as early as 1848,14 and Hawaii seems to be
the only American Jurisdiction where an early rejection of the rule
has not been overcome by later decisionP
Being hesitant to accept an irrational proposition of law, American
courts resorted to makeweight arguments on behalf of the Baker rule.
All of these arguments revolved around the "numberless actions" for
damages of an "awful magnitude" which would result from a contrary
rule, rn and the impossibility of calculating the pecuniary value of a
life. 17 These arguments carry little conviction when it is realized that
most of them were advanced subsequent to Britain's legislative renun
ciation in 1846 of the old rule that no action exists.
As one noted author has pointed out, the effect of Lord Ellen
borough's faulty analysis upon the common law was to make it
'', .. more profitable for the defendant to kill the plantiff than to
scratch him."18
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IV. STATUTORY REMEDIES FOR DEATH
BY WRONGFUL ACT
A. Lord Campbell's Act. The first remedy for wrongful death was
created in England in 1846 by the enactment of Lord Campbell's Act.
This act reads as follows:
9 & 10 Viet Cit 93. Act for compensating the Families of
Persons killed by Accidents
Whereas no Action at Law is now maintainable against a
Person who by his wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default may
have caused the Death of another Person, and it is often
times right and expedient that the \Vrong-doer in such
Case should be answerable in Damages for the injury so
caused by him: Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's
most excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Con
sent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons,
in this present Parliament assembled, by the Authority of
the same, That whensoever the Death of a Person shall be
caused by wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default, and the Act,
Neglect, or Default is such as would ( if Death had not
ensued) have entitled the Party injured to maintain an
Action and recover Damages in respect thereof, then and
in every such Case the Person who would have been liable
if Death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for
Damages, notwithstanding the Death of the Person injured
and although the Death shall have been caused under such
Circumstances as amount in Law to Felony.
II. And be it enacted, That every such Action shall be for
the Benefit of the Wife, Husband, Parent, and Child of the
Person whose Death shall have been so caused, and shall
be brought by and in the name of the Executor or Admin
istrator of the Person deceased; and in every such Action
the Jury may give such Damages as they may think pro
portioned to the Injury resulting from such Death to the
Parties respectively for whom and for whose Benefit such
Action shall be brought; and the Amount so recovered,
after deducting the Cost not recovered from the Defend
ant, shall be divided amongst the beforementioned Parties
in such Shares as the Jury by their Verdict shall find and
direct.
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III. Provided always, and be it enacted, That not more
than One Action shall lie for and in respect of the same
Subject Matter of Complaint, and that every such Action
shall be commenced within Twelve Calendar Months after
the Death of such deceased Person.
IV. And be it enacted, That in every such Action the
Plaintiff on the Record shall be required, together with
the Declaration to deliver to the Defendant or his Attorney
a full Particular of the Person or persons for whom and on
whose Behalf such Action shall be brought, and of the
Nature of the Claim in respect of which Damages shall be
sought to be recovered.
V. And be it enacted, That the following Words and
Expressions are intended to have the Meaning hereby as
signed to them respectively, so far as such Meanings are
not excluded by the Context or by the nature of the Sub
ject Matter; that is to say, Words denoting the Singular
Number are to be understood to apply also to the Plurality
of Persons or Things; and Words denoting the Masculine
Gender are to be understood to apply also to Persons of
the Feminine Gender; and the Word "Person" shall apply
to bodies Politic and Corporate; and the Word "Parent"
shall include Father and Mother, and Grandfather and
Grandmother, and Stepfather and Stepmother, and the
Word "Child" shall include Son and Daughter, and Grand
son and Granddaughter, and Stepson and Stepdaughter.
VI. And be it enacted, That this Act shall come into
operation from and immediately after the issuing thereof,
and that nothing therein contained shall apply to the Part
of the United Kingdom called Scotland.
VII. And be it enacted, That this Act may be amended or
repealed by any Act to be passed in this session of Parlia
ment.
l. Parliamentary intent. No doubt the inherent injustice of
denying a cause of action for death due to another's wrongful act
was the motivating factor behind the enactment of this act. As the
act's title and preamble state, it was designed to provide compensation for the families of those persons killed "... since it is oftentimes
right and expedient that the Wrongdoer ... be answerable in Dam16

ages for the Injury so caused by him: ... " It must have resulted, at
least in part, from a recognition that the rule denying an action for
a tortious killing was an accident of history.
2. Distinctive features of the Act. Briefly stated, Lord Campbell's
act provides that whenever a person's death is caused by the wrong
ful act, neglect, or default of another under circumstances that would
have entitled the party injured to sue for personal injuries had death
not ensued, an action may be brought within one year of his death
in the name of his personal representative solely for the benefit of
certain relatives of the deceased. These relatives include the wife,
husband, parents ( including stepparents and grandparents), and
children ( including stepchildren and grandchildren). Parties liable
under the act include bodies politic and corporate as well as indi
viduals. The total award is to be determined by the jury according
to the damages they may think resulted to the persons for whose
benefit the action is brought. This total award, however, is to be
divided among the beneficiaries by the personal representative as the
jury may direct.
Those features of the act of greatest significance theoretically are
the following: ( 1) an entirely new cause of action was created when
death resulted from the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another;
( 2) the new cause of action was limited to those cases where the
deceased would have had a valid cause of action for personal injuries
had death not ensued; ( 3) though the action could be brought only
in the name of the deceased's personal representative, the cause of
action was actually that of the named beneficiaries to whom recovery
was limited; and ( 4) damages were to be measured and awarded
only with respect to the losses suffered by the beneficiaries disre
garding any losses, either tangible or intangible, to the decedent or
his estate.
B. Florida's acts affecting wrongful death. Lord Campbell's Act
was followed by the enactment in many states and in Canada of
statutes modeled after it. Florida, likewise, created an action for
wrongful death during the late 19th century.
l. Survival Statute. At common law, not only was a remedy for
wrongful death denied, hut, similarly, there was a failure to provide
a remedy for personal injuries to a person who died either before
bringing or before completing a personal injury action. Just as British
and American wrongful death statutes of the Lord Campbell's type
attempted to create a cause of action for wrongful death, "survival
statutes" \\'ere enacted to provide a remedy for personal injuries
17

where the injured person died. Florida's survival statute presently
reads as follows:
F.S. §46.021 Actions; surviving death of party
No cause of action dies with the person. All causes of
action survive and may be commenced, prosecuted and
defended in the name of the person prescribed by law.
Survival statutes are conceptually different from wrongful death acts
since the former permit recovery by the deceased's personal repre
sentative for those injuries sustained by the decedent prior to death
and the latter provide recovery for the injuries sustained by survivors
because of the death itself. The prime difference between the two
types of statutes is that the survival statute continues in existence the
claim of the deceased himself as an asset of his estate, while the·
wrongful death statute creates a new claim based upon the death
rather than the personal injury, usually for the benefit of the de
ceased' s heirs or next of kin.
Florida's survival statute is mentioned at this point solely to show
that the death of a person due to injuries received at the hands of
a wrongdoer may result in more than one cause of action based upon
the same tortious act. A more thorough discussion of the survival
statute, including the damages recoverable thereunder, will be in
cluded in a later section of this report.
2. F.S. §768.01 - Florida's Death Act. Florida's statute creating
a cause of action for wrongful death was originally passed in 1883. 19
A second provision, passed simultaneously, named the parties to the
action and defined the damages to be recovered. 20 The current form
of Florida's operative death act, roughly corresponding to Section 1
of Lord Campbell's act, appears as follows:
768.01 - Right of action for death.-( 1) Whenever the
death of any person in this state shall be caused by the
wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any
individual or individuals, or by the wrongful act, negli
gence, carelessness or default of any corporation, or by the
wrongful act, negligence, carelessness, or default, of any
agent of any corporation, acting in his capacity of agent
of such corporation ( or by the wrongful act, negligence,
carelessness or default, of any ship, vessel or boat or per
sons employed thereon), and the act, negligence, careless
ness or default, is such as would, if the death had not en
sued, have entitled the party injured thereby to maintain
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an action ( or to proceed in rem against the said ship,
vessel or boat, or in personam against the owners thereof,
or those having control of her) and to recover damages in
respect thereof, then and in every such case the person or
persons who, or the corporation ( or the ship, vessel or
boat), which would have been liable in damages if death
had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages
( or if a ship, vessel or boat, to a libel in rem, and her
owners or those responsible for her wrongful act, negli
gence, carelessness or default, to a libel in personam),
notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and al
though the death shall have been caused under such cir
cumstances as amount in law to a felony.
( 2) The right of action as set forth in subsection ( 1)
above shall extend to and include actions ex contractu and
ex delicto.
The present version of this statute is the result of two amendments.
The first occurred in 1915, 21 and added the provision dealing with
maritime actions. Although the wording of the statute was also
slightly simplified at this time, the parenthetical additions were the
only substantive changes. The second amendment occurred in 1953,22
and added the second paragraph to the act and numbered the para
graphs.
Legislative history of the 1915 amendment is apparently non
existent23 though its general intent is clearly manifested by the paren
thetical wording. An established principle of maritime law, as well
as of common law, is that there is no cause of action for wrongful
death due to the tortious acts of another in the absence of state or
federal enabling legislation.24 At the time of the 1915 amendment
there were no federal acts providing a right of action for wrongful
death occurring on navigable waters within a state's territorial
limits.25 However, as early as 1886, the United States Supreme Court
held that in cases involving maritime wrongful death within the
territorial limits of a state, federal courts were obliged to enforce state
created wrongful death actions but that the " .. . right was subject
to the limitations which have been made a part of its existence...."26
Consequently, whenever a libel in rem not based on a federal statute
was brought against a vessel in admiralty for wrongful death, the
preliminary question facing federal courts was ,vhether the state's
wrongful death act contemplated vessels as potential defendants.27
Since most state statutes seemed to provide only ill pcrsonam actions,
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plaintiffs were always in danger of suffering adverse holdings based
on the wording of the particulat statute involved. Undoubtedly, the
parenthetical additions to Florida's death act were intended to serve
a dual purpose: ( 1) to make clear the fact that the act created a
cause of action for maritime torts resulting in wrongful death cog
nizable in admiralty and Florida's substantive law; 28 and ( 2) to as
sure federal admiralty courts that the act contemplated actions in
rem against the offending vessel as well as actions in personam
against its owners. Seemingly, the parentheses were added merely
to show that the amendment was intended for clarification and to
prevent a break in the continuity of a statute turgidly worded from
the outset.
It is generally agreed that the 1953 addition of the second para
graph to Florida's death act,20 was the direct result of the Florida
Supreme Court's 1951 decision in Whitely v. Webb's City, Inc.30 In
that case the court held that a breach of implied warranty of fitness
of a foodstuff was not actionable under Florida's death act which
contemplated only actions ex delicto. The court aligned itself with
the jurisdictions which hold that actions ex contractu are not main
tainable under statutes of the Lord Campbell's type. Though in 1953
legislature no doubt had breach of implied warranty in mind when it
amended the act, it is likely that all deaths attributable to breaches
of contract are now actionable in Florida due to the statute's plain
language.
3. F.S. §768.02 - Parties and Damages. The statutory provision
defining the parties entitled to recovery and the damages recoverable
under the Death Act ( §768.01) was also enacted in 1883.31 Though
this statute was intended to cover the matters contained in Section II
of Lord Campbell's act, it is immediately noted that the legislature
chose to radically depart from the British scheme of compensation.
The act reads as follows today with those portions added subsequent
to 1883 italicized:
768.02 - Parties; damages; proviso.-Every such action
shall be brought by and in the name of the widow or hus
band, as the case may be, and where there is neither
widow nor husband surviving the deceased, then the minor
child or children may maintain an action; and where there
is neither widow nor husband, nor minor child or children,
then the action may be maintained by any person or per
sons dependent on such person killed for a support; and
where there is neither of the above classes of persons to
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sue, then the action may be maintained by the executor or
administrator, as the case may be, of the person killed. In

case of the death of any person solely entitled, or of all
the persons ;ointly entitled to sue, before action brought
or before the recovery of a final ;udgment in action brought
by him or them, the right of action or the action as the
case may be, shall survive to the person or persons next
entitled to sue under this section, and in case of the death
of one or more persons iointly entitled to sue before action
brought or before the recovery of a final ;udgment in an
action brought by them, the right of action or the action,
as the case may be, shall survive to the survivor of such
persons so ;ointly entitled to sue; and in every such action

the jury shall give such damages as the party or parties
entitled to sue may have sustained by reason of the death
of the party killed; provided, that any person or persons to

whom a right of action may survive under the provisions
of this act shall recover such damages as by law such per
son or persons are entitled in t11eir own right to recover,
irrespective of the darnages recoverable by the person or
persons tclwm he or they may succeed.

This statute has been amended a single time when its length was
practically doubled. 3� Since it established a strict hierarchy of bene
ficiaries with the cause of action solely created for the benefit of the
person or persons standing in the specified relationship to the de
ceased, obviously the question would arise as to the disposition of the
cause of action should the beneficiary or beneficiaries primarily en
titled die before the action was brought or before final judgment.
Under the provisions of Lord Campbell's act this question does not
arise since in all cases the decedent's personal representative was to
recover in behalf of all lineal ascendent or descendent beneficiaries
within two degrees of the deceased and actually damaged by the
wrongful death. No doubt the failure of the legislature to originally
anticipate the "survival" problem may be attributed partially to the
absence of such a provision in Lord Campbell's act and partially to
the failure of the legislature to fully appreciate the ramifications of
its singular departure from the usual Lord Campbell provisions with
respect to parties and damages.
The 1907 amendment which added the underlim·d portions was
clearly intended to show that the action contemplated by the legis
lature was a class action with damages measured solely by the injuries
sustained by the members of the class living at final judgment. With
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the death of the member or members of a higher class, it was made
clear that the right of action was to vest immediately in the members
of the class next entitled with damages to be measured only by their
own losses.
No cases have been found which raised the questions alleviated by
this amendment prior to its enactment. It is likely that the 1907
amendment was thus the result of legislative "preventive medicine"
in order to dismiss arguments to the effect that the cause of action
provided survived to the estate of a primary beneficiary, or that the
damages recoverable by lower class beneficiaries should be measured
by those recoverable by the primary class beneficiaries had they sur
vived. In the absence of this amendment, both arguments would have
been plausible.
4. F.S. §768.03 Parties in actions for death of minor child. This
statute is designed to provide a cause of action to the parents of a
child wrongfully killed. Originally enacted in 1899, 33 the act provides
an action to the child's father for loss of his common law right to the
child's services until majority and for the mental pain and suffering
of both parents. In the absence of a father, the mother may bring the
action. Today the statute appears as follows with those portions
subsequently added again italicized:
768.03 Parties in actions for death of minor child; dam
ages.-( 1) Whenever the death of any minor child shall be
caused by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or
default of any individual, or by the wrongful act, negli
gence, carelessness or default of any private association or
persons, or by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness
or default of any officer, agent or employee of any private

association of persons, acting in his capacity as such officer,
agent or employee, or by the wrongful act, negligence,

carelessness or default of any corporation, or by the
wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any
officer or agent, or employee of any corporation acting in
his capacity as such officer, agent or employee, the father
of such minor child, or if the father be not living, the
mother may maintain an action against such individual,
private association of persons, or corporation, and may re
cover, not only for the loss of services of such minor child,
but in addition thereto, such sum for the mental pain and
suffering of the parent ( or both parents) if they survive,
as the jury may assess.
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( 2) The right of action as set forth in subsection ( 1 )
above shall extend to and include actions ex contractu and
ex delicto.
The necessity for adding this enactment to the original statutory
scheme adopted sixteen years before was readily accepted by the
legislature when it was realized that §768.02 prevented an action by
the parents of a deceased child for damages to the parent-child rela
tionship34 since seldom were the parents "...persons dependent on
such person killed for a support.. .." Again it should be noted that
this problem would not have arisen under Section II of Lord Camp
bell's act which involved parents as beneficiaries, and that the neces
sity for a third death statute is directly attributable to the legislature's
unique departure from Section II in defining the parties eligible for
wrongful death compensation.
In 1913, the italicized portions of paragraph one were added to
the statute 3� though in reality it cannot be said that the statute was
amended. These portions were included on the original enrolled bill
which was passed, but were somehow deleted from the Laws of
Florida as published in 1899. This deletion was carried over into the
General Statutes of 1906. No doubt this was the result of someone's
oversight. Nonetheless, the outcome was to limit the potentially
liable parties to corporations and associations. Individuals were left
unaffected.36 In 1913, the wording of the original bill was restored.
The second paragraph providing for ex contractu actions was not
enacted until 1963, 37 exactly ten years after the very same provision
was added to the original death act ( §768.01). There is no valid
reason why the two additions were not enacted at the same time, and
the draftsman of the 1953 amendment to §768.01 probably overlooked
the necessity for a similar addition to §768.03. The 1961 case of
Latimer v. Sears Roebuck and Co. 38 forced the issue when in a lengthy
decision a federal court held that the amendment to §768.01 could
not be applied to §768.03. The statute was amended to allow ex con
tractu actions at the next legislative session.

C. Comparison of Florida death acts and Lord Campbell's Act.

Florida's wrongful death acts are in several ways similar to Lord
Campbell's act. Both acts create an entirely new cause of action when
a death is caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another.
The Florida act replaces "neglect" with "negligence" and adds "care
lessness" as a basis for liability, but these slight variances in wording
are of no legal significance. Both acts also recognize that the cause
of action is that of the named beneficiaries to whom recovery is
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limited with damages to be awarded according to the losses actually
suffered. Recovery is also limited by both statutes to those cases
where the decedent would have had a valid cause of action for per
sonal injuries had death not ensued.
At this point, however, the two statutory schemes clearly diverge.
The similarities noted above prevent the conclusion that the two
statutes are totally dissimilar in theory. 39 Yet, sharp differences
appear in the actual operation of the two enactments. First, it is
immediately noticed that Florida has established a strict hierarchy of
beneficiary classes. 40 This hierarchy determines who possesses the
cause of action, who may bring suit, and who may recover damages.
Lord Campbell's act requires the deceased's personal representative
to bring the action, recovering those damages suffered by the dead
person's lineal relatives within two degrees, the Florida act requires
that the action be brought by the member or members of that hier
archial class having priority as established by the statute and that
damages be limited solely to the members of that class. Also unlike
Lord Campbell's act, Florida does not necessarily limit recovery to
lineal relatives of the deceased, but includes a separate beneficiary
class for any dependent persons. Under Florida's act, the estate of
the decedent also is included as a separate beneficiary class provided
the deceased was not survived by a prior class. Lord Campbell's act
contains no provision for recovery to the estate.
Florida's departure from the usual Lord Campbell provisions was
obviously the result of compromise. No doubt many legislators feared
that courts of the state would he smothered by wrongful death actions
resulting in excessive damages. Others probably felt that Lord Camp
bell's act was too restrictive as to parties allowed to recover. The
compromise remedy finally adopted has bred more ills than it pre
vented,41 but, as one author has noted, other states have had similar
experiences.42
" ( T) he example set by our brothers-in-law across the sea
was followed in the United States, but with many un
fortunate results. Few of the state acts followed Lord
Campbell's Act strictly in language; many used their own
conceptions of what the act was about; :md most were
confused as to the kind of cause of action created. All were
agreed, however, that they had adopted Lord Campbell's
Act or a reasonable facsimile thereof. The result has been
confusion compounded across several states of the United
States. and Florida has not been left untouched."
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V. SURVEY OF AMERICAN DEATH ACTS
AND THE FLORIDA ACTS
A. Acts giving rise to liability. The substantive basis of recovery
for wrongful death must be determined by reference to the language
of any statute purporting to change the common law rule. Lord
Campbell's Act provided that there would be liability for the death
of a person if death resulted from the "...wrongful act, neglect, or
default ..." of the defendant. The statutes of twenty-six states have
adopted this language intact. Of the remaining jurisdictions, most
have only slightly varied the wording while providing essentially the
same basis for recoveryY1 Florida is in the latter category.
Florida Statutes §§768.01 and 768.03 predicate the defendant's
liability upon his "... wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or de
fault..." Why the legislature chose to depart from Lord Campbell's
formulation by inserting "carelessness" as a basis for liability is un
known. The negligent man by definition is careless. Perhaps this
insertion was the result of a desire for statutory originality. More
plausible is the suggestion that it was added to clarify the statute's
purpose by inserting a lay term among legal words of art. The term
has been accorded no special significance by the courts and may be
viewed as surplusage.
l. Torts. It is well settled that the commission of a common law
intentional tort resulting in the victim's death will qualify as a
"wrongful act" for purposes of a wrongful death cause of action.44
If the death is due to circumstances amounting in law to a felony, the
Florida Act expressly prevents the common law doctrine of merger
from operating and thereby extinguishing the civil claim. Likewise,
if the defendant owes a duty of care to the decedent and breaches
that duty causing the decedent's death, an action for wrongful death
may be based on negligence. It is important to recognize that the
duty breached by the defendant is one owed to the decedent, not to
his survivors, even though the losses for which damages. are recover
able are usually those suffered by the survivors.
Whether death is the result of intentional or negligent injury must
be determined under the substantive tort law of each jurisdiction.
Florida law recognizes that an intentional wrongful act causing death
is to be distinguished from negligence and that different defenses may
apply to intentional and negligent acts though they both create the
same cause of action.45
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2. Strict Liability. All jurisdiction recognizing actions for personal
injury based upon strict liability without fault permit a wrongful
death action where a fatality results from such activity. 46 When first
accepted in the United States, strict liability was applied solely to
dangerous activities such as dynamite blasting. The recent trend,
however, has been the extension of strict liability to many inherently
dangerous activities. This has been most striking in the area of defec
tive products liability where a movement has begun to replace breach
of warranty with strict liability. 47 There are indications that Florida
courts have joined in this movement.48 It is possible that further
changes in the direction of increased strict liability will occur in
Florida. Should this development continue, death actions based upon
non-negligent "defaults" for which the defendent is strictly liable
may be allowed by Florida courts.
3. Breach of Contract. It is generally accepted that damages re
sulting from death caused by a breach of contract are not recoverable
under wrongful death statutes of the Lord Campbell type. Recovery
for death due to breach of contract was disallowed at common law,
and it is often stated that wrongful death statutes were intended only
to apply to actions ex delicto. 49 Yet, it might be possible for courts
to consider a breach of contract a "default" in order to render it ac
tionable under the traditional statutory language.
Florida Statutes §§768.01 and 768.03 expressly provide for wrong
ful death actions to extend to "actions ex contractu." The legislative
history of the 1953 amendment adding this additional basis for lia
bility indicates that death actions based on breach of warranty were
mainly contemplated. The clear language of the amendment is not
restrictive, however, and no doubt any breach of contract legally
causing death is actionable under Florida's death acts.50
4. Breach of Warranty. Personal injury actions based upon breach
of warranty have greatly multiplied in recent years due to the ex
panded scope of liability in products liability cases. Breach of war
ranty is a hybrid action containing elements of both contract and tort
theory. Earlier cases, emphasizing the ex contractu nature of warranty
actions, firmly disallowed recovery for wrongful death based upon
breach of warranty.31 The recent trend, however, has been to view
breach of warranty as a non-negligent "default" to which strict lia
bility is applicable. The 1953 amendment to F.S. §768.01 was clearly
intended to allow a wrongful death action on a breach of implied
warranty theory.52
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5. Unseaworthiness. Due care does not discharge the duty of a
shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel for his seamen. Unsea
worthiness is a type of strict liability known only to judge-made
maritime law. 53 This theory of liability provides a cause of action
generally not recognized in state courts since admiralty jurisdiction
is vested in the federal courts.
In the absence of Federal legislation, death actions based upon
maritime personal injuries occurring within the navigable waters of
a state must be brought, if at all, under the provisions of the state
wrongful death act. 54 Assuming it is found that a state's act contem
plates such actions (as Florida's acts expressly do), the state's sub
stantive law is applicable both with respect to the necessary elements
for the cause of action and to available defenses. If the vessel's un
seaworthiness is relied upon as the cause of the fatality, the question
arises whether unseaworthiness can be the basis of a cause of action
under the state's substantive law. The Florida Supreme Court has
recently held, in accordance with the majority of states, that substan
tive principles exclusively maritime in nature are not cognizable in
actions brought under Florida's death acts regardless of the fact that
the decedent could have relied upon those principles had he lived
and sued in the federal courts for personal injuries.�·• This holding
applies both to the complaint based upon unseaworthiness and to the
maritime defense of comparative negligence. 56
B. Theories of Damages. Since monetary compensation is the ob
ject of wrongful death acts, it is not strange that methods of damage
computation present the distinguishing characteristics for classifying
American wrongful death statutes. Nearly all American statutes are
of the Lord Campbell's type with regard to the party liable and to
the necessary acts establishing liability. By contrast, there are various
theories of damage computation which determine who possesses the
cause of action, who is to receive compensation, and what elements
of loss may be recovered.
American wrongful death statutes, then, can be classified according
to how they compensate for the losses caused by a death-producing
act. These losses are of three types. First, there are those damages
personal to the decedent. Secondly, there are those economic losses
consequent upon the decedent's ceasing to function as an economic
unit. The third broad classification of potential damages are those
generated by the non-economic loss of the decedent as a unique
human being who is valued by his family. Though it is true that the
courts and legislatures of the United States have accepted many vary27

ing formulas for compensating these losses, some generalization is
possible.
1. Survival Statutes. Most states provide survival statutes whereby
a cause of action for damages personal to the decedent survives to
his estate.�•• A survival action is conceptually different from a wrong
ful death action since each provides a remedy for a different loss.
Unlike most wrongful death acts, survival statutes provide compen
sation to the personal representative of the deceased for those personal
injuries suffered by the deceased up to the date of death. Needless
to say, recovery is disallowed where the decedent is killed instantly
since no damage to the deceased occurs during his lifetime. Several
jurisdictions have adopted hybrid death acts providing for recovery of
elements of both survival and wrongful death damages.�'8 These have
bred confusion. It is no doubt better policy to prevent more than one
action based upon the same act, but a mixture in a single statute of
two conceptually different theories of damages may be confusing
unless clarity can be achieved through careful legislative drafting.
The elements of damages generally recoverable by a decedent's
personal representative in a survival action are as follows: conscious
pain and suffering, medical expenses, funeral and burial expenses,:rn
and loss of earnings to date of death.
In jurisdictions like Florida where the survival action is separate
and distinct from an action for wrongful death, the recovered dam
ages are assets of the decedent's estate subject to the claims of credi
tors, and distributable by will or intestate succession if there is no will.
2. Loss to Survivors Death Acts. While survival statutes only
compensate the estate of the decedent for those damages personally
suffered by him prior to death, wrongful death acts create a new cause
of action for damages either to the estate or survivors of the deceased
caused by the loss of the deceased as a producing economic unit.
Most death acts also permit damages based upon the loss to his family
of the decedent as a unique individual. There are many elements of
damages which may be considered by a legislature or court when it
attempts to compensate for losses caused by an actionable death, and
without doubt there are many combinations of damage elements pos
sible. As a concession to the shortness of human life, however, let us
generalize with regard to those few combinations which most Ameri
can jurisdictions have found acceptable and from this gain insight
into the underlying policy bases for allowing monetary recovery for
wrongful death.
A majority of state and federal death acts adopt the loss to sur-

28

vivors theory of damages. Even where the particular act does not
specify how damages should be computed, the courts have generally
accepted this theory. The reason fo1· this weight of authority is
partially found in the fact that Lord Campbell's Act expressly pro
vided for damages "...proportional to the injury ..." to specifically
designated beneficiaries. More convincing is the consideration that
the law should most interest itself in the protection of the living who
have been injured by the decedent's death. Damages should be com
puted with an eye toward the losses of those dependents who will
actually receive compensation and not toward the decedent or his
estate.
Though Lord Campbell's Act provided a rather broad standard for
jury awards, it was judicially restricted to pecuniary damages only
without any recovery for "sentimental" losses.6" Most American juris
dictions adopting Lord Campbell's type statutes provide that damages
are to be computed in accordance with the losses �uffered by the
decedent's survivors. A majority of these have also restricted recovery
to pecuniary losses, either by statutory provision or by judicial con
struction of general language. This restriction is for the most part
illusory, however, since many courts have been willing to allow the
jury to place a pecuniary value upon items difficult to evaluate such
as loss of services, companionship, and training. Generally, the pecu
niary loss restriction has been applied to prevent recovery for mental
pain and anguish of the survivors.
Damages under the loss to survi\'ors theory, then, are awarded for
the pecuniary value reduced to pre�ent worth of the probable con
tributions to support which the deceased would have made to the
survivors had he lived and for the value of the services which the
decedent normally would have rendered to the survivors. In most
states this includes the value of a parent's training, guidance, com
panionship, and education. These items of damages are computed
based upon the joint life expectancies of both the decedent and each
individual beneficiary. In addition, some states allow recovery for
the present value of the probable inheritance the survivors would
have received had the decedent lived out his normal life span. In
those states having hybrid survival-death statutes, the decedent's
medical and funeral expenses are often allowed.
Florida's death acts incorporate the loss to survivors theory of dam
ages. This is singularly complicated, however, by the strict hierarchy
of beneficiary classes which F.S. §768.02 erects and by the inclusion
of the decedent's estate as a separate beneficiary class in the absence
of living dependents. Like Lord Campbell's Act, the Florida statutes,
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except for the Wrongful Death of Minors Act ( F.S. §768.03), provide
little guidance for damage computation. This has resulted in much
litigation with questionable results, which the Florida courts have
recognized.
Unlike most jurisdictions which usually allow recovery by all de
pendents of the decedent, Florida prevents recovery except to those
highest in the beneficiary hierarchy. Damage computations are de
pendent upon the identity of the person suing. All persons in fact
dependent upon the decedent may recover the present value of lost
support or services61 provided, of course, that they are members of
the class entitled to bring suit. In the case of a surviving spouse,
damages are also allowed for lost comfort, protection, society, com
panionship and consortium.62 In addition, a surviving widow may
recover the loss of that amount which she may reasonably have ex
pected to receive as a legacy from her husband's estate.63 Though
Florida does not subscribe to the "pecuniary loss" restriction, a sur
viving spouse may not recover for mental pain and suffering.64 In an
action by minor children, loss of attention, care, comfort, education
and moral training may be compensated6;; as well as lost services
and support. Where the decedent is a minor child, F.S. §768.03
authorizes a separate cause of action for the parents who would ordi
narily be unable to bring themselves within one of the beneficiary
classes of F.S. §768.02. In an action by a parent, the allowable re
covery includes loss of the child's services to majority and mental
pain and suffering of both parents. In such a situation, there may
also be a cause of action under F.S. §768.01 on behalf of the minor
decedent's estate.66
3. Loss to estate death acts. There are basically four types of
death acts which measure damages either wholly or partially by the
loss sustained by the decedent's estate. Eight jurisdictions have
enacted hybrid survival-death acts which are essentially survival ac
tions for the decedent's personal injuries expanded to include damages
for wrongful death. Since the cause of action is viewed technically as
a survival to the decedent's estate with wrongful death losses added,
damages are entirely measured by loss to the estate and are recovered
for the benefit of the estate. Although recovery is to the estate, most
statutes of this type require distribution to designated statutory bene
ficiaries. Others, however, treat the recovery as personal property
of the estate distributable either by will or intestate succession after
payment of debts of the decedent.
The remaining three classes of statutes allowing recovery measured
by the loss to decedent's estate are distinguishable from the hybrid
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survival-death statutes in that they create an entirely new cause of
action. Like most "true" death acts, these statutes do not recognize
the cause of action as merely a legal survival of the decedent's estate.
The first group of these statutes are those of the Lord Campbell
type which provide only general directions for damage computation
by the jury. In several states, the language has been judicially con
strued to measure damages by loss to the decedent's estate although,
once recovered, the damages are immediately distributed to the
designated statutory beneficiaries without becoming property of the
estate subject to debts and testamentary dispositions.
A second group of "true" death acts measure damages by loss to
survivors, but in addition allow the decedent's personal representative
to recover certain losses to the estate. These generally are losses
resulting from the injury and death such as funeral and medical ex
penses. Generally, this type of death act is found in jurisdictions
either without survival statutes or with death acts expressly preempt
ing the survival cause of action.
The last group of loss to estate death acts measure damages by loss
to survivors where they exist, but provide for loss to the estate under
specified circumstances. One is Florida's, which provides that if the
decedent is not survived by statutory beneficiaries the action "may be
maintained by the executor or administrator ...of the person killed."
Under statutes of this type loss to the estate in general may be re
covered.
There are three different theories of damage measurement utilized
where loss to estate is recoverable. The least important of the three
is a recovery based upon the decedent's probable gross earnings re
duced to present value and without deduction for decedent's personal
living expenses. Only a few states accept this method of measure
ment, and of these it is suspected that there is a desire to compensate
beneficiaries for "sentimental" losses in a disguised manner. Georgia,
for example, permits recovery of the gross estate only where the action
is brought by the spouse or child of the decedent or by the parents of
a minor decedent.
The most popular theory of loss to estate measurement is that
monetary damages should represent the present value of decedent's
probable future net earnings. This figure is found by determining the
probable future gross earnings of the decedent over his life expectancy
and deducting therefrom his probable personal living expenses. The
figure is then discounted to present value.
Another theory of recovery to the estate subscribed to by several
states is to measure damages by the present value of decedent's prob31

able future accumulations. 67 This is the Florida position when there
is no survivor in the three prior classes. Like the probable "net in
come" theory, this method of measurement relies solely on probable
business income without regard to possible investment income.68 The
future accumulations theory, however, requires that the jury deter
mine the amount of decedent's net earnings he would have saved and
left at his death as part of his estate. Though it is indeed a fine line
which separates the "net earning" theory from the "future accumu
lations" theory, the latter seems more equitable since the jury must
not only evaluate the decedent's propensity to earn but also his pro
pensity to save. In Florida, the jury is allowed to consider the habits,
skill, age, and health of the decedent in determining his probable
accumulations.6n This approach is probably more difficult to apply,
however, since the jury must objectively evaluate the subjective per
sonality traits of the decedent.
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VI. DEFECT S IN THE FLORIDA LAW OF
WRONGFUL DEATH
Grave difficulties were created by the unique departure from the
usual Lord Campbell provisions in F.S. §768.02. The strict hierarchy
of beneficiary classes created by this enactment, in the final analysis,
must be recognized as the most serious defect. Florida's death acts
have caused so much injustice and confusion that the Supreme Court
has been prompted to request legislative revision.70 The ideal death
act should require the tortfeasor to respond in one civil action for the
actual losses of those living dependents of the deceased. The wrong
ful death laws of Florida do not achieve this ideal. Further, a great
deal of unfairness is possible in Florida to both dependents of the
deceased and the tortfeasor.
A. Mechanics. Rather than one comprehensive death act providing
for one civil action, Florida has four acts that may come into play
when a person causes a fatal injury, and they create three different
causes of action. The survival statute provides recovery of those
damages personal to the decedent suffered prior to death.71 These
include medical and funeral expenses, lost earnings, and mental pain
and suffering. This cause of action survives to the decedent's estate
and may be brought by his personal representative.
An additional cause of action is created upon death by F.S. §768.01
for the injuries sustained by the survivors of the decedent.F.S.§768.02
provides a hierarchy of beneficiary classes that determines who may
sue, who may share in the recovery, and, to some extent, what losses
will be compensated. This hierarchy is as follows:
( I) surviving spouse; (2) minor children; ( 3) other dependent per
sons; and ( 4) the decedent's estate. Actually, "estate" is not men
tioned; rather, the statute provides that the action may be maintained
"by the executor or administrator ...of the person killed". The cause
of action is vested exclusively in the highest beneficiary class. Mem
bership in the highest class has been recognized as an essential
element of the cause of action.72 Members of a lower class cannot
sue even if the existing class having priority refuses to do so;73 the
cause of action cannot be assigned to those of a lower class; 74 and
only members of the class with priority may recover damages after
having alleged and proven the non-existence of a higher class.75 Unless
the beneficiary suing under the death acts is also the decedent's
personal representative, the tortfeasor must respond to two separate
actions, one for wrongful death and one for surviving personal in-
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juries. Even if such joinder is possible, it is not compulsory and the
plaintiff may elect to afflict the defendant with two lawsuits.
The damages recoverable under the Florida death acts depend
upon the identity of the person suing. These may be briefly sum
marized according to each statutory class:
( 1) Survi\'ing spouse - lost financial support, services, comfort,
protection, society and corsortium. Lost inheritance and the
existence of minor children may be considered if the support
of the minor children has been thrust upon the surviving
spouse by the death of the husband and father.
( 2) �linor children - lost financial support, services, attention, care,
companionship, and educational and moral training.
( 3) Other dependent persons - lost support and service only. Dam
age� for these three classes arc computed according to the "loss
to survivors" theory.
( 4) Decedent's estate - lost savings that decedent probably would
h,we accumulated had he lived.
The inclusion of the decedent's estate as the last beneficiary class
produces a switch to the "loss to estate" theory of damages and, of
course, is dependent upon the non-existence of any person dependent
upon the deceased.
Under Florida's fourth act affecting the problem, F.S. §768.03 pro
vides the parents of a deceased minor child with a third and distinct
cause of action for loss of the common law right to the child's services
and for mental pain and suffering. This is the only death statute pro
viding explicit directions for damage awards and the only one under
which mental pain and suffering of the plaintiffs may be recovered.
This Wro11gf11/ Deatl1 of Minors Act was created due to the short
comings produced by the beneficiary hierarchy of F.S. §768.02 since
seldom were the parents dependents of their minor children. The
problems presented by F.S. §768.03 are a product of the flaws in the
earlier death legislation of Florida.
A had feature of F.S. §768.03 is that it can result in further multi
plicity of suits. Though as a practical matter minors seldom have
dependents or personal representatives other than their parents, it
is not impossible that a tortfeasor would have to respond to three
separate civil actions by three separate plaintiffs. Assuming a working
minor with a dependent friend or relative other than a parent and
who has appointed a personal representative other than a parent by
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will, two separate death actions and a separate survival action are
theoretically possible. Three causes of action in favor of a parent of
a deceased minor child are common, an<l it is possible for the plain
tiff to sue on them separately. Obviously, the possibility of harrass
ment of the defendant exists.
B. Factual examples. The defects in Florida's death acts can be
illustrated by examples. To show the mechanics of the act, assume
that H, a middle aged man, is negligently killed by T and is surviYe<l
by a wife, W, a minor son, S, and a minor daughter, D. H also sup
ports his elderly mother, M, who resides with the family. Under
Florida law, only \V may maintain a death action for damages ex
clusively personal to her. Although it has long been held that the
existence of minor children may be considered by the jury}'; \Vs
recovery is strictly for her only without a portion allowed exelusively
to the children as such. The mother and children of H are without
remedy for their loss due to the e...:istence of \V. Yet, their losses are
no less real. This unfairness can be intensified by assuming the fol
lmdng: ( 1) \V is a second wife to II and a stepmother to the chil
dren, and she either chooses not to sue or sues only for herself since
she is not re,ponsible for the children's support, or ( 2) D is an ado
le,cent girl who suffers severe psychological trauma due to her father's
death and rerg1ire, psychiatric help. In both cases there is no re
coYery by the children though their actual lo"e, may be great. The
existence of W also precludes any recovery to the e,tate except under
the survival statute, which may produce little for the children after
creditors han· been satisfied, and there will be no survival action if
the death was instantaneous.
Multiplicity of law suits is possible by the fact that both W and
the decedent's personal representative may be different persons who
must sue T separately, or, even if the same person, may elect to pro
ceed in two separate actions. It has already been shown how the
death of a minor may result in a third lawsuit. Assuming that three
interests which the law should protect have been damaged, there is
still no sound reason why all three losses cannot he asserted in one
civil action.
Another factual example will point out the unsatisfactory situation
with regard to damages presented hy the Florida death acts. X is a
nineteen year old youth fatally injured due to T's negligence who dies
after a brief ,tay in the hospital. To oversimplify, it is assumed that
X's gross lifetime earnings may be found to be $200,000 when reduced
to present ya)ue. The personal representative of X may recover for
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the mental pain and suffering of X as well as for his lost earnings to
date of death and medical expenses. He will also recover funeral
expenses. If X is survived by a wife, she may recover that portion of
the $200,000 which the jury reasonably believes would have been
spent for her support had X lived. Assuming that X has two small
children, that portion of X's probable gross earnings that would have
been spent on them is not recoverable except as part of the wife's
damages. Similarly, no recovery will be allowed X's estate for that
portion of the $200,000 which X probably would have accumulated
as savings though this amount would have been recoverable by his
estate ( fourth class) had X not been survived by immediate depend
ents. The anomolous result, according to the Florida Supreme Court
is that "... the wrongdoer (is) required to respond in a less amount
of damages if the injured person dies, than if the injured person sur
vives ..."n since if X had lived with a total and permanent disability
he would be allowed to recover the present entire value of the
$200,000 as impaired earning capacity in addition to his other personal
injury damage elements.
A further anomaly results from the fact that a person's earnings
normally are spent on family and personal expenses with only the
remainder being accumulated as savings. The more dependents a
person has, the less he will probably accumulate. F.S. §768.02 allows
but one class of dependents to recover to the exclusion of all others.
Yet when the decedent is survived by no dependents, his personal
representative may recover the entire net estate as accumulated sav
ings, which may be disproportionately large in the absence of de
pendents. As the Florida Supreme Court has again pointed out, in
many cases " ... it might be said that it is cheaper to kill a person
who leaves a spouse or child . . . than it is to kill a person who is
survived by no one..."78 Seemingly, the Florida death acts are capa
ble of discriminating against those persons whom the law should
most zealously protect in favor of collateral kin, who receive not sup
port but a windfall. Stated otherwise, recoveries are small where
actual losses are great, and recoveries are large where actual losses
are small. This is indefensible.
This problem becomes particularly disturbing in the case of the
wrongful death of a minor child. The parents of the dead child are
given a cause of action by F.S. §768.03 for the value of the child's
services during minority and for mental pain and suffering presumably
because F.S. §768.01 does not permit mental pain and suffering to be
recovered and F.S. §768.02 does not even include parents as a class
that can sue as such. There is also an action arising under F.S.§768.01,
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and usually the only class in existence will be the estate. So the father
of the dead child can recover as personal representative of the child's
estate the lost accumulations of the child figured from his majority
and this amount will be distributed to the child's parents under
Florida's laws of intestate succession. As noted in the preceeding
paragraph, the probable accumulated savings of a person without de
pendents-and minors usually are-may be found to be very great.
Add this recovery to that possible under F.S. §768.03, and it may be
concluded that Florida's death acts theoretically allow the highest
recovery in the case of a minor's death where he is survived by par
ents but by no dependent persons. Parents of minor children, there
fore, may not only recover larger pecuniary damages than dependents
of decedents generally, but, unlike a surviving spouse and children,
are also allowed recovery for mental pain and suffering. This borders
on the ridiculous when it is realized that parents are seldom viewed
as the primary objects of a person's bounty and that parents seldom
need such large recoveries. Why should it be more expensive to kill
a minor on whom no one is dependent for support than to kill a
breadwinning husband and father?79
The theoretical flaws pointed out above have, of course, been held
in check to a great extent by the common sense of jurors and by the
watchful eye of judges, trial and appellate, which discourage exces
sive verdicts, but that is no excuse for the death acts of Florida to
embody such an irrational and distorted view of public policy. They
should, as a minimum requirement, present a picture of theoretical
consistency in order to aid the courts, which have trouble enough
with the facts of individual cases without having to be concerned
with faulty statutes. The Florida death acts have failed to supply our
judges and juries with a consistent theory of damage recovery that
accords with common sense and public opinion. Large awards where
no one needs it, and small awards where there are many dependents
is nonsense.
C. Miscellaneous problems. There are several other problems with
regard to wrongful death worthy of legislative consideration. Some
of these have been presented to our courts and have been reasonably
resolved by them even though Florida's death acts do not expressly
deal with them.
With regard to damages, recovery for the mental pain and suffering
of the surviving spouse or children of the decedent has been dis
allowed under the Florida acts. 80 Though it is the general rule today
that damages of this type are not recoverable under the "loss to sur37

vivors" theory, the Legislature of Florida in the Wrongful Death of
Minors Act ( F.S. §768.03) has clearly manifested a belief that these
damages do occur and can be ernluated. Most jurisdictions refuse to
allow the mental anguish type of damage because the courts say there
is no precise method for arriving at a monetary eYaluation. The flaw
in this argument lies in the fact that a majority of jurisdictions allow
recovery for lost companionship, an element of loss that is also clearly
without a price tag. It is also worth noting that, to a large extent,
all losses caused by a wrongful death are somewhat speculative. Per
haps the best explanation for the disallowance of mental pain and
suffering is a distrust of the jury's competence to arrh·e at a just award
based upon an element of damages that is negative in quality. The
emotional effects of a death upon dose relatives is distinguishable
from those more positive elements of damages such as the money and
scrYices that the decedent would have contributed to the survivors
had lw lived. Yet, most juries at present have adequate opportunity
to make awards based upon sentiment and sympathy, and the addi
tion of one more "non-pecuniary" element of loss could make little
difference. The justice of such an addition, on the other hand, would
particularlr manifest itself in those cases where the dependent's men
tal damage has resulted in positively identifiable physical or psychi
atric illness. These damages can reasonably be established through
expert medical testimony. Medical science is not so helpless in assess
ing mental anguish and its effects as it was when the rule disallowing
this damage element ,rns adopted by the courts.
Another problem is the protection of the decedent's general credi
tors. General creditors of the decedent have priority in survival statute
recoveries as against the decedent's survivors. Further, all wrongful
death recowries by the estate in the absence of dependents under
F.S. §768.02 are subject to the claims of creditors. The problem arises
solely in the case of the surviving spouse who may recover her lost
inheritance without its being subject to the claims of creditors. Firmly
established is the legal policy that no beneficiary of an estate should
be allowed to receive his legacy prior to the satisfaction of decedent's
creditors.
The problem of creditors' claims cannot be discussed without also
considering the question of recovery for lost inheritance by statutory
beneficiaries other than widmYs. Probable inheritance of statutory
beneficiaries is recognized in the majority of "loss to !>urYivors" juris
dictions as a valid e-.;pectancy to he legally protected. Florida courts
allow recovery for a widow's probable inheritance, but not for that
of minor children or other dependents. The difficulty with computing
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lost inheritance i, that the jur). in addition to computing the other
losses to survivors, must also determine the dccP<lenfs probable ac
cumulations and the likelihood of a portion lwing left to the particular
beneficiary. Yet. if this difficulty is not controlling where widows are
concerned, why are children not allowed a recm-cry of their expect
ancy also'?
The allowance of an inheritance recovery under the "loss to sur
vivors" theory may be undesirable in two respects. First, it permits
payment of what is much like a legacy direct to the beneficiary with
out its having passed through the decedent's estate thereby becoming
subject to the claims of creditors. Secondly. it may be unfair to the
defendant, whose liability may be based on simple negligence, to be
required to act as an insurer of a legacy to the parents or collateral
relatives of an unmarried decedent who neither need nor expect such
a windfall since they would not normally he the objects of the dece
dent's bounty. One solution to this problem would be to shift a "loss
to estate" theory w (lS to permit. as additional damages, recovery hy
the personal representative of the net accumulations for purposes of
preserving expectancies. 81 This recovery would be subject to the
claims of creditors. distributable by will or by intestacy, and could
be disallowed except where the decedPnt is survived by a spouse or
children, the most natural objects of his bounty.
Another aspect of the wrongful death problem not clearly covered
by Florida's death acts concerns the rights of adopted and illegitimate
children.
In summary, the following are the major problem areas in Florida's
death acts:
( 1) The strict hierarchy of beneficiary classes established by F.S.
§768.02, which blocks recovery of real losses.
( 2) The possibility of multiple causes of action based on a single
tortious act resulting in court congestion, complexity, and pos
sible harrassment.
( .3) The absence of guides for damages computation including a
specification of recoyerable elements.
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HEVISION
I. Replace the three death acts with a comprehensive \Vrongful
Death Act.
2. The comprehensive act should be remedial, not punitive, and
a policy statement should require a liberal interpretation where jus
tice demands.
3. The personal representative of the decedent should recover on
behalf of all eligible survivors and the estate, if the estate is to re
cover, in one civil action. If there is to be a recovery on behalf of
all beneficiaries, the personal representative of the decedent is the
most logical plaintiff.
4. Although the act should contain an expanded "loss to survivors''
theory of damages, a recovery should be allowed the estate for losses
heretofore allowed under the survival statute, and lost accumulations
should be recoverable to the estate under certain defined circum
stances. No longer should a separate surviving cause of action be
allowed the estate for personal injuries of the deceased where the
injury has resulted in a wrongful death, but all damages would be
recoverable in the wrongful death action.
5. Potentially liable parties should be simplified to specify any
person or watercraft. This would neither contract nor expand those
parties presently liable, and would dispense with some of the admi
ralty terms and turgid language currently found in F.S. §768.01.
6. Liability should be based upon the wrongful act, negligence,
default, or breach of contract or warranty of the defendant. "Care
lessness" as a term of art is synonomous with "negligence" and omit
ting it will leave the meaning unchanged. As to "breach of contract,"
there is no reason to write Florida statutes in Latin. "Warranty" needs
to be mentioned to avoid confusion arising from developments in
strict liability.
7. No wrongful death action should be recognized except in those
cases where the decedent could have recovered for personal injuries
had he survived.
8. Damages should be calculated from the time of in;ury, not from
the time of death. This will permit the recovery of damages now
recoverable in a separate survival action for personal injury, except
for pain and suffering of the decedent. This recognizes the fact that
the dead are beyond compensation for either physical or mental suf-
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fering. The personal representative should also be allowed to recover
on behalf of the decedent's survivors in the following manner utilizing
the "loss to survivors" theory:
a. A spouse and all blood relatives dependent in whole or in part
upon the decedent should be allowed to recover the full value of lost
support and services calculated from the time of injury to date of
judgment plus interest. The present value of future lost support and
services may also be recovered.
b. A surviving spouse should also recover for lost companionship
and protection as well as for mental pain and suffering to be calcu
lated from the date of injury. Loss of consortium should not be com
pensated as such since this legal term of art is misunderstood by many
jurors to represent merely sexual activity.
c. Surviving minor children also should be allowed to recover lost
parental companionship, instruction, and guidance. A recovery for
their mental pain and suffering should also be recoverable from the
date of injury. The recovery should not be restricted to legitimate
children.
d. Parents of a deceased minor child should also be allowed to
recover mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.
9. Those damages recoverable by the personal representative on
behalf of the estate utilizing the "loss to estate" theory should include
the following:
a. Loss of earnings of the decedent from the date of injury to the
date of death less lost support of survivors. These losses should not
be computed beyond the death unless the decedent is survived by a
spouse or lineal descendants. If this is the case, net accumulations
should also be calculated for the decedent's life expectance and re
duced to present value. Any recovery of net accumulations should be
distributed either by will or the Florida probate law after having first
satisfied the claims of creditors.
b. Hospital and medical expenses and funeral expenses should be
recoverable by the personal representative or by a survivor who has
actually paid them.
c. The decedent's pain and suffering should not be allowed since
this element of damage has had substituted for it the pain and suffer
ing of close relatives.
10. Each survivor's share shall be separately stated in the verdict
of the trier, and the recovery allowed the estate shall also be sepa
rately stated.
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11. The court in its discretion should be allowed to protect the
amounts recovered for minor children and incompetents by the per
sonal representative.
12. Compromise settlements must receive court approval to be
effective if any survivor is a minor or incompetent or if any survivor
objects to the proposed compromise.
13. The award to each survivor and the estate should each bear
a share of the expenses of litigation including attorney fees in pro
portion to the amount awarded to each.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wrongful deaths acts throughout the United States are in a state
of disarray.

Florida's is no exception. so,ne of the results that are

possible under the wrongful death legislation of Florida can only be
fairly described as deplorable.

The Florida courts have increasingly

called attention to these defects, and some of the recent Judicial calls
for legislative help have had a plaintive and desperate quality.
An impressive effort to answer the calls for help occurred in 1957
with the publication of "The Florida Death Acts" by Leo H. Alpert, Esq.,
in 10 University of Florida Law Review 153 (1957). Mr. Alpert concluded
his article with a bill introduced in the 1957 Legislature by Messrs.
Sweeny and l<arl of Volusia County, which would have completely rewritten
F.S. Section 768.02 in order to eliminate some of the defects.
killed in co111111lttee.

It was

It Is hoped that this current effort will meet

a better fate.
Another very valuable study entitled "Florida's Wrongful Death
Law:

Time for a Change" was written by David K. Deitrich, Esq., when

he was a law student at the University of Florida.

It may be found in

18 University of Florida Law Review 637 (1966).
There are several things wrong with the wrongful death sftuatfon
In Florida, but suffice it to say here that Florida's current position
seems to be to minimize recoveries when there are many dependents left

- 5 offense.6 Accidental or involuntary homicides wete not treated as fel
onies since they lacked the necessary mental element, but the defendant's
property nonetheless was forfeited to the state-originally as deodand.7
Hornocides of this nature were called killings per lnfortuniu�8 and were
not considered crimes but �isfortunes. 9 "Yet, because the king hath
lost his subject, and that men should be more careful, he (defendant)
forfeits his goods•••• 1110

No action for damages was allowed the deceased's survivors mainly
because his goods being forfeit, the defendant was left "judgment p�oof. 1 1

The merger doctrine, that a tort merges into a felony, Is no doubt
derived from this situation.
It is generally agreed that the Baker v. Bolton decision was the
product of Lord Ellenborough's confusion between two separate legal
doctrines, that expressed by the maxim actlo personalis moritur cum
persona (personal actions die with the person) and that of merger.

The

first was certainly not applicable since the plaintiff was suing in his
own behalf and not as the decedent's personal representative.

The rnerger

doctrine was also a poor basis for denying plaintiff his remedy since
merger operated only where the act causing death was of a criminal
nature, thus requiring forfeiture of the defendant's goods.11
pointed out by Dean Prosser, Lord Ellenborough's

11 • • •

But as

forte was never common

sense••. 12
C.

The rule in America.

Baker v. Bolton, with its rule based

neither upon precedent nor logic, was accepted by nearly all American

courts though there Is much evidence of hesltation.13 Baker was followed
in Massachusetts as early as 1848,14 and Hawaii seems to be the only

- 6 American Jurisdiction where an early rejectfon of the rule has not been
overc0111e

by

later decision.IS

Being hesitant to accept an irratfonal proposition of law, American
courts resorted to makeweight arguments on behalf of the Baker rule. All
of these argurnents revolved around the "nurnberless actions11 for damages
of an "awful magnitude" which would result from a contrary rule,16 and

the Impossibility of calculating the pecuniary value of a lffe.1 7 These
arguments carry little conviction when it is realized that most of them

were advanced subsequent to Britain's legislative renunciation In: 1846
of the old rule that no action exists.
As one noted author has pointed out, the effect of Lord Ellenborough's
faulty analysis upon the common Jaw was to make it

11 • • •

lllOre profitable

for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him.1118 Yet,
it is questionable whether the fault lies with Lord Ellenborough or
with those American Judges who followed the rule without subjecting
it to a fresh and penetrating analysis.
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111.
A.

STATUTORY REMEDIES FOR DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT

Lord Campbell's Act. The first remedy for wrongful death was

created in England in 1846 by the enactment of Lord Campbell's Act.
This act reads as follows:

9

& 10 Viet Ch 93. Act for compensating the Families of
Persons killed by Accidents

Whereas no Action at Law is now maintainable against a Person
who by his wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default may have caused
the Death of another Person, and it is oftentirnes right and
expedient that the Wrong-doer In such Case should be answer
able in Damages for the injury so caused by him: Be it there
fore enacted by the Queen's rnost excellent Majesty, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Te1T1poral
and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, by the
Authority of the same, That whensoever the Death of a Person
shall be caused by wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default, and the
Act, Neglect, or Default is such as would (if Death had not
ensued) have entitled the Party injured to maintain an Action
and recover Damages in respect thereof, then and In every
such Case the Person who would have been liable If Death
had not ensued shall be liable to an action for Damages, not•
withstanding the Death of the Person injured and although
the Death shall have been caused under such Circumstances as
amount in Law to Felony.
II. And be it enacted, That every such Action shall be for
the Benefit of the Wife, Husband, Parent, and Child of the
Person whose Death shall have been so caused, and shall be
brought by and in the name of the Executor or Administrator
of the Person deceased; and in every such Action the Jury may
give such Damages as they may think proportioned to the
Injury resulting from such Death to the Parties respectively
for whom and for whose Benefit such Action shall be brought;
and the Amount so recovered, after deducting the Cost not
recovered from the Defendant, shall be divided amongst the
beforementioned Parties in such Shares as the Jury by their
Verdict shall find and direct.
Ill. Provided always, and be it enacted, That not rnore than
One Action shall lie for and in respect of the same Subject
Matter of Complaint, and that every such Action shall be
c01m1enced within Twelve Calendar Months after the Death of
such deceased Person.

- 8 IV. And be it enacted, That in every such Action the Plaintiff
on the Record shall be required, together with the Declaration
to deliver to the Defendant or his Attorney a full Particular
of the Person or persons for whorn and on whose Behalf such
Action shall be brought, and of the Nature of the Claim in
respect of which Damages shall be sought to be recovered.
V. And be it enacted, That the following Words and Expres•
sions are intended to have the Meanings hereby assigned to
them respectively, so far as such Meanings are not excluded
by the Context or by the nature of the Subject Matter; that
is to say, Words denoting the Singular Number are to be under
stood to apply also to the Plurality of Persons or Things; and
Words denoting the Masculine Gender are to be understood to
apply also to Persons of the Feminine Gender; and the Word
"Person" shal 1 apply to bodies Politlc and Corporate; and
the Word "Parent" shalI include Father and Mother, and Grand•:
father and Grandmother, and Stepfather and Stepmother, and
the Word "Child" shall include Son and Daughter, and Grandson
and Granddaughter, and Stepson and Stepdaughter.
VI. And be it enacted, That this Act shall come into opera•
tion from and i1T11T1ediately after the issuing thereof, and that
nothing therein contained shall apply to the Part of the
United Kingdom called Scotland.
VII. And be it enacted, That this Act may be amended or
repealed by any Act to be passed in this session of Parlia•
ment.
1.

Parliamentary intent.

No doubt the inherent injustice of

denying a cause of action for death due to another's wrongful act was
the motivating factor behind the enactment of this act.

As the act's

title and preamble state, it was designed to provide compensation for
the fa111ilies of those persons killed " ••• since it is oftentimes right
and expedient that the Wrongdoer ••• be answerable in Damages for the
Injury so caused by him

...

II

It must have resulted,at least in part,

from a recognition that the rule denying an action for a tortious killing
was an accident of history.
2.

Distinctive features of the Act.

Briefly stated, Lord Campbell's

act provides that whenever a person's death ls-caused by the wrongful

- 9 act, neglec� or default of another under circumstances that would have
entitled the party injured to sue for personal injuries had death not
ensued, an action may be brought within one year of his death in the
name of his personal representative solely for the benefit of certain
relatives of the deceased. These relatives include the wife, husband,
parents (including stepparents and grandparents), and children (includ
ing stepchildren and grandchildren).

Parties liable under the act include

bodies politic and corporate as well as individuals.

The total

award is

to be determined by the jury according to the damages they may think
resulted to the persons for whose benefit the action is brought.

This

total award, however, is to be divided a•nong the beneficiaries by the
personal representative as the jury may direct.
Those features of the act of greatest significance theoretically
are the following:

{I) an entirely new cause of action was

created

when

death resulted fr0t11 the wrongful act, neglect,or default of another; (2)
the new cause of action was limited to those cases where the deceased
would have had a valid cause of action for personal injuries had death not
ensued; (3) though the action could be brought only In the name of the
deceased's personal representative, the cause of action was actually
that of the named beneficiaries to whom recovery was limited; and (4)
damages were to be measured and awarded only with respect to the losses
suffered by the beneficiaries disregarding any losses, either tangible
or intangible, to the decedent or his estate.
8.

Florida's acts affecting wrongful death.

Lord Campbell's Act

was followed by the enactment in many states and in Canada of statutes
modeled after it.

Florida, 1 ikewise, created an action for wrongful

death during the late 19th century.

• 10 -

I. Survival Statute. At conmon Jaw, not only was a remedy for
wrongful death denied, bu� similarly, there was a failure to provide a
remedy for personal injuries to a person who died either before bringing
or before completing a personal injury action.

Just as British and

American wrongful death statutes of the Lord Campbell's type attempted
to create a cause of action for wrongful death. "survival statutes''
were enacted to provide a remedy for personal injuries where the Injured per•
son

died.

Florida's survival statute presently reads as follows:

F.S, §46.021

Actions; surviving death of party

No cause of action dies with the person. All causes of
action survive and may be commenced, prosecuted and defended
In the name of the person prescribed by Jaw.
Survival statutes are conceptually different from wrongful death acts
since the former permit recovery by the deceased's personal representa•
tive for those Injuries sustained by the decedent prior to death and the
latter provide recovery for the injuries sustained by survivors because
of the death itself. The prime difference between the two types of
statutes is that the survival statute continues in existence the claim of
the deceased himself as an asset of his estate, while the wrongful death
statute creates a new claim based upon the death rather than the personal
injury, usually for the benefit of the deceased's heirs or next of kin.
Florida's survival statute Is mentioned at this point solely to
show that the death of a person due to injuries received at the hands of
a wrongdoer may result in more than one cause of action based upon the
same tortious act.

A more thorough discussion of the survival statute,

including the damages recoverable thereunder, will be included In a later
section of this report.
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Legislative history of the 1915 amend•nent is apparently nonexistent2 3

though its general intent is clearly manifested by the parenthetical word
ing. An established principle of maritime law, as well as of common law,

Is that there is no cause of action for wrongful death due to the tortious

acts of another In the absence of state or federal enabling leglslatlon. 24
At the time of the 1915 amendment there were no federal acts providing a
right of action for wrongful death occurring on navigable waters within

a state's territorial llmits.25 However, as early as 1886, the United

States Supreme Court held that in cases involving maritime wrongf,ul death
within the territorial limits of a state federal courts were obliged to
enforce state created wrongful death actions but that the

11 • • •

right

was subject to the limitations which have been made a part of its exist

ence ••.• 1126 Thus, whenever a I ibel

.Lu�

was brought against a ves-

sel in ad,niralty for wrongful death, the preliminary question facing
federal courts was whether the state's wrongful death act contemplated

vessels as potential defendants.27 Since most state statutes seemed to
provide only

l!! personam

actions, plaintiffs were always in danger of

suffering adverse holdings based on the wording of the particular statute
involved.

Undoubtedly, the parenthetical additions to Florida's death

act were intended to serve

a

dual purpose:

(I) to make clear the fact

that the act created a cause of action for maritime torts resulting In
wrongful death cognizable in admiralty as well as under Florida's sub
stantive law; 28 and (2) to assure federal admiralty courts that the act
contemplated actions
tions

l!!. personam

J.n. !!!!!

against the offending vessel as well as ac

against Its owners.

Seemingly, the parenthesis were

added merely to show that the amend�ent was intended for clarification

- I1 2. F.S. §768.01 - Florida's Death Act. Florida's statute creating

a cause of action for wrongful death was originally passed in l883.19
A second provision, passed simultaneously, named the parties to the

action and defined the damages to be recovered,20 The current form of
Florida's operative death act, roughly corresponding to Section I of
Lord Campbell's act, appears as follows:
768.01 - Right of action for death.-(1) Whenever the death of
any person in this state shall be caused by the wrongful act,
negligence, carelessness or default of any individual or in
dividuals, or by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness
or default of any corporation, or by the wrongful act, negJi�
gence, carelessness, or default, of any agent of any corpora
tion, acting in his capacity of agent of such corporation
(or by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default,
of any ship, vessel or boat or persons employed thereon), and
the act, negligence, carelessness or default, is such as
would, if the death had not ensued, have entitled the party
injured thereby to maintain an action (or to proceed in rem
against the said ship, vessel or boat, or in personam against
the owners thereof, or those having control of her) and to
recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such
case the person or persons who, or the corporation (or the
ship, vessel or boat), which would have been liable in dama
ges if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for
damages (or if a ship, vessel or boat, to a libel in rem, and
her ONners or those responsible for her wrongful act, negll·
gence, carelessness or default, to a libel in personam),
notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although
the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as
amount in Jaw to a felony.
(2) The right of action as set forth in subsection (1) above
shall extend to and include actions ex contractu and ex deJlcto.
The present version of this statute is the result of two amendments.

The first occured in 1915,21 and added the provisions dealing with marl•
time actions. Although the wording of the statute was also slightly

simplified at this ti•ne, the parenthetical additions were the on1y sub

stantive changes. The second amendment occurred in 1953,22 and added the
second paragraph to the act and nu�bered the paragraphs.

- 14 entitled, or of all the persons jointly entitled to sue,
before action brought or before the recovery of a final judg
ment in action brought by him or them, the right of action
or the action as the case may be, shall survive to the person
or persons next entitled to sue under this section, and in
case of the death of one or more persons jointly entitled to
sue before action brought or before the recovery of a final
judgment in an action brought by them, the right of action
or the action, as the case may be, shall survive to the sur
vivor of such persons so jointly entitled to sue; and in
every such action the jury shall give such damages as the party
or parties entitled to sue may have sustained by reason of the
death of the party killed; provided, that any person or per
sons to whom a right of action may survive under the provisions
of this act shall recover such damages as by law such person
or persons are entitled in their own right to recover, irre
spective of the dama9es recoverable by the person or persons·
whom he or they may succeed.
This statute has been amended a single time when Its length was

practically doubled. 3 2 Since it established a strict hierarchy of bene
ficiaries with the cause of action solely created for the benefit of the
person or persons standing In the specified relationship to the deceased,
obviously the question would arise as to the disposition of the cause
of action should the beneficiary or beneficiaries primarily entitled die
before the action was brought or before final judgment.

Under the

provisions of Lord Campbell's act this question does not arise since In
alt cases the decedent's personal representative was to recover In be•
half of all lineal ascendent or descendent beneficiaries within two de
grees of the deceased and actually damaged by the wrongful death.

No

doubt the failure of the legislature to originally anticipate the
11

survival11 problem may be attributed partially to the absence of such

a provision in Lord Campbell's act and partially to the failure of the
legislature to fully appreciate the ramifications of its singular de
parture from the usual Lord Campbell provisions with respect to parties
and damages.

• 13 and to prevent a break in continuity of a statute turgidly worded fr0111
the outset.
It is generally agreed that the 1953 addition of the second para•

graph to Florida's death act,29 was the direct result of the Florida

Supreme Court's 1951 decision in Whitely v. Webb's City, lnc. 3 0 In that
case the court held that a breach of implied warranty of fitness of a
foodstuff was not actionable under Florida's death act which contemplated
only actions !lS, delicto. The court aligned itself with the jurisdictions
which hold that actions !lS, contractu are not maintainable under statutes
of the Lord Campbell's type. Though the 1953 legislature no doubt had
breach of implied warranty In mind when it amended the act, it is likely
that all deaths attributable to breaches of contract are now actionable
in Florida due to the statute's plain language.

3. F.S. §768.02 - Parties and Damages. The Florida Statute defin•
ing the parties entitled to recovery and the damages recoverable under

the Death Act (§768.01) was also enacted in 1883. 3 1

Though this statute

was intended to cover those items contained in Section II of Lork Camp•
bell's act, it is irnrnediately noted that the legislature chose to radic•
ally depart from the British scheme of compensation.

The act reads as

follows today with those portions added subsequent to 1883 underlined:
768.02 - f._artics; damages; proviso. - Every such action shall
be brought by and in the na�e of the widow or husband, as the
case may be, and where there is neither widow nor husband
surviving the deceased, then the minor child or children may
maintain an action; and where there is neither widow nor hus
band, nor minor child or children, then the action may be
maintained by any person or persons dependent on such person
killed for a support; and where there is neither of the above
classes of persons to sue, then the action may be �aintained
by the executor or ad�inistrator, a� the case may be, of the
person killed. In case of the death of any person solely

- 15 •
The 1907 amendment which added the underilned portions was clearly
Intended to show that the action contemplated by the Legislature was a
class action with damages measured solely by-the injuries sustained by
the rnembers of the class living at final Judgment. With the death of the
member or members of a higher class, It was made clear that tt-e right of
action was to vest limiedlately fn the rnembers of the class next entitled
with dacnages to be measured only by their own losses.
No cases have been found which raised the questions alleviated by
this amendment prior to Its enactrnent.

It Is likely that the 19P7 arnend•

inent was thus the result of legislative "preventive medicine" in order to
dismiss arguments to the effect that the cause of action provided sur•
vlved to the estate of a primary beneficiary, or that the damages re
coverable by lower class beneficiaries should be measured by those
recoverable by the primary class beneficiaries had they survived.

In

the absence of this amendment, both arguments would have been plausible.
4.

F.S. §768.03 Parties In actions for death of minor child.

This statute is a piece of special legislation designed to provide a
cause of action to the parents of a child wrongfully killed.

Orlglnally

enacted In 1899, 33 the act provides an action to the child's father for
loss of his common law right to the child's services until inajorlty
and for the mental pain and suffering of both parents.

In the absence

of a father, the mother may bring the action. Today the statute appears
as follows again with those portions subsequently added underlined:
768.03 Parties in actions for death of minor chf1di damages. (1) Whenever the death of any minor child shall be caused
by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of
ADY jndividual. or by the wrongful act, negligence, careless•
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ness or default of any private association or persons, or by
the wrongful act, negligence. carelessness or default of any
officer, agent or employee of any private association of per•
sons, acting in his capacity as such officer, agent or
e,ieloyee, or by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness
or default of any corporation, or by the wrongful act, neg•
llgence, carelessness or default of any officer or agent,
or employee of any corporation acting In his capacity as
such officer, agent or employee, the father of such minor
child, or If the father be not living, the mother may main•
tain an action against such individual, private association
of persons, or corporation, and may recover, not only for
the loss of services of such minor child, but in addition
thereto, such sum for the mental pain and suffering of the
parent (or� parents) If they survive, as the jury may
assess.
(2) The right of action as set forth In subsection (1)
above shall extend to and Include actions ex contractu and
ex def lcto.
The necessity for adding this enactrnent to the original statutory
scherne adopted ·sixteen years before was readily accepted by the leglsla•
ture when it was realized that !768.02 prevented an action by the parents
of a deceased child for damages to the parent-child relationshtp34 since
seldOITI were the parents

11 • • •

persons dependent on such person kllled

for a support ••••11 Again It should be noted that this problem would
not have arisen under Section II of Lord Campbell's act which involved
parents as beneficiaries, and that the necessity for a third death statute
is directly attributable to the legislature's unique departure fr0111
Section II In defining the parties eligible for wrongful death c�en
sation.
In 1913, the underlined portions of paragraph one were added to the
statute35 though In reality it cannot be said that the statute was
amended. These portions were Included on the original enrolled bill
which was passed, but were s0111ehow deleted from the Laws of Florida
as published· in 1899.

This deletion was carried over into the General

- 17 Statutes of 1906. No doubt this was the result·of someone's oversight.
Nonetheless. the outcome was to limit the potentially liable parties to
corporations and associations.

Individuals �re left unaffected. 3 6

In

1913. the wording of the original bill was restored.
The second paragraph providing for� contractu actions was not
enacted until 1963, 37 exactly ten years after the very sarne provision
was added to the original death act (§ 7 68.01).

There is no valld reason

why the two additions were not enacted at the same time. and the sponsor
of the 1953 amendment to § 7 68.0I probably overlooked the necessity for
a similar addition to §7 68.03 . The 1,61 case of Latimer v. Sears Roe

buck and Co.3 8 forced the issue when in a lengthy decision a federal

court held that the amendment to § 768.01 could not be applied to § 768.03.
The statute was amended to allow� contrac tu actions at the next legis·
lative session.
C.

Comparison of Florida deat h acts and Lord Campbell's Act.

Florida's wrongful death acts are in several ways similar to Lord Camp•
bell's act. Both acts create an entirely new cause of action when a
death is caused by the wrongful act, neglec� or default of another.
The Florida act replaces "neglect" with "negltgence" and

adds

"careless•

ness" as a basis for liability. but these slight variances in wording
are of no legal significance. Both acts also recognize that the cause
of action is that of the named beneficiaries to whOITI recovery is limited
with damages to be awarded according to the losses actually suffered.
Recovery Is also limited by both statutes to those cases where the dece•
dent would have had a valid cause of action for personal Injuries had
death not ensued.

• 18 At this point, however, the two statutory'schemes clearly diverge.
The similarities noted above prevent the conclusion that the two statutes
are totally dissimilar in theory. 39 Yet, few parallels can be drawn
between the actual operation of the two enactments.

First, it Is i,nrne

diately noticed that Florida has established a strict hierarchy of bene
ficiary classes.40 This hierarchy determines who possesses the cause
of action, who may bring suit, and who may recover damages. Whereas
Lord Campbell's act requires the deceased's personal representative to
bring the action, recovering those damages suffered by the dead ,person's
lineal relatives within two degrees, the Florida act requires that the
action be brought by the member or rnembers of that hlerarchial class
having priority as established by the statute and that damages be limited
solely to the members of that class.

Also unlike Lord Campbell's act,

Florida does not necessarily limit recovery to lineal relatives of the
deceased, but includes a separate beneficiary class for any dependent
persons.

Under Florida's act the estate of the decedent also is included

as a separate beneficiary class provided the deceased was not survived
by a prior class.

Lord Campbell's act contains no provision for

recovery to the estate.
Florida's departure from the usual Lord Campbell provisions was
obviously the result of compromise.

No doubt many legislators feared

that courts of the state would be s1110thered by wrongful death actions
resulting in excessive damages.

Others probably felt that Lord Campbell's

act was too restrictive as to parties allowed to recover.

The cornpromtse

re•nedy finally adopted has probably bred more I I Is than it prevented, 41
but, as one author has noted, other states have had similar experlences. 42

- 19 "(T)he example set by our brothers-in-law across the sea
was followed in the United States, but with many unfortunate
results. Few of the state acts followed Lord Campbell's Act
strictly in language; many used their own conceptions of
what the act was about; and most were confused as to the kind
of cause of action created. All were agreed, however, that
they had adopted Lord Campbell's Act or a reasonable facsimile
thereof. The result has been confusion compounded across sev•
era) states of the United States, and Florida has not been
left untouched."
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IV. SURVEY OF AMERtCAN DEATH ACTS AND �HE FLORIDA ACTS.
A.

Acts giving rise to liability.

The substantive basis of recovery

for wrongful death must be determ(ned by reference to the language of
any statute purporting to change the common law rule.

Lord Campbell's

Act provided that there would be liability for the death of a person
if death resulted from the "•••wrongful act, neglect, or default••• "
of the defendant. The statutes of twenty-six states have adopted' this
language intact. Of the remaining jurisdictions, most have only sllghtly
varied the wording while providing essent1ally the same basis for re•

covery.43 Florida is In the latter category.

Florida Statutes §§768.01 and 768.03 predicate the defendant's
liability upon his " •••wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default•••"
Why the legislature chose to depart from Lord Campbell's formulation by
lnsertlng "carelessness" as a basis for liability is unknCMn. The
negligent man by definition is careless. Perhaps this insertion was the
result of a desire for statutory originality.

More plausible Is the

suggestion that it was added to clarify the statute's purpose by In•
serting

a

lay term among legal words of art. The term has been accorded

no special significance by the courts and should be viewed as surplusage.
1. Torts.

It Is well settled that the commission of a c011m0n law

Intentional tort resulting in the victim's death will qualify as a

"wrongful act" for purposes of a wrongful death cause of actfon.44

If

the death is due to circumstances amounting in law to a felony, the
Florida Act expressly prevents the common law doctrine of merger fr0111

- 21 -

operating and thereby extinguishing the civil claim.

Likewise, If the

defendant owes a duty of care to the decedent and breaches that duty
causing the decedent's death, an action for wrongful death may be based
on negligence.

It is important to recognize that the duty breached by

the defendant is one owed to the decedent, not to his survivors, even
though the losses for which damages are recoverable are usually

those

suffered by the survivors.
Whether death is the result of Intentional or negligent Injury
must be determined under the substantive tort law of each jurlsdic.tion.
Florida law recognizes that an intentional wrongful act causing death Is
to be distinguished from negligence and that different defenses may
apply to each tortious act though they both create the same cause of
actlon. 45
2. Strict Liability.

All jurisdictions recognizing

actions

for

personal injury based upon strict liability without fault permit a
wrongful dea.th action where

a

fatality results from such activity. 46

When first accepted in the United States, strict liability was applied
solely to dangerous activities such as dynamite blasting.

The recent

trend, however, has been the extension of strict liability to many in
herently dangerous activities.

This has been rnost striking in the area

of defective products liability where a movement has begun to replace
breach of warranty theory with strict llablllty. 47 There are Indica
tions that Florida courts have joined in this movern�nt. 48

It Is probable

that further changes in the direction of increased strict liabllity wlll
occur In Florida. With this development, death actions based upon nonnegligent "defaults" for which the defendent· ls strictly liable w111
surely be allowed by Florida courts.
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3. Breach of Contract. It is generally accepted that damages
resulting from death caused by a breach of contract are not recoverable
under wrongful death statutes of the Lord Campbell type.

Recovery for

death due to breach of contract was disallowed at cornmon law, and It Is
often stated that wrongful death statutes were intended only to apply
to actions� deJlcto.49 Yet, it might be possible for courts to con•
sider a breach of contract a "default" in order to render it actionable
under the traditional statutory language.
Florida Statutes §§768,0I to 768.03 expressly provide for w�ongful
death actions to extend to "actions !?5. contractu". The legislative
history of the 1953 amendment adding this additional basts for liability
indicates that death actions based on breach of warranty were mainly
contemplated. The clear language of the amendment is not restrfctfve,
however, and no doubt any breach of contract legally causing death Is
actionable under Florida's death acts.SO
4. Breach of Warranty.

Personal injury actions based upon breach

of warranty have greatly multiplied in recent years due to the expanded
scope of liability in products liability cases.

Breach of warranty ls

a hybrid action containing elements of both contract and tort theory.
Earlier cases, emphasizing the ex contractu nature of warranty actions,
firmly disallowed recovery for wrongful death based upon breach of
warranty. S I
as

a

The recent trend, however, has been to view breach of warranty

non•negligent "default" to which strict Iiabi Iity Is appl lcable.

The 1953 amendment to F.S. 768.01 was clearly Intended to allow a wrong•
ful death action on a breach of implied warranty theory.52

5. Unseaworthiness. Due care does not discharge the duty of a
shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel for his seamen.

Unseaworthiness
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This tort provides a cause of action generally not recognized in state
courts since admiralty jurisdiction is vested-in the federal courts.
In the absence of Federal enabling legislation, death actions based
upon maritime personal injuries occurring within the navigable waters
of a state must be brought, if at all, under the provisions of the state

wrongful death act. 54 Assuming it is found that a state's act contem
plates such actions (as Florida's acts expressly do), the state•� sub

stantive law is applicable both with respect to the necessary elements
for the cause of action and to available defenses.

If the vessel's

unseaworthiness is relied upon as the cause of the fatality, the question
arises whether unseaworthiness can be the basis of a cause of action
under the state's substantive law.

The Florida Supreme Court has re

cently held, in accordance with the majority of states, that substantive
principles exclusively maritime in nature are not cognizable in actions
brought under Florida's death acts regardless of the fact that the de
cedent could have relied upon those principles had he lived and sued
in the federal courts for personal injuries. 55 This holding applies
both to the complaint based upon unseaworthiness and to the maritime
defense of comparative negllgence. 56
B.

Theories of Damages. Since damage compensation is the object

of wrongful death acts, it is not strange that methods of damage c0111pu
tation present the distinguishing characteristics for classifying American
wrongful death statutes.

Nearly all American statutes are of the Lord

Campbell's type with regard to the party liable and to the necessary
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By contrast, there are various theories

of damage computation which determine who possesses the cause of action,
who is to receive compensation, and what eJem�nts of Joss may be re•
covered.
American wrongful death statutes, then, can be classified according
to how they compensate for the losses caused by a death-producing act.
These losses are of three types.
to the decedent.

First, there are those damages personal

Secondly, there are those economic losses consequent

upon the decedent's ceasing to function as an economic unit.

The· third

broad classification of potential damages are those generated by the
non-economic loss of the decedent as a unique human being who Is valued
by his family.

Though it is true that the courts and legislatures of

the United States have accepted many varying formulas for cocnpensating
these losses, some generalization is possible.
I.

Survival Statutes.

Most states provide survival statutes whereby

a cause of action for damages personal to the decedent survives to
his estate. 57 A survival action is conceptually different frorn a wrong•
ful death action since each provides a remedy for a different loss.

Un•

like most wrongful death acts, survival statutes provide c0'1'1pensation
to the personal representative of the deceased for those personal injuries
suffered by the deceased up to the date of death.

Needless to

say,

recovery is disallowed where the decedent Is killed instantly since
no damage to the deceased occurs during his lifetime.

Several jurisdic

tions have adopted hybrid death acts providing for recovery of elements
of both survival and wrongful death damages. S B These have bred confusion.

It is no doubt better policy to prevent more than one action

based upon the same act, but a confusing mixture in a single statute of
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unless clarity can be achieved through careful legislative drafting.
The elements of da�ages generally recoverable by a decedent's personal
representative in a survival action are as follows:

conscious pain and

suffering, medical expenses, funeral and burial expenses,59 and loss of
earnings to date of death.
In jurisdictions like Florida where the survival action is separate
and distinct fr0'11 an action for wrongful death, the recovered damages
are assets of the decedent's estate, subject to the claims of creditors,
and distributable by will, or intestate succession If there is no will.
2.

Loss to Survivors Death Acts. While survival statutes only

coopensate the estate of the decedent for those da�ages personally
suffered by him prior to death, wrongful death acts create a new cause
of action for damages either to the estate or survivors of the

deceased

caused by the loss of the deceased as a producing econoinlc unit. ·Host
death acts also provide for damages based upon the loss to his family
of the decedent as a unique individual.

There are many elements of

damages which may be considered by a legislature or court when it attempts
to compensate for losses caused by an actionable death, and without doubt
there are many combinations of damage elements possible. As a conces
sion to the shortness of human life, however, let us generalize with
regard to those few combinations which most American jurisdictions

have

found acceptable and from this gain insight into the underlying policy
bases for allowing monetary recovery for wrongful death.
A majority of state and federal death acts adopt the loss to sur
vivors theory of damages.

Even where the particular act does not specify

how da�ages should be computed, the courts have generally accepted this
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in the fact that Lord Campbell's Act expressly provided only for damages
"· .•proportional to the injury••• " to specifically named beneficiaries.
More convincing is the consideration that the law should most interest
itself In the protection of the living who have been injured by the
decedent's death.

Damages should be computed with an eye toward the

injuries of those dependents who will actually receive compensation
and not toward the decedent or his estate.
Though Lord Campbell's Act provided a rather broad standard for
jury awards, it was judicially restricted to pecuniary damages only
without any recovery for "sentimental" losses.60 Most American Juris•
dictions adopting Lord Campbell type statutes provide that damages are
to be computed in accordance with the losses suffered
survivors.

by

the decedent's

A majority of these have also restrt ct.ed recovery to pecun I ary

losses, either by statutory provision or by judicial construction of
general language. This restriction ts for the most part illusory, how
ever, since many courts have been willing to allow the Jury to place a
pecuniary value upon items difficult to evaluate such as loss of services,
c01Tipanionship 1 and training. Generally, the pecuniary loss restriction
has been applied to prevent recovery for .�ntal pain and anguish of the
survivors.
Damages under the loss to survivors theory, then, are awarded for
the pecuniary value reduced to present worth of the probable contributions
for support which the deceased would have made to the survivors had he
lived and for the value of the services which the decedent normally
would have rendered to the survivors.

In most states this includes
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the value of a parent's training, guidance, companionship, and education.
These items of damages are computed based upon the joint life expect
ancies of both the decedent and each individual beneficiary.

In addition,

some states allow recovery for the present value of the probable inher
itance the survivors would have received had the decedent lived out his
normal life span.

In those states having hybrid survival-death statutes,

the decedent's inedical and funeral expenses are often allowed.
Florida's death acts incorporate the loss to survivors theory of
damages.

This is singularly complicated, however, by the strict hier

archy of beneficiary classes which F.S. §768.02 erects and by the in•
clusion of the decedent's estate as a separate beneficiary class In the
absence of living dependents. Like lord Campbell's Act, the Florida
statutes, except for the Wrongful Death of Minors act (F.S. 768.03),
provide little guidance for damage cornputation. This has resulted in
much litigation with questionable results, which the Florida courts
have recognized.
Unlike most jurisdictions which usually allow recovery by all
dependents of the decedent, Florida prevents recovery except·to those
highest in the beneficiary hierarchy. Damage computations are dependent
upon the identity of the person suing • . All persons in fact dependent
upon the decedent may recover the present value of lost support or
services61 provided, of course, that they are members of the class
entitled to bring suit.

In the case of a surviving spouse, damages are

also allowed for lost comfort, protection, society, companionship and
consortlum. 62

In addition, a surviving widow may recover the loss of that

amount which she may reasonably have expected to receive as a legacy from
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rida does not subscribe to the
"pecuniary loss" restriction, a surviving spouse rnay not recover for
mental pain and suffering.64

In an action by rninor children, loss of

attention, care, cornfort, education and 'lloral training may be cornpensated65
as well as lost services and support. Where the decedent is a 'llinor child,
F.S. §768.03 authorizes a separate cause of action for the parents who

would ordinarily be unable to bring thernselves within one of the bene
ficiary classes of F.S. 1768.02.

In an action by a parent, the allowable

recovery includes loss of the child's services to majority and mental
pain and suffering of both parents.

In such a situation, there may also

be a cause of action under F.S. 768.01 on behalf of the minor decedent's

estate.66

3. Loss to estate death acts. There are basically four types of
death acts which measure damages either wholly or partially by the loss
sustained to the decedent's estate. Eight jurisdictions have enacted
hybrid survival-death acts which are essentially survival actions for the
decedent's personal injuries expanded to include damages for wrongful
death. Since the cause of action is viewed technically as a survival
to the decedent's estate with wrongful death losses added, damages are
entirely measured by loss to the estate and are recovered for the benefit
of the estate. Although recovery is to the estate, rnost statutes of
this type require distribution to named statutory beneficiaries.
Others, however, treat the recovery as personal property of the estate
distributable either by will or intestate succession after payment of
debts of the decedent.

29 The remaining three classes of statutes allowing recovery measured
by the loss to decedent's estate are distinguishable from the hybrid
survival-death statutes in that they create a11 entirely new cause of
action.

Like rnost "true" death acts, these statutes do not recognize

the cause of action as merely a legal survival of the decedent's estate.
The first group of these statutes are those of the Lord Campbell
type which provide only general directions for damage computation by the
jury.

In several states, the language has been judicially construed to

measure damages by loss to the decedent's estate although, once recovered,
the damages are immediately distributed to the statutory beneficiaries
without becoming property of the estate subject to debts and testamentary
dispositions.
A second group of "true" death acts measure da111ages by loss to sur
vivors, but in addition allow the decedent's personal representative to
recover certain losses to the estate.

These generally are losses re

sulting from the injury and death such as funeral and medical expenses.
Generally, this type of death act is found in jurisdictions either without
survival statutes or with death acts expressly preempting the survival
cause of action.
The last group of loss to estate d�ath acts measure damages by loss
to survivors where they exist, but provide for Joss to the estate under
specified circumstances.

One is Florida's, which provides that if the

decedent is not survived by statutory beneficiaries the action "may be
maintained by the executor or administrator•.•of the person killed".
Under statutes of �his type loss to the estate in general may be recovered,
though some limit recovery to certain enumerated expenses of the estate
such as funeral and medical expenses.

30 There are three different theories of damage measurement utilized
where loss to estate is recoverable. The least important of the three
is a recovery based upon the decedent's probable gross earnings reduced
to present value and without deduction for decedent's personal living
expenses.

Only a few states accept this method of �easurement, and of

these it is suspected that there Is a desire to compensate beneficiaries
for "sentirnenta 1" 1osses in a disguised manner.

Georgia, for examp 1e,

permits recovery of the gross estate only where the action is brought
by the spouse or child of the decedent or by the parents of a rninor
decedent.
The 'llOSt popular theory of loss to estate measurement is that rnone
tary damages should represent the present value of decedent's probable
future net earnings. This figure is found by determining the probable
future gross earnings of the decedent over his life expectancy and
deducting therefrom his probable personal living expenses.

The figure

ls then discounted to present value.
Another theory of recovery to the estate subscribed to by several
states is to rneasure damages by the present· value of decedent's probable

future accurnulations.67 This is the Florida position when there is no
survivor in the three prior classes.

Li!<_e the probable "net income"

theory, this method of measurement relies solely on probable business
Income without regard to possible invest�ent incorne.68 The future

accumulations theory, however, requires that the jury determine the
arnount of decedent's net earnings he would have saved and left at his
death as part-of his estate.

Though it is indeed a fine line which

separates the "net earning" theory from the "future accurnulations"

31 theory, the latter seems more equitable since the jury must not only
evaluate the decedent's propensity to earn but also his propensity to
save.

In Florida, the jury is allowed to consider the habits, skill,

age, and health of the decedent in determining his probable accumulations.69
This approach is probably more difficult to apply, however, since the
jury must objectively evaluate the subjective personality traits of the
decedent.
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DEFECTS IN THE FLORIDA LAW OF WRONGFUL DEATH.

Grave difficulties were created

by

the unique departure from the

usual Lord Campbell provisions in F.S. §768.02.

The strict hierarchy

of beneficiary classes created by this enactment, in the final anaylsis,
must be recognized as the most serious defect.

Florida's death acts

have caused so much injustice and confusion that the Supreme Court has
7o The 'd
' I at1ve
'
' '
been prompted to request 1 eg1s
rev1s1on.
I ea 1 death act
should require the tortfeasor to respond in one civil action for the actual
losses of those living dependents of the deceased.
laws of Florida do not achieve this ideal.

The wrongful death

Further, a great deal of

unfairness is possible in Florida to both dependents of the deceased
and the tortfeasor.
A. Mechanics.

Rather than one comprehensive death act providing

for one civil action, Florida has four acts that may come into play when
a person causes a fatal Injury, and they create three different causes
of action.

The survival statute provides recovery of those damages

personal to the decedent suffered prior to death.71

These include

medical and funeral expenses, lost earnings, and mental pain and suffering.
This cause of action survives to the decedent's estate and may be brought
by his personal representative.
An additional cause of action is created upon death by F,S. 768.01
for the injuries sustained by the survivors of the decedent.

F.S. 768.02

provides a hierarchy of beneficiary classes that determines who may sue,
who may share in the recovery, and, to some extent, what losses will be
compensated. This hierarchy is as follows:
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and (4) the decedent's estate.

Actually, "estate" is not mentioned;

rather, the statute provides that the action may be maintained "by the
executor or administrator •.. of the person killed".

The cause of action

is vested exclusively in the highest beneficiary class.

Membership in

the highest class has been recognized as an essential element of the

cause of action. 72 Members of a lower class cannot sue even if the exist
ing class having priority refuses to do so;73 the cause of action cannot
be assigned to those of a lower class;74 and only members of the class
with priority may recover damages after having alleged and proven the
Unless the beneficiary suing under

non-existence of a higher class. 75

the death acts is also the decedent's personal representative, the tort•
feasor must respond to two separate actions, one for wrongful death and
one for surviving personal Injuries.

Even if such joinder is possible,

it is not compulsory and the plaintiff may elect to afflict the defendant
with two lawsuits.
The damages recoverable under the Florida death acts depend upon
the identity of the person suing.

These may be briefly summarized

according to each statutory class:
(I)

Surviving spouse - lost financial support, services, comfort,
protection, society and consortium.

Lost inheritance and the

existence of minor children may be considered if the support
of the minor children has been thrust upon the surviving spouse
by the death of the husband and father.
(2)

Minor children • lost financial support, services, attention,
care, companionship, and educationa 1 and rnora I trat n ing.
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Other dependent persons - lost support and service only.

Damages

for these three classes are c01T1puted according to the "loss
to survivors" theory.
(4)

Decedent's estate - lost savings that decedent probably would
have accumulated had he lived.

The inclusion of the decedent's estate as the last beneficiary class
produces a switch to the "loss to estate" theory of damages and, of course,
is dependent upon the non-existence of any person dependent upon the
deceased.
Under Florida's fourth act affecting the problem, F.S. 768.03 pro
vides the parents of a deceased minor child with a third and distinct
cause of action for toss of the common law right to the child's services
and for mental pain and suffering.

This is the only death statute pro

viding explicit directions for damage awards and the only one under
which mental pain and suffering of the plaintiffs may be recovered.
This Wrongful Death of Minors Act was created due to the shortcomings
produced by the beneficiary hierarchy of F.S. §768.02 since seldom were
the parents dependents of their minor children. The problems presented
by F.S. 768.03 are a product of the flaws in the earlier death legislation
of Florida.
A bad feature of F.S. 768.03 is that it can result in further multi
plicity of suits.

Though as a practical matter minors seldom have

dependents or personal representatives other than their parents, it
ls not impossible that a tortfeasor would have to respond to three sepa
rate civil actions by three separate plaintiffs.

Assuming a working

minor with a dependent friend or relative other than a parent who has

- 35 appointed a personal representative other than a parent by will, two
separate death actions and a separate survival action are theoretically
possible.

Three causes of action in favor of

a parent of a deceased

minor child are common, and it is possible for the plaintiff to sue on
them separately.

Obviously, the possibility of harrassment of the

defendant exists.
B.

Factual examples.

illustrated by examples.

The defects in Florida's death acts can be
To show the mechanics of the act, assume that

H, a middle aged man, is negligently killed by T and is survived by a
wife, W, a minor son, S, and a minor daughter, D.
elderly mother, M, who resides with the family.

H also supports his
Under Florida law, only

W may maintain a death action for damages exclusively personal to her.
Although it has long been held that the existence of minor children may
be considered by the jury,76 W's recovery is strictly for her only

without a portion allowed exclusively to the children as such.

The

mother and children of H are without remedy for their loss due to the
existence of

w.

Yet, their losses are no less real.

can be intensified by assu•ning the following:

This unfairness

(I) W is a second wife

to Hand a stepmother to the children, and she either chooses not to sue
or sues only for herself since she is not responsible for the children's
support, or (2)0 is an adolescent girl who suffers severe psychological
trauma due to her father's death and requires psychiatric help.

In both

cases there is no recovery by the children though their actual losses
may be great.

The existence of W also precludes any recovery to the

estate except under the survival statute, which may produce little for
the children after creditors have been satisfied, and there will be no
survival action if the death was instantaneous.
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Multiplicity of law suits is possible by the fact that both Wand
the decedent's personal representative may be different persons who
must sue T separately, or, even if the same person, may elect to pro
It has already been shown how the death

ceed in two separate actions.

of a minor may result in a third lawsuit.

Assuming that three interests

which the law should protect have been damaged, there is still no sound
reason why all three losses cannot be asserted In one civil action.
Another factual example will point out the unsatisfactory situation
with regard to damages presented by the Florida death acts.

X is:a

nineteen year old youth fatally injured due to T's negligence who dies
after a brief stay in the hospital.

To oversimplify, it is assumed that

X's gross lifetime earnings may be found to be $200,000 when reduced to
present value.

The personal representative of X may recover for the rnent�

pain and suffering of X as well as for his lost earnings to date of
death and medical expenses.

He will also recover funeral expenses.

If X Is survived by a wife, she may recover that portion of the $200,000
which the jury reasonably believes would have been spent for her support
had X lived.

Assuming that X has two small children, that portion of

X's probable gross earnings that would have been spent on them is not
recoverable except as part of the wife's damages.

Similarly, no recovery

will be allowed X's estate for that portion of the $200,000 which X
probably would have accumulated as savings though this amount would
have been recoverable by his estate (fourth class) had X not been sur
vived by immediate dependents. The anomolous result, according to the
Florida Supreme Court Is that

11

• • •

the wrongdoer (is) required to respond

in a less amount of damages If the injured person dies, than if the

- 37 injured person survives .•• 11 77 since if X had lived with a total and
permanent disability he would be allowed to recover the present entire
value of the $200,000 as impaired earning capaclty in addition to his
other personal injury damage elements.
A further anomaly results from the fact that a person's earnings
normally are spent on family and personal expenses with only the remainder
being accumulated as savings.

The more dependents a person has, the

less he will probably accumulate.

F.S. 768.02 allows but one class of

dependents to recover to the exclusion of all others.

Yet when the

decedent is survived by no dependents, his personal representative may
recover the entire net estate as accumulated savings, which may be
disproportionately large in the absence of dependents.
Supreme Court has again pointed out, in many cases

11 • • •

As the Florida
it might be said

that it is cheaper to kill a person who leaves a spouse or child•••than
it is to ki 11 a porson who is :;urvivcd by no one••. 1178 Seemingly, the

Florida death acts ure capable of discriminating against those persons
whorn the law should most zeaiously protect in favor of collateral kin,
who receive r.ot support but a windfall.

Stated otherwise, recoveries

are small where actual losses are great, and recoveries are large where
actual losses are small.

This is indefensible.

This problem bacomes particularly disturbing in the case of the
wrongful death of a mino1 child.

The parents of the dead child are given

a cause of action by F.S. 768.03 for the value of the child's services
during minority and for mental pain and suffering presumably because
F.S. 768.01 does not permit mental pain and suffering to be recovered
and F.S. 768.02 does not even include parents as a class that can sue
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There is also an action ar}sing under F.S.

the only class in existence will be the estate.

768.01,

and usually

So the father of the

dead child can recover as personal representative of the child's estate
the lost accumulations of the child figured from his majority and this
amount will be distributed to the child's parents under Florida's laws
of intestate succession.

As noted in the preceeding paragraph, the

probable accumulated savings of a person without dependents-and minors
usually are-may be found to be very _great. Add this recovery to that
possible under F.S.

768.03,

and it may be concluded that Florida's death

acts theoretically allow the highest recovery in the case of a minor's
death where he is survived by parents but by no dependent persons.
Parents of minor children, therefore, may not only recover larger pecuni
ary damages than dependents of decedents generally, but, unlike a surviving
spouse and children, are also allowed recovery for mental pain and suffer•
ing.

This borders on the ridiculous when it is realized that parents

are seldom viewed as the primary objects of a person's bounty and that
parents seldOlll � such large recoveries, Why should it be more ex•
pensive to kill a minor on whom no one is dependent for support than
to kill a breadwinning husband and father? 79
The theoretical flaws pointed out above have, of course, been held
in check to a great extent by the common sense of jurors and by the
watchful eye of judges, trial and appellate, which discourage excessive
verdicts, but that is no excuse for the death acts of Florida to embody
such an irrational and distorted view of public policy,

They should,

as a minimum requirement, present a picture of theoretical consistency
in order to aid the courts, which have trouble enough with the facts of
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The Florida death acts have failed to supply our judg�s and juries with
a consistent theory of damage recovery that accords with common sense
and public opinion. large awards where no one needs it, and small awards
where there are many depen<lents is nonsense.
C. Miscellaneous problems. There are several other problems with
regard to wrongful death worthy of legislative consideration. Some of
these have been presented to our courts and have been reasonably resolved
by them even though Florida 1 s death acts do not expressly deal with them,
With regard to damages, recovery for the mental pain and suffering
of the surviving spouse or children of the decedent has been disallowed

under the Florida acts.80 Though it is the general rule today that

damages of this type are not recoverable under the 11 loss to survivors1 1
theory, the Legislature of Florida in the Wrongful Death of Minors Act
(F.S. 768.03) has clearly m�nifested a belief that these damages do
occur and can be evaluated.

Most jurisdictions refuse to allow the

mental anguish type of damage because the courts say there is no pre
cise method for arriving at a monetary evaluation. The fl�N in this
argument lies in the fact that a majority of jurisdictions allow recovery
for lost companionship, an element of loss that is also clearly without
a price tag.
caused

It ls also worth notin� that, to a large extent, all losses

by a wrongful death are some.what speculative.

Perhaps thP- best explanation for the disallowance of mental pain
and suffering is a distrust of the jury 1 s competence to arrive at a just
award based upon an element of damages that is negative in quality. The
emotional effects of a death upon close relatives is distinguishable
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from those more positive elements of damages such as the money and
services that the decedent would have contributed to the survivors
had he lived.

Yet, most juries at present have- adequate opportunity

to make awards based upon sentiment and sympathy, and the addition of
one more "non-pecuniary" element of loss could make little difference.
The justice of such an addition, on the other hand, would particularly
manifest itself in those cases where the dependent's mental damage has
resulted in positively identifiable physical or psychiatric illness.
These damages can reasonably be established through expert medical:testi·
mony.

Medical science is not so helpless in assessing mental anguish

and its effects as it was when the rule disallowing this damage element
was adopted by the courts.
Another possible source of injustice not specifically dealt with by
Florida's death acts is the rule denying liability for the wrongful
death of a viable fetus.

Recovery has been denied by Florida courts

on the grounds that the viable fetus is not a minor child within the
meaning of the Wrongful Death of Minors Act.81

As a matter of statu�

tory interpretation, the decision is undoubtedly sound.

It seems

reasonable, nevertheless, for the death statutes to allow a limited re
covery since otherwise those losses peculiar to this type of death are
not compensable at all, since they are not recoverable in the personal
Injury action the mother may have.

These losses include the mental

pain and suffering of the father and the medical expenses of the preg
nancy.

Here is anott:er area where medicine has made great progress.

A fetus inay not be a "rninor child," but modern medical science assures
us that it is a life separate frO'TI the mother even in the womb.

41 Another problem is the protection of the decedent's general creditors.
General creditors of the decedent have priority in survival statute
recoveries as against the decedent's survivors.

Further, all wrongful

death recoveries by the estate in the absence of dependents under F.S.
§768.02 are subject to the claims of creditors.

The problem arises solely

in the case of the surviving spouse who may recover her lost inheritance
without its being subject to the claims of creditors.

Firmly established

is the legal policy that no beneficiary of an estate should be allowed
to receive his legacy prior to the satisfaction of decedent's creditors.
Though it may be contended that a widow's wrongful death recovery presents
an exception to this rule, the proposition is subject to re-examination
where the loss to the estate is an element of the recovery.
The problem of creditors' claims cannot be discussed without also
considering the question of recovery for lost inheritance by statutory
beneficiaries, another problem not specifically covered in the Florida
acts.

Probable inheritance of statutory beneficiaries is recognized

in the majority of

11

loss to survivors" jurisdictions as a valid expect

ancy to be legally protected.

Florida courts allow recovery for a widow's

probable inheritance, but not for that of minor children or other de•
pendents.

The difficulty with computing lost inheritance is that the

jury, in addition to computing the other losses to survivors, must
also determine the decedents probable accumulations and the likelihood
of a portion being left to the particular beneficiary.

Yet, if this

difficulty is not controlling where widows are concerned, why are children
not allO\�ed a recovery of their expectancy also?
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The allowance of an inheritance recovery under the "loss to survivors" theory rnay be undesirable in two respects.

First, it permits

payment of what is much like a legacy direct to the beneficiary without
its having passed through the decedent's estate thereby becoming subject
to the claims of creditors.

Secondly, it may be unfair to the defendant,

whose liability rnay be based on simple negligence, to be required to act
as an insurer of a legacy to the parents or collateral relatives of an
unmarried decedent who neither need nor expect such a windfall since
they would not normally be the objects of the decedent's bounty.

One

solution to this problem would be to shift to a 11 loss to estate" theory
so as to permit, as additional damages, recovery by the personal repre
sentative of the net accumulations for purposes of preserving expectancies. 8 2
This recovery would be subject to the claims of creditors, distributable
by will or by intestacy, and could be disallowed except where the decedent is survived by a spouse or children, the most natural objects of his
bounty.
Other aspects of the wrongful death problem not clearly covered
by Florida's death acts include the rights of adopted children, the
rights of adopting parents, and the rights of illegitimate children and
their parents.
In summary, the following are the major problem areas in Florida's
death acts:
(I)

The strict hierarchy of beneficiary classes established by F.S.
§768.02, which blocks recovery of real losses.

(2)

The possibility of multiple causes of action based on a single
tortious act resulting in congestion, complexity, and possible
harrassrnent.

43 (3)

The absence of guides for damages computation including a
specification of recoverable elements.
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VI.
I.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVISION.

Replace the three death acts with a comprehensive Wrongful

Death Act.
2. The comprehensive act should be rernedial, not punitive, and a
policy statement should require a liberal interpretation where justice
demands.

3. The personal representative of the decedent should recover on
behalf of all eligible survivors and the estate, if the estate is to
recover, in one civil action.

ff there is to be a recovery on behalf

of all beneficiaries, the personal representative of the decedent is
the most logical plaintiff.

4. Although the act should contain an expanded loss to survlvors"
11

theory of da�ages, a li�ited recovery should be allowed the estate for
losses heretofore allowed under the survival statute, and lost accumu
lations should be recoverable to the estate under certain defined cir
cumstances. No longer should a separate surviving cause of action be
allowed the estate for personal injuries of the deceased where the
injury has resulted in a wrongful death.
5.

Potentially liable parties should be simplified to specify

any person or watercraft.

This would neither contract nor expand those

parties presently liable, and would dispense with s� of the admiralty
terms and turgid language currently found in F.S. §768.0l.

45 6.

Liability should be based upon the wrongful act, negligence,

default, or breach of contract or warranty of the defendant.

"Careless

ness" as a term of art is synonomous with "negligence" and ornitting ft wi11
leave the meaning unchanged.

As to "breach of contract," there is no

reason to write Florida statutes in Latin.

"Warranty" needs to be men

tioned to avoid confusion arising frorn develop�ents in strict liability.

7. No wrongful death action should be recognized except in those

cases where the decedent could have recovered for personal injuries had
he survived, and all rights and defenses should depend upon the sub
stantive law of Florida even where the action involves a death caused
on navigable waters of the state.
8.

Damages should be calculated frorn the tirne of injury. not frorn

the time of death.

This will perrnit the recovery of darnages now recover

able in a separate survival action for personal injury, except for pain
and suffering of the decedent.

This recognizes the fact that the dead

are beyond compensation for either physical or rnental suffering.

The

personal representative should also be allowed to recover on behalf of
the decedent's survivors in the following manner utilizing the "loss
to survivors" theory:
a.

A spouse and all blood relatives.�ependent in whole or in part

upon the decedent should be allowed to recover the full value of lost
support and services calculated from the time of injury to date of judg
ment plus interest.

The present value of future lost support and services

may also be recovered.
b.

A surviving spouse should also recover for lost companionship

and protection as well as for rnental pain and suffering to be calculated
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fro•n the date of injury.

Loss of consortium should not be·compensated

as such since this legal term of art is misunderstood by many jurors to
represent merely sexual activity.
c.

Surviving minor children also should be allowed to recover lost

parental companionship, instruction, and guidance.

A recovery for their

mental pain and suffering should also be recoverable from the date of
injury.
d.

The recovery should not be restricted to legitimate children.
Where the action is brought on behalf of the parents of a

deceased minor who is unmarried, damages should be limited to that amount
which will reimburse the parents for the reasonable cost of raising the
child to the time of his death.
be allowed.

Mental pain and suffering should also

This will recognize the economic fact that children are no

longer assets to their parents but liabilities, with the value of their
services usually much less than the cost of rearing.
e.

The parents of a visble fetus born dead due to the defendant's

acts should recover the costs of pregnancy and delivery.

Mental pain

and suffering should also be allowed from the date of injury.
9.

Those damages recoverable by the personal representative on

behalf of the estate utilizing the ''loss to estat�• theory should include
the following:
a.
Injuries.

Net accumulations lost to the estate due to the decedent's
These losses should not be computed beyond the death unless

the decedent is survived by a spouse or lineals.

If this fs the case,

net accumulations should be further calculated for the decedent's life
expectancy and reduced to present value.

Any recovery of net accumu-

47 lations should be distributed either by will or the Florida probate law
after having first satisfied the claims of creditors.
b.

The personal representative should also recover the present

value of the interest at the legal rate on the sum expended for the
funeral, calculated for the decedent's life expectancy and not exceeding
the amount actually spent.

This sum is payable by the personal repre

sentative to the per5on who actually paid these expenses.

This method

of calculation recognizes that the funeral expense has not been caused
but merely accelerated by th� defendant's act.
c.

Hospital and meclical expenses should be recoverable by the estate.

d.

The decedent's pain and �uffering should not be allowed since

this element of damage has had substituted for it the pain and suffering
of close relatives.
10.

Each survivor's share shall be separately stated in the verdict

of th� trier, and the recovery allowed the estate shall also be s�parately
stated.
11.

The court in its discretion should be allowed to protect the

amounts recov.:-rP.c! for minor children and incompetents by the personal
representative after considerin£J _the ages of the children, the amounts
involved, the capacity and integrity of any surviving spouse, and any
othe.r facts known to the court.
12.

Cornprr.mise settlements must receive court approval if any sur

vivor is a minor or incompetent or if any survivor objects to the pro
posed compromise.
13.

The awards to the survivors and the estate should each bear

Its proportionate share of the expenses of litigation including attorney
fees.
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THE WRONGFUL DEATH MESS IN FLORIDA
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· The judiciary of Florida has been plaintively requesting legislative
\
1
action for many years to remove defects in Florida 1 s wrongful death laws.

A

bill was introduced in the House of Representatives during the 1957 Legislature
designed to eliminate some of the worst defects, but this bill died in commit
tee.

The Florida Law Revision Commission became interested in the problem,

and a bi11 it proposed was introduced in 1970,
the floor of either house.

but the proposal never reached
,.... � ... '?!'le

The Commission bill was greatly -i'l'Jlprov.ed during

the subsequent year and was again introduced in both houses during the 1971
session as HB 120 and SB 323.
The Comm,s�ion's proposed bill received fayorable reports from committees
in both houses, and it was enacted by an unanimous vote in the House of Re�re
senta�ives.

The bill was amended in a minor respect during its consideration

by ihe House Judiciary Committee, and the bill as enacted by the House was re
ferred to committee when it arrived in the Senate.

The Senate Judiciary Com-

mittce again govc a f<1vorc1blc report after adopting amendments of its own.

This

occurred as the session was approaching its end, and the bill died in the Senate
without ever coming to a vote.
There �re several defeits in the wrongful death legislation of Florida.
The hierarchy of oeneficiary classes is the most serlous defect.

The language

of r·.s. §768.02 seems to require that the cause of action be vested exclusively
in t�e highest beneficiary class in existence.

T�e classes are surviving

spouse, minor children, othe� dependent persons, and the executor or admini
strator of the person killed.

Membership in the highest class has been recog

nized as an essential element of the cause of action. · Jt has been held' that
members of a lower class cannot sue even if the existing class havi�g priority

refuses to sue, and the cause of action cannot be assigned to a lower class.

3

Since only members of the class with priority may recover damages, the result
1s that the wrongdoer is required to pay less damages if an injured person dies
than if the injured person survives.

If an injured person lives wi\h a total

and permanent dis.abi"lity, he.will be allowed to recover the entire present value
of his lost earnings over his I ife expectancy and this would usually be consid
erably more than the lost support a surviving· spouse, for example, can recover
under the Florida wrongful death statutes.

There is no recovery of future earn

ings as such when a person wrongfully injured dies from the,,injury under the law
of Florida.

,-,-�·�

4

The outcome of cases where there are stepchildren involved is part!cularly
poignant.

There have been several cases where the wrongful death of the father
.•
\"l\J--··Y'-t'.>'-·

or mother of the children resulted in the surviving second wife or second husband recovering to the utter exclusion ·of the natural children of the deceased.
This does not exhaust the horrible results that -are possible.

It makes no dif

ference that a deceased husband may have been supporting his aged parents prior
tG �is wrongful death.
tri2

Only his surviving spouse is entitled to recover, and

parents can recover nothing although they have suffered an unqu�stionable

� of support. It is most commendable that the Florida Supreme Court
--�
found a way to permit a recovery of support for minor children of a wrong_fully
killed father even though the surviving mother, the widow, is in existence.
This was done by declaring that the surviving widow could recover for the support of the children that would be cast upon her by the death of their father.
This is not a perfect result, however, because there are no provisions in the
present statute to assure that the children will actually benefit from such
recovery, t he amounts for this loss of support being awarded to the widow as
part of her damages.
- 2 -

5

A further anom�ly results from the fact that a person's earnings are
normally spent on family and personal expenses with only the remainder being accumulated as savings.

The more dependents a person has, the�, the less

he wi 11 probably accumulate.

..,±.

() "} &.c..-p
:.-., ..A• . under F.S. 768.02,
If there is one class
surviving
/I.

it will recover to the exclusion of all others. Yet, when the deceased is
survived by no dependents in the first three.classes, his personal representa
tive may recover as the fourth class the entire net estate as accumulated savings, which may be disproportionately large in the abscnc�.;.Q.f dependent's. As
�
v'd. }
:\
11• •
it might be said that it is
Florida Supreme Court has pointed out
//I
,
cheaper to kill a person who leaves a spouse or child ...
than i.t is to kill
a person who is survived by no one.

116

It seems that Florida minimizes re-

coveries where there are close relatives and other dependents left by the de
ceased, and maximizes recoveries where there is no one dependent on the deceased,
Amounts recovered are small where actual losses are great, and they are large
where actual losses are small.

This is indefensible.

Another.defect is that Florida's wrongful death statutes encourage a multi
plicity of suits.

It is not impossible that a tortfeasor would ha�e to respond

to three civil actions by three separate plaintiffs in the wrongful death of a
child. Assume a working minor child with a dependent friend or relative other
than a parent and who has appointed a personal ·representative other than a ,parent
by will, two separate death actions and a separate survival action for personal
injury are theoretically possible in three different plaintiffs.

Three causes

of action in favor of a parent of a deceased minor child is common without that
unusual situation, and it is possible for the plaintiff to sue on them separately.
Even if the wrongful death of an adult is involved, two separate actions usually
arise, the surviving personal injury action and a separate action for wrongful
death, and the plaintiff or plaintiffs have the option of bringing these suits
- 3 -

separately.

Consolidation for trial often

helps, but it is not mandatory

and is only available when the multiple actions are pending in the same court.
With the serious problem of court congestion, it seems very much a9e1inst the
pub! ic interest to encourage a multiplicity of suits, especially where all of
them involve the same accident and the same witnesses. Why assemble several
juries to do what one jury can do, and why devote so much unnecessary judicial
effort to multiple actions in this area?

Further, harrassment of defendants

can and does occur.
Another problem is the great uncertainty about the damages recoverable
for wrongful death in Florida.

This problem becomes particularly acute in the

case of the wrongful death of a minor child,

Parents of the dead child are

given a cause of action by F.S. §768.03 for the value of the child 1 s services
during minority and for mental pain and suffering.

T�ere is also an action

arising under F.S. §768.01 and usually the only class in existence will be the
estate, so the father of the dead child can also recover as personal representa
tive of the child's estate the loss accumulations of the chi Id figured from his
majority to the end of his life expectancy, and this amount will be;distributed
to the child 1 s parents under Florida 1 s laws of intestate succession.

The proba

ble accumulated savings of a person without dependents, and minors usually are,
may be found to be very great.

Add this to the recovery that is possible under

f.S. §768.03, and it may be concluded that Florida 1 s death acts theoretically
allow the highest recovery in the case of a minor•s death who is survived by
parents but no dependents.

It follows that parents of minor children may not

only recover larger pecuniary damages than dependents of decedents generally,
but, unlike a surviving spouse and children, are also allowed recovery for mental
pain and suffering.

This borders on the ridiculous when it is realized that

parents are seldom viewed as primary objects of a minor child 1 s bounty and sel
dom need such large recoveries.

Why should it be more expensive to kill a minor

on whom no one is dependent for support than to kill a breadwinning husband
and father?

There is a regrettable absence of specification of recoverable

damage elements in Florida's wrongful death legislation.
There are a few other problems with Florida's wrongful death law that
are not 1ikely to cause as much trouble as those already discussed, but they
should be corrected.

An example is the requ�rement that the death occur "in

this state" found in the general wrongful death act, F�S. §768.01.

Some juris

dictions like the District of Columbia have wrongful death statutes that apply
only to "injury done or happening within the 1imits of the..;.,D�r�tr_ict, [whereby]
the death of a person is caused.

If one of Florida's congressmen was in

an accident in Florida, returned to the District of Columbia and died there as
a result of the accident, it would seem to follow that no wrongful death stat
ute would apply.

The District of Columbia statute would not because the in

jurious happening did not occur there, and the florida statute would not be
cause the death did not occur in Florida.

Both types of 1imitation are unde

sirable, because there are many variables to consider in deciding a conflict
of laws ques�ion such as this, and rigid statutory tests are not as 1 ikely to
produce acceptable solutions as decisions by courts.

Florida's dea'th of a minor

child statute, F.S. §768.03, has no requirement that the death occur in this
state.

It is difficult to think of a reason why the death of an.adult must oc

cur in Florida in order for a wrongful death action to be available that would
not equally apply to the wrongful death of a minor child.
The proposed wrongful death bi11 solves these problems.

All surviving

dependent relatives may recover their losses and not just one preferred class.
All actions presently possible are merged into one civil action to be brought
by the personal representative of the deceased person, including any surviving
action for personal injury.

The damage elements recoverable by the various
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survivors are carefully specified, and each survivor's share shall be
separately stated in the verdict.

There are some complications, of course,·

but all of these that can be foreseen are carefully provided for in\this
comprehensive statutory proposal, i.e., provisions for judicial protection
of minors and incompetents and for court approval of settlements where such
persons are involved or where� survivor objects.
In the case of Garner v. Ward,

the Supreme Court of Florida on July

1971 filed an opinion overruling many cases.

7,

In this case,.)�volving step

:'\

children and their wrongfully killed natural father, the Court held it could
no longer recognize the compulsory hierarchy of classes _set out in F.S. 768.02
so as to bar the minor children from any recovery.

It is assumed that the

Florida Supreme Court, having waited a number of years for the Legislature to
correct the injustices already discussed, decided to change the law by decision.
There is certainly no serious argument against fhe result reached in the p�r
tJc�lar case, because it permits the minor children of the deceased father to
recover the support lost to them by his wrongful death in spite of the fact
that he left a second wife surviving, who can also recover her damages under
the decision.

Yet, some of the language in the opinion will disturb many mem

bers of the Bar.

For example, "under the factual circumstances of cases such

as this, all persons who suffer loss as a result of the wrongful death and who
aie entitled to recover are proper parties.

All such persons may join, or upon

motion by the defendant should be joined by the court if it has jurisdiction.
l� these cases, the damages suffered by each survivor entitled to sue must be
and s�parately assessed."
-is not at all clear how this is to be managed in cases where there are
a great many claimants.

There will be cases where the deceased may have left

a surviving spouse, more than one set of minor children, dependent parents, and
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foster children and oth�r non-related dependents.

Who is in charge of the

litigation for the claimants, and which lawyers make the decisions for the
plaintiffs?

Who pays the various lawyers who may be involved _and fi\om what?

Suits may b� started in more than one county and, perhaps, in more than one
state depending on where the defendant may be legally served with process and
venue requirements met.

The complications are frightening.

There is no quar

rel with the particular result in Garner v. Ward, because many judicial tears

have been most justly shed over the plight of stepchi 1 dren JCl,,/ 1 or ida wi-ongfu 1
I\

death) itigation, but surely this case is the best example of the old adage
that "hard cases make bad law."
The bil I proposed by the Florida Law Revision Commission cures the bene
ficiary problem as well as the others mentioned herein, and plac�s the wrongful
death claims in one action to be brought by the personal representative of the
deceased just as the original Lord CampbelJ l s Act did, which, incidentally, is

still the law of England.9 The personal representative is the logical choice

because he is a fiduciary under control of_the courts, and this logic undoubtedly
explains why the wrongful death acts of many states name him as the ,one to bring
the action and assert the claims of those entitled to recover.

This bill is

prefiled for the session of the Legislature beginning in February, 1972, and
it is respectfully submitted that it provides a better solution to Florida's
wrongful death mess than anything else in sight.
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FLORIDA LAW REVISION COMMISSION
Mailing List for Wrongful Death Act
1.

Law Revision Commissions of the world

2.

Governor

3.

Senators (State)

4.

Representatives (State)

5.

Supreme Court Justices

6.

Ju::lges of the District Courts of Appeal

7.

Circuit Judges

8.

Federal District Judges

9.

The Florida Bar
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10.

Chairman of the Legislative Committee of the Florida Bar

11.

President of the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers

12.

Trial Lawyers' Section

13.

Judicial Council

14.

Interested members of law school faculties

15.

2 or 3 copies to ittorney general's office

16.

Each member of the Jurisprudence and Law Reform Committee of the
Florida Bar.

The Honorable John R. Blanton
Miami, Florida (Judge, Civil Court of Record)

Mr. Max I. Ossinsky
Daytona Beach

Honorable Edward S. Klein
Judge, Criminal Court of Record
Miami

Mr. Donald L. Gattis, Jr.
Or 1ando

Mr. Frank Schaub, President
Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association
Mr. Al Sepe, Assistant State Attorney
Mr. Marvin Mountz, County Solicitor
Mr. Ted Duncan, State Attorney

.'

Mr.

L. S. Powers·
University of Florida
College of Law
Gainesville, Florida
Dear Lynn:

·- ..·1 had a conversation with Bill Wagner in. Fort Lauderdale about. , : -:-·
our proposed revision of the wrongful deat� statute. Several
of the.comments he made impressed me so I asked him to send
me his points in writing and he· has done. so.
I have reviewed the points he has made, some of them with you,_.·.:·:\:·:>>;:
in previous correspondence and I find that most of them have
.•
been covered in subsequent drafts or were fully discussed by ;" · -; ){ \ ., · \
'
the Commission and rejected._ Only two of the points gave· me
·
concern.

< .• :'- ·.; · :�
.

.>t

The first point was our definition of survivors. Bill indicated ,.':.;/,:·.r
that it might be difficult to a�certain who the survivors were .._· .
under the rather broad terminology that w� ,used in the proposal •. ·:._
I, have carefully reconsidered the present language proposed in \<"· f,\) j
view of Bill·' s comments and have reached the conclusion that we ·.�;,•f.-;\·;· ;.f
1
should make no �hange there. I recognized th� force of Bill's. ;.
·
·. arg�ent and that the definttion is very broad and may; cause
·.:. · /��:::}
. :. ·
.
· .. ·:. some perplexing problems in, identification for the personal - .,\
:;
·
.
>. ,:- ·_· :_, · representative of the est'ate. I have weighed this on the one.
_hand with the desire to do justice' to' anyone who is a· dependent·. /;�,>:;·:;�
· :.
.
· · : · on the decedent and I have concluded that_ we made the proper. . .-::,__.
:· : : � ,: .- :.- .' :. �ecisioI?, in the proposal.
·

\>.'{.:��
,· /,.,1_<·�;
·-:�.,_-.·? /�

-�-<,;:-·',�

�-.·':-:�.)',.:\_:!
/;:;::{t\

'

I

' . The second point concerns· some form of notice to· the survivors·
� ·_ .. ·who may be entitled to benefit from the wrongful de�th action •.
.
.
· This is a difficult problem to solve in theory because of the
: · ·. · '-;:
'· broad definition of survivors. How�ver, in practice. I do not
:·- ·, think it will prove so difficult. In the ordinary case the
'dependent survivors or other beneficiaries will be rather ob- . , _.:. • :'):\
�---- vious.
I am, nevertheless,-concerned about the lack of provis1on· .._- ...:_:.:,.�
·
to
them. ' I· am not sure· that ·my_ reasons are the same·. "<·,_. .-_- ·:�
.. for
notice
._

\> ��;

.'I.•

·,.

•

/.' \

·:•

.

Mr. L. S. Powers-

Page 2.

October 8, 1971

as Bill's. Some cute constitutional qu�stions could arise if
there is• no notice. I do not think the notice has to be given
until the suit is begun, bu_t at some point the personal rep
resentative should be required to notify the survivors entitled
to the benefits of the Wrongful Death Act. If he does not do
so, how can.the claims for damages be adequately'presented?
Please let me have you� thoughts on this "! _
Best regards,
Henry P. · Trawick, _-Jr •.
HPT/pjh
cc:

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
The
Mr.
Mr.

Henry M. Kittleson
David F. Dickson
Wade L. Hopping
Honorable Talbot D'Alemberte'
Bill Wagner
James C. Quarles
'·
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The Honoreble Henr-y tit. Ktttleson
"'81tber, Law Revision Co,nfsslon
92 Lake wt re Drive
P.O. Drawer IN
Lakeland, Florida 33802
Dear Henry:
In reply to your letter of May 8. I think that you wlll agree that
we settled tlOSt of these things on the telephOft/8 on May 10 and that the
draft of May 12 elllbodla our conclusions. Cansequently. I wl II not
attefflPt to deal with all the •ttera r•f•ed 1ft your letter of May 8.
but I do with to •ke one er two c:..,.ts.
Scne of the changes we qreecl on lut Seturday and that are now
Incorporated ht the draft of May 12 are not changes that I would have
preferred. I r•tfze. how.ver, that h Is better to give In on tOl'le
111fnor otafls then to run tM risk of the prGPoe•d Wrongful Death Act
ftOt being enacted and that fs the reason why I h•ve been wflling to
agree to these changes. I 1111 speaking of the change allawln9 tunaral
expenses to be recovered rather than lnt•rest only, the dropping of an
action for the death of a vfabte fetua, and the ellmfn.atr°" of the cost
of rearing a minor chlJ4 ff d•ases for the d..th of• •fnor chl1d.
The••• along with • ,., other changes we udt prior to ta- draft of May
12, I would put In the cate,ory of changes fr• our earlier draft• In
order to uke the bf I I _,,.. palatable, but I cannot regard thM as changes
that are dealreble on • pollc:y buls. Yet, one has to be practlcal
and recogt1lze the nece11ttres of politics. Therefore, I heve gone along
with changes of this type In order to preser� the basic and fundeMntal
refol'IIIS that are stlll embodied h, the May 12 draft. Perheps we can
get,-. of the•• Jeul1onefl features Into our Wrongful Death Aet at
ION later date. Hy reason for mentfOftfng them In this letter to you
11 tn order to preserve my c•veat. I have enough uperlence with legls•
1etlve dreftfng to get over eny ,.. 11119 of pride of authorship. I
agree with everything••••• not Oft1y In feet IHlt In prfnclpfa, a stated
In your letter.

The Honorable Henry H. Kittleson

Page 2

Kay 14. 1969

To answer SOiie of your questions, the Statute of Lh1ltetfon1 period
as appllu to a wrongful death action rwna fr0t11 the date of the duth.
There It quite • problu If the $tatute of Ll•ltatf•• perfoct app11eable
to the personal Injury action has expired prior to the death. The
majority of Jurisdictions hold that since • n., cause of action In fevor
of new parties ta cr..ted by the Wrongful Death Act, the statute runs
only from the date of death and that the runnlrtg of the tlehatfons period
appllc.tbl• to the personal Injury wl It not be allCMed •• • defense to
the wrGn9ful death action. On tha other hod, • ,.lftOrlty of c:ourts have
reached the reverse concluslon on the bHII that a doth action only
comes Into existence If the d.ced.nt could have recovered for personal
Injury r, he had ltved. I have found no Florlda cue on this point and
would I Ike to 1eave It to the courts to decide. You and ICJime of the
others uy have a different feeling about this question. and we could
draft so q to deelde ft. Oft the other haftd, the Statute of Ll•ltatlons
for wrongful death la now• pert of F.S. 95.11 (6), and I think th•t we
decided at an earlier MMtfng of the Florida Law Revision COlllllll•• Ion
not to recOIIIIM-ftd any change• as to the limitations section.
In Wf'f opinion, there•• a sound basfs for • speclal llaftatlona period
for wrongful death actions, bec•us• It orcly begfM to run when the
death occurs, and there uy have already been e substantial period of
ti• t,efore the death but after the Injury wa Inflicted. As1U111ln9 ttwlt
the ·,-rson.1 Injury was caused by negllgence of the defendent aftCI that
over three years heve elapsed prior to the death, more than five years
could have elapsed after tha tortlous Injury wn lnflfeted before the
plalntlff has to begin the suft for wrongful de•th. Many states have
shorter 1 hnf tatIons periods for wrongful death ect Ions than two years.
but I think that two years Is pretty reasonable, I certainly woul4 not
1 Ike to see It shorter.
There Is one problem that I heve been thinking about for several
days, and I nNd your help and the help of any others who uy tt.v. 1oae
suggestions cORc:ernlng It. Our present Wrongful DMth Act provide•
that there sti.11 be a action for wrongful ••th "whenever the deeth of
any person In this state stMtll be caused," etc. Our proposed Wrongful
Death Act contains the SH9 fde4tt "When the de•th of • person In this
state, Jncludlng Its navlgeble waters, Is caused, .. etc. If our present
act end the propoaed act...,. what they ••Y• there Is no ectlon for
wrongful death arlsfng when a citizen of Florlda 11 Injured In Florida
but di• In another •tete, for ex-,le. et the Mayo CI lnlc. t have
checked the wrongful dffth legl1latlon of other stat••• and I cu find
no ••••••r ll�lt•tlon. The District of Colltlllbfa hat a Wrongful Death
Act that requires that th• act causing the Injury MUSt occur In the Dis•
trlct of Columbf• In order for a wrongful cle.th action to arise, and
Maryl•nd hn • provision that If the wrongf11I act occurs outside of
Maryl.nd that the Maryland court shall apply the law of the Jurisdiction
where the tortlous Injury occurred. Most of the 1tate1 have absolutely
nothing dealIng with the question of what needs to occur ln orct.r for the
state's wrongful death act to be epp11cable. As• result. the Intriguing
confll�t of laws questions arising In KIiberg v. North.eat Alrlfna,

..
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S-

Dr. Edgar H. Wilson, Executive Director
Florida Law Revision Commission
L. S. Powers

Suggested Amendments of Senator Truett Ott

v·ou have advised me that Senator Truett Ott has proposed adding the following
provision to both FS 768.0l and FS 768.03:
('3) Such right of action shall include all the rights and remedies
an injured person would have had had he survived, including those
rights and remedies provided by the maritime law of the United States. 11
11

note in the l�tter of Ernie Means to you that he thinks the primary objective
of these amen�ments to the Wrongful Death Statute is to strengthen the incor
poration of maritime law, the status of which he believes is in doubt under the
cases. It is my opinion that the incorporation of such a provision would run
counter to the basic philosophy of the proposed Wrongful Death Act which we have
drafted. The proposed new act contemplates that there will be no surviving
personal injury action where death has resulted from a personal injury. This
is in Section 6 of the proposed act, and it reads as follows: 11When a personal
injury results in death, no action for personal injuries of the decedent shall
survive under Section 46.021, Florida Statutes 1967, and any action pending at
the time of death shall abate.11 Then in other sections of the proposed act
damages that might have been recovered in a personal injury action are recover
able in wrongful death action, except for pain and suffering of the deceased
person.
I realize that wrongful death actions may arise from personal injuries inf! icted
on persons on navigable waters of the State and within the three-mile limit.
Yet, it seems to me that when a litigant avails himself of the State Wrongful
Death Act he should be treated the same as litigants whose actions arise on
land. I am afraid that to incorporate Senator Ott 1 s proposal in our new act
would have the effect of permitting a recovery of pain and suffering of the
deceased under the new act but only in the case of those who suffered a mari
time injury. Perhaps Senator Ott made his suggestion without knowledge of the
changes we are about to propose. If our bill should fail to pass, in other
words, it might then be well to give his suggestion further consideration. To
incorporate it into our proposed Wrongful Death Act would certainly create some
uncertainty as to the legislative intent concerning survival of personal injury
actions where a death had occurred.
I am returning Ernie Means letter and the text of Senator Ott's proposal.
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WEST PALM BEACH, FLORIDA

November 7, 1969

AREA CODE 305
TELEPHONE: 833-6673

Cer1on / {

Prof. Leonard s. Powers
University of Florida
Holland Law School
Gainesville, Florida 32601
Dear Len:

During the last meeting of the Board of Directors
� of the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, the proposed new
wrongful Death Act for Florida was discussed and our President,
Bill Tanney, requested me to review the proposed act in detail and follow the progress of any amendments or modifica
tions in order to accurately present it to the Boarq and
membership for evaluation.
It is my:understanding that the Law Revision
Commission met in T·ampa on November 1, 1969, and although I
am not aware of any intended discussion of the proposed
Wrongful Death Act at that time, I presume that you were present
at the meeting and would appreciate y6ur-aavis1:ng ttr�""T!"" "a'nyi:..:.••• ...,,
thing further was done referable to this particular piece of
proposed legislatio�.
Additionally, several questions have been raised
about the ramifications of the proposed act as presently
drafted and I will appreciate such interpretation or enlighten
ment as you may be-able to give me at this time. Specifically,
So. 2nd,.
the Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich, Fla.,
upholding 213 So. 2d 278 {Fla. App. 3d, 1969) decision con
firms through the Florida Supreme Court that punitive damages
are recoverable under the survival act as presently embodied
in Section 46.021, Florida Statutes and that this claim is
not dissipated because of the death of either the injured
party or the tort-feasor.
It is my understanding of the pro
posed act t�at any claim of this nature presently available
to the estate of the deceased victim of a defendant's negli,gence is abrogated by the death of the victim and the only re
maining claim thereafter exists in the form of a claim for
mental anguish which may be asserted by those dependents of
the decedent who can prove that his injury, lingering and sub
sequent death caused mental anguish to the dependent. Obvi
ously, this would be the result if it is the intention of the
Law Revision Commission to recommend that the legislature com
pletely abolish Chapters 768 and 46 as they relate to Wrongful
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Death and survival actions particularly since the proposed
act does not in its present form cover the subject of punitive
damages and in its original form specifically stated that no
punitive damages would be recoverable under the act. Fortun
ately, this particular provision was excised from the proposed
act and this would seem to be the only effort directed toward
this particular feature of the act to bring it into alignment
with the attitude and philosophy of the Florida Supreme Court
as set forth in the.Atlas Properties decision.
two-fold.

To simplify my inquiry, therefore, the question is
First, <lors the pronoscd act anticipate
that the
·

.
ed
<;Xisting clnim for ,eunitivc c1l!Dst3.C� wjJ.�
lcg1.slaE1vc s,y.f 9Cry. Second) y. j f so, will the claim survive
tne demise oi the in1ured victim or will it d1ss115�1:�·:..w1th
:✓

����e.. 2l a.3 ro.: .fo.i �tiC?i.i11C����rnns:�f e�-.r-I}s . _
1
e before death.

..

....,.,.,..
The second primary point which seems to be of some
concern at this juncture is the provision in the proposed
of apportioning
act which is designed to 1 -�
Frankly,
attorneys' fees among th res ective plaintif
this strikes me as an unworkable p
n un ess a single
attorney represents everyone who files a claim as a result
of the victim's wrongful death. Additionally; it would seem
that the attorneys' fee arrangement should remain a matter
of contract between the plaintiff and his counsel and
theoretically this fee should remain the same insofar as that
particular plaintiff is concerned regardless of whether or
how many others are.involved as plaintiffs. It would there
fore seem that this;provision as proposed is at best super
fluous and objectionable from a substantive standpoint as
suggested.

As we have discussed previously, I concur generally
with the concept that a new Wrongful Death Act is desirable
and that the existing act is shot with deficiencies. Further,
I am pleased and impressed with the job you have done as
the draftsman of th� proposed act and certainly my thoughts
as enumerated herein are intended to be constructive on be
half of the Academy so that the closest thing to perfection
can be achieved wh�n the ultimate version of the proposed
act is presented to the legislature.

As you know, the Academy is· still concerned with
several other areas such as recovery for the wrong'ful death
of a viable unborn .infant but I am in hopes that our joint ·
efforts will enable us to achieve considerable progress in s
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this area rather than sacrifice a good piece of legislation
over objections that have historically proven to be non
constructive.
After you have had an opportunity to review these
thoughts and give th�m some consideration I would appreciate
your response and, again, want to thank you for the fine
job you have done.
With kindest

Beverly
DB:mlr
cc:

Officers and Directors of AFTL
Larry Klein, Esquire

I
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REPLY TO:

ROY C.YOUNG

Lakeland, Florida
November 12, 1969

�- Henry P. Trawick, Jr.
Attorney at Law
2051 Main Street
Sarasota, Florida 33577
Re:

Florida Law Revision Commission
proposed new wrongful death act

Dear Henry:
I enclose a copy of a letter that I receiyed
today from Bill Frederick, who is a competent and intel
ligent plaintiff's personal injury lawyer. It does, I think
reflect the thinking of a typical active and aggressive
plaintiff's lawyer, who looks at causes of action,
arising out of negligently-caused deaths, as something
more than reimbursement to living persons for economic
loss that they have suffered or will suffer, Even
though there is no living person who has or will suffer
economic loss, the typical plaintiff's lawyer has a
deeply sincere, purely objective feeling that AngloAmerican jurisprudence and natural law should not allow the
tortfeasor to escape without having to pay money to someone >
and the plaintiff's bar is ready, willing and able to perform
this service in the interest of justice.
Sincerely yours,

Henry M. Kittleson
IMK:vs
cc:

Commission members
Executive Director
Dean Powers

TAMPA, FLORIDA 33601
TELEPHONE

(813) 223-1621

LAWOfflCES

MILLICAN & TRAWICK
LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL BUILDING
2051 MAIN STREET

SARASOTA, FLORIDA 33577

FRANCIS C. MILLICAN
HENRY P. TRAWICK,JR.

November 14, 1969

TELEPHONE �5-7136
AREA CODE 813

Mr. James C. Quarles, Executive Director
Florida Law Revision Connnission
College of Law, University of Florida
Gainesville, Florida 32601
Dear Jim:
On further reflection I agree with Len Powers about the change I sug
gested in connection with loss of earnings. I believe that loss of
earnings are covered in 768.21(6)(a) as it presently stands. His
proposal to specifically include loss of earnings is going to com
plicate the section more than need be because the definition of net
accumulations in 768.18(5) covers the point on loss of earnings.
I suggest we make no change in 768.21(6)(a).
I am concerned about the proposal to amend 768.21(6)(b) as suggested
because it may conflict with (5). But this problem can be eliminated
by adding to the suggestion in your letter of November 6 the following
"excluding amounts recoverable under subsection (5)".
I hope some of the other members of the Commission will give this
consideration so that we can iron out these two final problems.

HPT/lcg

/O <;'?-II\

""o

wD -Co 1,t v

November 20, 1969

Mr. Henry P. Trawick, Jr.
Attorney at law
Lawyers Professional Bldg.
2051 Hain Street
Sarasota, Florfda
Dear Henry,
I have seen a copy of your letter of November 14, 1969 concerning some
further changes In the proposed wrongful death act.

Concerning the matter dealt with In your first paragraph, I believe you
wlll agree that the full loss of earnings prior to death should be
recovered by the estate of the deceased. Net accumulations, as we have
defined It, does not Include amounts spent on the decedent's personal
expenses prior to death. Certainty his estate Is entitled to this as well
as net accumulations since such amounts would have been spent prior to his
death. In other words, net acc1111ulatlons Is quite appropriate for the loss
to the estate after death, but lost earnings without deductions, except support
of survivors which survivors will recover directly, seems to be the proper
measure of luch loss of Income prior to death. Consequently, I believe the
change I have suggested In 768.21(6)(a) Is appropriate although I agree
that this makes the provision more complicated.
. ,.

As to the matter mentioned In your second paragraph, I fully agree that
this wilt clarify a matter that needs clarification. Consequently, I
am suggesting to Jim Quarles that section 768.21{6){b) be amended as you
suggest.
Thanka very much for your Interest and perceptiveness. This ought to be
the most "cleaned"up" proposal ever to be presented to the Florida
leglslature.
Please cane to see us whenever you can.
Sincerely,
l. S. Pcwers
Assoc Iate Dean

cc: Hr. James c. Quarles, Executive Director�
Florida law Revis Ion Conmlss Ion

LAW OFFICES

BILLINGS AND FHEDEHICK
236 SOUTH LUCERNE CIRCLE AT DELANEY

JARED M. BILLINGS

OHLAND0, FL0H.IDA :32001
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Re: F lorida Law Revision Commission Proposed new Wrongful Death A ct
Dear Henry:
Tl:iank you for your consideration in forwarding to me, by
your letter of October 20th, the proposed new comprehensive Wrongful
Death Act.
The Act has many, many things to recommend its passage and
I certainly share the opinion that consolidation of the other wrongful death
statutes in this State properly belong in one comprehensive statute. I
assume that you are more particularly interested in possible shortcomings
which might be evident in the statute and I would make the following sugges
tions to you, pursuant to this.
Under 768. 20 1 1 Parties 11
It is apparent that this new statute >
completely abrogates the decedent's claim for pain and suffering as an as1set
of his estate. Presumably, this is picked up in the pain and suffering of the
survivor's action, but, of course, a lot is going to be lost in the transition.
The second item pertaining to this area is the case of an elderly
gentleman who is survived by no lineal descendants and who is killed instan
taneously. I had a case involving these facts where a man was killed by a
speeder fleeing from the police. The net result was that beyond burial
expenses, we had no item of damages. He was killed instantaneously. There
was no conscious pain and suffering as a result of the act. He had no accumu
lations, since he was on a pension and had no surviving spouse who could claim
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pain and suffering. It depressed me at the time that here was a wrong
without a remedy and some provision should be made for this. As I told
Leon Handley, if you're driving down the road and see a feeble old man
on the side of the road and you have a choice between running over him
and a crate of eggs, you'd probably be better off, financially, to run over
the old man.
The next item here is that under this consolidation, you may
eliminate the possibility of punitive damages. As you know, under existing
case law, there is no cause of action for punitive· damages in a wrongful
death action. It requires that there be some survival to lay the predicate
in the survival action. If we 're consolidated, what becomes of the possibility
of this claim? At the present time, !_have a very substantial lawsuit in
Brevard County involving the �eath of two minor children who were crushed
instantaneously. Under this new Act, would the possibility of punitive damages
be available? If not, certainly some provision should be made, so that if the
cause of action existed under a survival circumstance, the same cause of
action would inure to the estate.
Section 768. 24 severely curtails the benefits to a survivor who
dies before final judgment. What if a husband is killed and the wife lingers
for two years, deeply grieveq. and affected by the death? Knowing this, it
would substantially be in the interest of the insurance company to prolbng
the litigation to preclude her a just claim for pain and suffering, whic\1 is
the essence of her cause of action.
I have not had, really, the opportunity to examine all of the changes
as carefully as I would like, but I feel that these suggestions might be of inte3:est
to the committee. If I might comment furthe_r, be certain to give me a call
or drop me a note.
On balance, this is an excellent Act and I am sure with some
· minor adjustments, will receive the unanimous support of the plaintiffs' Bar.
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First Federal Building,
33132,
December 19, 1969.

Miami, Florida

James c. Quarles, Esquire,
Florida Law Revision commission,
College of Law,
University of Florida,
Gainesville, Florida 32601.
Re:

Sponsored Revision of Florida
wrongful Death Act.

Dear Mr. Quarles:
The writer has had an opportunity to review a
copy of the Florida Law Revision of the Florida wrongful
Death and Survival Statute and would like to offer the
following suggestions.
I believe that the idea behind the proposed
revision has several things to commend it. The existing
statutes on wrongful death allow for a separate wrongful
death action and also permit a survival action which can
be instituted as a separate suit. The propaeed statute
would eliminate this multiplicity of actions and would
provide for a single survival action and wrongful death
statute.
Under the present statute, the action is vested
solely in the surviving spouse even if there are minor
children who were dependent upon the deceased. The pro
posed revision would allow an award to be made in favor
of minor children in addition to that allowed for the
spouse. The proposed act would also provide for the
award to minor children to be protected by court order
by being placed in trust or otherwise.
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It seems to me, however, that the act goes too
far in allowing the parents or an adult deceased to
participate in the Judgment if the parents have lost
services performed by the deceased. This proposal would
apparently allow the parents to participate in the suit
if their adult child, for example, visited his parents
and periodically replaced lightbulbs or performed other
minor repairs about the house. In my opinion, this
would be going too far in compensating for the death or
a deceased and that recovery to parents should be strictly
limited to those cases in which they are actually physi
cally dependent upon the deceased child for support.
The definition of "services" in Section IV(4)
of the amended act is vague, ambiguous and poorly drafted.

Some of the comments_of the reporter concerning
the proposed act make no sense whatever. For example,
on page 46 of the report, paragraph D states that the
parents of the deceased unmarried minor should be entitled
to recover damages "which will reimburse the parents .for
the reasonable cost of raising the child to the time of
his death". It is elementary and traditional in the law
that damages are awarded only for injuries that are caused
by the negligence of the tort feasor. Obviously, a tort
feasor who is liable for the wrongful death of a minor
child did not cause the parents the expense of raising
the child to the time of his death. In my opinion it
is ridiculous to suggest that recovery should be allowed
for such expenses which would have been incurred in any
event, whether the child lived or died. The reporter
also suggests that the parents of a viable fetus born
dead due to the defendant's acts should recover the costs
of pregnancy and delivery as well as damages for mental
pain and suffering. This would effect a change in the
law as established by the Stokes v. Libert Mutual decision
and would allow a duplication or recovery {nasmuch as the
injured mother would, herself, be entitled to recover for
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medical expenses incident to a miscarriage as well as
her own pain and suffering including that incident to
the miscarriage.
The proposed act as drafted would repeal in
part Section 46.021, Florida Statutes, the survival
statute, where the deceased dies as a result of the
injuries inflicted by the tort prior to effecting reco
very. However, Section 46.021 is not mentioned anywhere
in the statute as being repealed.
A significant change in the existing law would
be effected by Section 6 of the act which provides: "A
defense which would bar or reduce a survivor's recovery
if he were the plaintiff may be asserted against him,
but shall not a.ffect the recovery of any other survivor."
Under this provision, if a mother was negligent in·
supervising a child which resulted ·in the child's:death,
the mother's recovery·would be barred b�t that or· the
father would not be affected. This, as I understand
it, would constitute a change in the . present iaw_ •. · .
In summary, it appears that the proposed act,
although desirable in some r�spects, would greatly
expand the amounts recoverable in an action for wrongful·
death and would permit recovery by survivors who now
have no right of recovery. Adoption of this statute
would unquestionably be a great boon to the plaintiff�s
bar.
.· I certainly hope that the above will be accepted
in the spirit in which it .is written; namely, to try to be
of some assistance to you and to the committee fn considering
this very i�portant revision.
If we can render any further assistance, please
do not hesitate to call upon us.
I
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January 3J, 1970

Hr. Wl111am H. Alper
Sams, Anderson, Alper & Spencer
Attorneys At Law
Seventh Floor, Concord Building
66 West Flager Street
Miami• Florida·
33130
Dear. Hr. Alpt:tr:
I apologize for the delay In replying to your letter of December 16, 1969.
· '.-We ,have had a hectic time here at the College of Law ending our fall quar
·<ter and beginning our winter quarter •
.

.The .report of the Law Revision Commission on. the proposed Wrongful Death
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CHAMBERS Or

ROGER J. WAYBRIGHT
CIRCUIT JUDGE
FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT Or FLORIDA
206 OUVAL COvNTY COURTHOUSE
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA 32202

Fepruary 6, 1970

Honorable w. E. Grissett, Jr.
First Bank and Trust Building
231 East Forsyth Street
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Dear Ted:
Re:

Florida Law Revision Commission
recommendations and report on
Florida Wrongful Death Statutes

I have read with interest the brochure dated December
1969 enclosed with your letter of February 3.
The commission's recommended wrongful death act appear
ing on pages 9 - 12 of that brochure seems to me to be very good,
and I would like to see it enacted into law.
The only suggestions I have in connection with it are
these: In subsection (6) of the proposed section 768.18 (appear
ing as lines 21 - 24 on page 11 of the brochure) the language is
used If the decedent's survivors include a surviving spouse or
lineal descendents, loss of net accumulations beyond death and
reduced to present value may also be recovered.
While it is
clear to me on close examination that this means that the loss
�f net accumulations may also be recovered by the decegent's
personal representative for the decedent's estate, it would per
haps help to ward off considerable expressions of garbage by
murky thinkers if the words were to be added "by the personal
representative for the decedent's estate". Proposed section
768.25 (appearing as lines 1 - 5 on page 12 of the brochure)
is of course not objectionable, but I am sure you realize that
in practical operation approval by a court is virtually meaning
less because the court could not have an adequate basis for
intelligent approval or disapproval unless the data as to extent
11

11
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of injury to the minor or incompetent should be presented on as
full a scale as if during a trial between contesting parties,
and that is never done in the course of a "friendly suit", nor
can the court make parties who are not in disagreement act like
they are to the extent of presenting evidence full scale.
Cordially yours,

� P.-wa�ight
RJW:gp

ROGER J. WAYBRIGHT
CIRCUIT JUDGE

FLORIDA LAW REVISION COUNCIL
- THE-HOLLAND BUILDING
WADE L. HOPPING
CHAIRMAN

C. McFERRIN SMI.TH, Ill

TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32304

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

(804) 488-2937

April 24, 1974
Mr. s. David Cox
200 N.E. 1st Street
Gainesville, Florida

32601
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Dear Mr • Cox :
Representative Kenneth MacKay has referred to me your letter
of April 8, 1974, inquiring about legislative intent behind chap
ter 72-35, Laws of Florida, the Wrongful Death Act. Buddy refer-,
red this inquiry to my office because the l�gislation which ultimately became chapter 72-35 was drafted by the Law Revision
Council.
The Supreme Court's opinion in the case of McKibben vs.
Mallory is a very accurate reflection of the true legislative
intent. The court construe� the act to apply prospectively only,
thereby leaving the old wrongful death act to apply to cases which
arose prior to the enactment of the new act. This was the only
result the court could have reached without construing the new
act so as to abolish causes of action which were pending on the
effective date of the new act. Therefore, rather than creating
an injustice the court properly construed the new act to avoid
a serious injustice.
One of the most thoroughly debated provisions of the new
wrongful death act was the omission of the deceased's pain and
suffering as an element of damages in wrongful death actions.
This item was very intentionally omitted from the act by the Law
Revision Council, and the Legislature was very much aware of its
...omission when 72-35 was passed. The reasons for this omission
were two:
(1) The bill provided a new element of damages which
had- previously only been recoverable in the case of a wrongful
death of a minor. That element is the mental pain and suffering
of a survivor - in this case the surviving spouse. This additional
element of damages was consistent with the Council's objective of
____ providing compensation-- for---actual damages to those· who are capable
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of being compensated. Obviously, a dead person is beyond
compensation.
(2) The above reason ties in with the second
reason; the objective of making the new wrongful death act
compensatory in nature only, thereby eliminating punitive
damages and any measure of damages which amounted -to punitive
damages. The only reason ever advanced for allowing a survivor
to recover the decedent's pain and suffering was that we would
somehow be punishing the wrongdoer, or keeping some insurance
company from getting off the hook. Although this might be the
way many plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lawyers feel, this does not
represent any form of legitimate compensatory damages, but rather
punitive damages under the guise of "compensating the deceased
through his survivors".
Therefore, when you couple the creation of a new mental pain
and suffering element of damages with the objective of eliminating·-
any punitive aspects from the elements of damages, you result in
-----··· a very intentional elimination of the decedent's pain and suffering.
Many plaintiffs' lawyers do not accept this basic premise, and it
is of course a judgment question on which rea·sonable men may differ.
However, the legislature was presented with both sides of the argu
ment and was very much aware of what it was doing.
I hope this has provided some explanation for you of the
problems referred to in your letter to Buddy. If I can give you
any further information please let me know. I will enclose for
your information a copy of the Law Revision Council pamphlet on
the new Wrongful Death Act.
Sincerely,

c-!l1U��11iJ:

C. McFerrin Smith, III
CMS/pw
encls.
cc: Kenneth MacKay
Wade Hopping
Jack Harkness
w • . E. Grissett
Sylvan Strickland

FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TALLAHASSEE
KENNETH H. MACKAY, JR.
IEPRESENTATIVE, 30TH DISTRICT
P.O. BOX 1668

April 15, 1974

OCALA, FLORIDA 321570

COMMITTEES:

Chairman
Vice Chairman

GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS,
EDUCATION,

A PPROPRIATIONS
JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDITING
RULES lie CALENDAR

Mr. Jack Harkness
Staff Director
House Judiciary Committee
House Office Building
Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Dear Jack:
I am enclosing a letter from Mr. S. David Cox
an attorney who practices in Gainesville.
As you will see, Mr. Cox is concerned about the
application of the wrongful death statute, by virtue
of the construction of the Florida Supreme Court in
the case of McKibben v. Mallory.
This is not an area in which I have any particular
expertise, and I am at a loss to answer Mr. Cox in a
meaningful manner. I hope you will be able to provide
the information which he needs.
Sincerely,
7

fi/�c- �-/
K. H. MacKay, Jr.
�,..,_,,/

KHMjr:pw
Enclosure
cc:

Mr. s. David Cox
Barton & Cox
Attorneys at Law
200 NE 1st Street
Gainesville, Florida

32601

LAW OFFICE

BARTON & COX
200 N. E. 1ST STREET
GAINESVIL.L.E, FL.OAIOA

32601

PHILIP 'BARTON
S. DAVID COX

TIELE,-HONE
Alll<A CODE SI04
378•4871

HAROLD SILVER
CHRISTOl"HER W. WICKERSHAM

April 8, 1974

Honorable Kenneth H. MacKa.y
Post Office Box 1668
Ocala, Florida

�!tit,

Dear Representati

�

I have just1attended a continuing legal education seminar and
it bas brought out that the new wrongful death statute chapter
72 - 35 Laws of Florida, designated as Section 768.16 through
768.27 Florida Statutes, adopted by the legislature during the
1972 legislative session, that there are two glaring injustices
that would be resul�ing from an obvious omission from the statute.
The Supreme Court in its decision of McKibben v. Mallory, et
al., case number 44,653 in the July term of 1974, opinion filed
on March 20, 1974 construed the statutes as to retain the wrong
ful death action of persons dying prior to July 1, 1972.
The glaring inequity of the new statute about which there seems
to be some confusion as to the reading and interpreting of the
statute is that the legislature has inadvertently somehow
omitted the pain and suffering of the deceased from the time of
an injury until the time of his death, if the deceased had not
secured a recovery prior to his death. Death has never pre
viously terminated any rights on pain and suffering and it is
a feeling of a great many of the lawyers in the state that this
was inadvertently omitted and was not designed intentionally by
the legislature to create a sudden windfall or escape for the
insurance companies who are the real parties at interest and who
would have to bear the expense of said pain a nd suffering in the
event of automobile accidents or other negligence matters generally.

Would you please address yo
urself to this matter an
d rectify
sa me during this session.
Please advise me of your po
si
matter. With kindest perso tion and the prgress of this
nal regards, I remain
Very
S
SDC/nbt

uJJy Yours,
�

./.J;(f;id Cox
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April 18, 1975

Mr. McPherin Smith,
Law Revision Council,
Tallahassee, Florida 32302.
Dear McPherin:
I enjoyed our conversation immensely of April 17,
1975, in regard to the Florida Wrongful Death Statute.
As you know, I was interested in the ef feet, .if
any, of the Majority Statute upon the definition of a "minor"
under the Wrongful Death Statute. You, of course, expressed
your opinion that the change in definition of a "minor" under
the Majority Statute affected all Florida statutes in which
the term "minor" was used, including the Wrongful Death
Statute. Expressing a contrary view, for the sake of argu
ment, you told me that what was involved under the Wrongful
DeathAct in the case of a deceased minor child, was really
the rights or obligations of the parents, and, therefore, a
technical reading of the Majority Statute would not necessarily
apply.
I tried to recall, _whi.le speaking wi.th. you, an earlier
conversation that I had with one o! the associates in this
Finn, but could not call it to mind at the tune. Since our
conversation, however, I have discussed this matter again wit�
Mr. Roger Blackburn of our Firm, and would want to pass along
·
his comments to you. He begins with the premise that the

Mr. McPherin Smith,
April 18, 1975,
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definition of "minor" as used in the Wrongful Death Statute
necessitates an unitary definition, inasmuch as it is
defined in the Wrongful Death Statute in F.S. 768.18(2)
as unmarried children under 21 years of age. Under the
Wrongful Death Statute, there are two senses in which the
term "minor child" appears. One, is the case where the minor
child is the deceased, and his parents are bringing the action.
This was the case that you had in mind when we· spoke over the
telephone. The other case, however, is where the minor
child is the survivor bringing the action because of the
death of his parent. In that case, the rights or liabilities
of the minor would be directly involved, and therefore the
legislative intent as expressed in the Majority Statute
would clearly apply. No one would, therefore, reasonably
argue that a 19 year old would be considered a minor child
under the Wrongful Death Statute in bringing an action for
the loss of his parent. Since an unitary definition is
required when the term "minor child" appears in the Wrongful
Death Statute, then a 'de·ceased under the age of 18 must· also
be considered a minor. In short, it would be hard for an
attorney to argue that the terJl! "minor" is defined in one sense
under the Wrongful Death Statute if the minor is a deceased,
and in another sense if he is a survivor.
I will take your advice and contact Dr. Ernest
Means, at my earliest opportunity. I again wish to express
my deep gratitude to you and to your secretary for the time
spent with me on this important matter.
Very truly yours,

r l!!_�c/�
�\TH L. OLSEN
For the Firm

KLO/kt

WRONGFUL DEATH

I

Wrongful Death at Common Law
A.

Lord Ellenborough said in Baker v. Bolton (1808).

11 • • •

in a civil court, the death of human being could not be
complained of as an injury. 11
B.

Common Law's Evolution
1.

Anglo-Saxon law treated all homicides as private.

The blood fend was relied upon to keep the peace.
2.

The notion of the "King's Peace 11 crept in with a

fine or !lwergild 11 paid to the crown for each homicide.
3.

By the 13th century the evolution was complete with

every homicide being a criminal offense.

Even in unintentional

homicides the defendant forfeited his goods to the crown,
thus leaving a judgment proof defendant - this probably was
the source of the doctrine of merger.

4.

Thus Lord Ellenborough had

11

rnerger" and "the action

dies with the plaintiff'' to underly his statement.
II

Statutory Remedies - Survival and Death Acts.
A.

Lord Campbell's Act - first Wrongful Death Act, enacted

in 1846.
B.

Became the model for most american death acts.

Major featurer of Lord Campbell's Act.
1.

Creates an entirely new cause of action.

2.

Cause of action dependant on deceased having had a

cause of action if he had not died.
3.

Action brought by decedent's personal representative

for the benefit of named beneficiaries.
-1-

4.
C.

Damages measured by losses suffered by 'beneficiaries.

Florida's Act, enacted in 1833, deviated from Lord

Campbell's act in important respects; mainly beneficiaries.
D.

Florida also had a survival act (F.S. §46.021) and an

act for the death of a minor child (F.S. §768.03 - 1899).
III
A.

Survey of Wrongful Death Acts.
Acts giving Rise to Liability.
1.

Torts - traditional P.I. - intentional or negligent.

2.

Strict liability - e.g. inherently dangerous activities.

3.

Breach of Contract - purely statutory, as in Fla. 's

new act.
4.

Breach of Warranty - products liability and malpractice -

new trend.
5.
B.

Unseaworthiness - a type of strict liability.

Theories of Damages
1.

Survival Statutes - only allows damages that decedent

actually suffered.
2.

Loss to Survivors - Lord Campbell's Act - there are

varying degrees of measuring survivors' damages (pecuniary
vs. sentimental losses).
3.

Loss to Estate.
a.

Includes hybrid survival - death act jurisdictions.

b.

Some states have Lord Campbell's Act with

courts construing it as a loss to estate act.
4.

Florida's new act is a loss to survivors act with

loss to the estate damages awarded in some situations.
Florida's old act was a screwed-up loss to survivors act
with the estate being the last in the class of survivors.
-2-

IV

Florida's Philosophy
A.

There should be one law suit only.

All claims should

be litigated in that one suit, brought by P.R.
B.

Loss to Survivors � We mean to compensate the living -

some losses to the estate are permitted to insure the complete
compensation of the survivors.
C.

Basis for liability - same as Lord Campbell's Act, but

including breach of contract and warranty.
D.

Damages calculated from the time of injury - this

facilitates the combination of the old survival action with
the death action, except for pain and suffering of decedent.
E.
V

Special verdict - patterned after Lord Campbell's Act.

Florida's New Act - a few questio--ns.
A.

Has the definition of "minor" been altered.

B.

Does §768.20 successfully abate any survival action?

C.

Has the statute (§768.21) abolished damages for decedent's

mental pain and suffering. (Kluger v. White}.
D.

What is the effect of re-marriage of the surviving

spouse?
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HARRIETT AND SPROULL----·
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
:114 ■T. JCHH■ AVlCHUIC

PALATKA, F'LORICA

December 19, 1974

Senator Jim Glisson
Post Office Box 296
Pioneer Building
Taveres, Florida 32778
Re: Albert Beard
Dear Senator Glisson:
Mr. Beard has come to our office and discussed with us the
apparent problem he has in not having a Cause of Action for his son's
death, as a result of the new Florida Wrongful Death Act.
As you well know, the definition of minor in Florida Statute
Section 1. 01 has now been changed to define a minor as being a person
who has not attained the age of eighteen years. Said change in the age
for minority was accomplished by Chapter 73-21 of Laws enacted in
the 1973 Regular Session of the Florida Legislature. Section 4 of Chapter
73-21 specifically provides that any law inconsistent herewith is hereby
repealed to the extent oi such inconsistency in editing the manuscript for
the next revision of the Florida Statute. The Statutory revision and indexing
service is hereby directed to conform existing statutes to the provisions of
this act.
Ap?arently, from the wording of this Section of the Chapter, the
Statutory revision and indexing S,1,,J}�{./or the State of Florida in its 19 74
revision will amend Florida Statufe� 18, sub-Section 2, to read: a minor
child means unmarried children u:-ider eighteen years of age; therefore, it
would appear at first glance that Mr. Beard does not have a Cause o:f Action
for his son's death with the exception of medical and/or funeral expenses
and any loss of support that Mr. Beard's son may have provided him by both
money and/or services.
The legislature, in redrafting the Wrongful Death Act, apparently
thought it had done a commendable job; but as your office and our office
knows they failed to do so in a number of circumstances. In the ·,1e.w Wrongful

-- ---

- en- ator Glisso;.

December 19, 1974

Death A ct it states that its p .irpose is, and that the public policy of the
State of Flo:--ida is , to shift the losses resulting when wrongful death
occurs frorn the survivors of the decedent to the wrong-doer. and that
the m?w Wronful Death Act sub-sections are remedial an::l should be
liberally construed.
1

Howe·-rer, u::ider the prior law a pa.�·ent could re ,:over for the
pain a::id suffering for the death of the minor child. Under the n�w Wrongful
Death Act such recovery is prohibited. So, apparently, what the leg"islature
has said is that when a minor child dies leaving no lineal decend-z:--.ts, no one
suffers and pain of suffering for his death not even his parents. As you well
know that doesn 1 t come fort with common sense and logic. It is undeniable
that parents suffer great loss and great pain and suffering for the death of
the minor child.
Also, quite obviously, this piece of legislation is not as carefully
drafted and written as a close examination of the preamble to this act and
other recordings of hearings that may have taken place prior to the passage
of this act may reveal that the legislature did not intend for this result to
occur. F.owever, we have not been able to find such legislative readings
from odd sources of research material.
We feel that a Court suit to determine the intent of the legislature
in redrafting the Florida Wrongful Death Act would only result in the Court
affirming the strict wording of the language. Ho'.'vever, if the minutes of
hearings and committees which passed upon and forwarded 0:1 this legislation
for reapproval indicate otherwise then such a Court suit may have different
results.
If you have any information in this regard or if you wish any further
information from us, please do not hesitate to contact us.

JFS:dr
cc: Albert Beard

January 23, 1975

Mr. John F. Sproull
314 St. Johns Avenue
Palatka, Florida 32077
Dear Mr. Sproull:

Your letter of December 19, 197§, to Senator Glisson
regarding the new Wrongful Death Act has been forwarded to
my office for a reply. This letter was referred to us
because the Law Revision Council prepared the original re
commendation which the Legislature subsequently enacted as
the new Wrongful Death Act.
I presume from the tone of your letter that Mr. Al•ert
Beard had a son who reached the age of majority when he was
killed by the wrongful act of another. Based upon these
facts your question ·1s - was it the intent of the Legislature
to deny to the parents of an adult child recovery of damages
for their pain and suffering resulting from the child6s
death?

Since I was Executive Director of the Law Revision Coun
cil when this recommendation was passed by the Legislature
I can relate to y�u the aspects of the porposal which were
discussed most thoroughly by the committees. The House Judi
ciary Committee, chaired by Representative Talbot D'Alemberte,
and the Senate Judiciary Committee, chair·ed by Senator Demps,y
Barron, both discussed in detail the proposal's failure to pro
vide damages fpr any mental pain and suffering except in the
limited cases of a surviving spouse and the parents of a
minor child. Therefore, to the extent that your letter in
dicates that the new act does not permit mental pain and suf
fering damages to the parents for the death of a minor child
you are incorrect. See Fla. Stat. §768.21(4).
However, your question seems more directed at the· new
act's failure to allow the recovery of the parent's mental
pain and suffering for the death of an adult child. This was

M�-- John F. Sproull
January 23, 1975
Page Two

a very intentional omission both by the Law Revision Council
and by the Legislature, acting through its committees. The
old act did not allow these damages, and both the Council and
the l&gislatdYe committees felt that public policy required
a continuation of the old act's policy placing a limitation
on damages for mental pain and suffering. In selecting a
cut-off point, itwwas felt that when a child reaches the age
of majority he leaves his childhood family unit and establish
es a family of his own. This, of course, will vary some from
individual to individual. However, the very existence of a
concept of minority vs. majority implies that when one obtains
that age, the connection with the family unit is altered in
aome respects. Therefore, the new Wrongful Death Act merely
recognizes the age of majority as that point in ones life
at which he leaves his original family unit.
Your complaint seems to address the question of when one
reaches the age of majority rather than what effect reaching
this age has on rights of the surviying parents under the
Wrongful Death Act� Whether the age of �afority should be 18
or 21 or some other age is a seperate question from the
application of the Wrongful Death Act. Whatever the age of
majority, the Wrongful Death Act was intended to use that as
the date beyond which surviving parents could not recover
damages for their mental pain and suffering. As pointed out
earlier, this is not a change from the old wrongaul death act.
The only change in this respect was tee seperate piece of
legislation which cha:nged -the age of tfiajority from 21 to 18.
In summary, since parents of a deceased adult child could
not �ecover damages for their mental pain and suffering under
either the old or new wrongful death acts, your complaint
appears to·be with ch. 73-21, Laws of Florida, relating to the
age of majority. On the other hand, if Mr. Beard's son was a
minor, he still has his cause of action for mental pain and
suffering just as he did under the old wrongful death act.
I hope this information has been of some assistance to
you. If I can help in any other way please let me know.
Sincerely,

CMS/js
cc:

Sylvia Alberdi
Charles Hood
Senator Jim Glisson
w. E. Grissett
Harold S. Wilson

C. McFerrin Smith, III

�'.l'IN\v, UNITED SEOURITY SERVIOESi INO.
Cite as, Fla., 314 So.2d 765

ma. 765

·tionfforf�Qti'Spira"Cy·i�hetein, the; appellant financial worth· is ·meager, •it· .would· be .to
· ,assertedr-that}�liel ,verdict for punitive dam his advantage to introduc� �uch·•evidence in
-�ges :ag;iinst d1im :couid· not. stand ; for lack order to mitigate the .damage award. ,/As
' ' . -:ot.i�\fideiicerofrJiis\ fiiia'ncial iwcirt1r; the· Su- was 'stated·•hy Sutherlan<!,. in'ihis'.-Treatise
. ;:"::,,'ll-enie'C<nftit
Carolina:held',
·on Damages;-§ ·404 at-::,1315,.:,,."Jn-',cases
}$-���-•�1r,-�•.1r(�,:;-,r,•i•· 1t:•-x��:�·�•1:--- �.. �•; 2�H ' �
where it is competent · for the plaintiff to
fJ>I>��!a1:1�,-�z:e��, ��� ,�sse�t� _as a prove the wealth ,of the :defendant to· ·in
-:, part of the-argument.of himself. and the
crease the damages, it is equally competent
T��is c°«»npany\hat the'° ve�di�t for pu- for
the defendant to show a want of it to
nitive damages' against him cannot stand
diminish them."
for ·1ack of . evidence· of his·· financial
·: worth/ 1· The only> evidence · which we Accordingly, the decision of the District
•;,:flnd i�: the1-'reccirci•touching this defend Court of Appeiil; Third District, is . ap
:,ant's finani:fal, condition is that he was proved and the writ is discharged.
1'·'• �ne''manager or representative for the
z
It is so ordered.
Texas Corporation with extensive terri
tory; but he cites no authority, and we
ADKINS, C. J., McCAIN and ENG
know of none, that' requires evidence of
a defendant's financial worth to warrant LAND, JJ., and ORLANDO, Circuit
a finding of punitive damages if there is Judge, concur.
other required evidence upon which to
base such a finding. All the authorities
are to the effect that the financial ability
. of- iLaefendant is·a facFfor considera
tion of the jury but, as stated, none of
. which we know �ake ' it a requisite.
Th�re may well be. cases, this one of
- -· them, where sources of evidence of a de Beverly C; MARTIN, as Administratrix c. t. a.
of the Estate of Joyce Chesworth
fendant's worth are not available to the
Atchley, Deceased, Appellant,
plaintiff. Such information is peculiarly
,•-•Within- the possession of the ··defendant
v.
and in this instance, although he testi
UNITED SECURITY SERVICES, INC.,
fied, he furnished none, and we do not
a corporation, Appellee.
think that under these circumstances
James MOBLEY, as Administrator of the
he should be heard to complain of its ab
Estate of James Kelvln Mobley, De
sence or paucity."
ceased, et al., Petltlon,ers,
Cf�.'-Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233
v.
S.C. 567, 106 S.E.2d 258 (1958), and Par
AMERICAN
BANKERS
INSURANCE COM•
ker v. Hoefer, 118 Vt. 1, 100 A.2d 434

�J':'.X��

--

'oH,out�

°'" ., :

0

v�s3y;

For the foregoing· reasons, we
agree with the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, sub judice in answering the
certified question posited by the trial court
·in the negative and we hold that evidence
·,,:,.;:;:....._of firtS:ncial worth is admissible and may
-, -- ·be considered by the jury in its determina
,;...::.�: ': ti'6n of the amount to be a\\'.arded af puni
tive damages, but evidence of worth" is not
a requisite to such award. If defendant's

PANY OF FLORIDA, a Florlda Cor

poration, et al., Respondents.
Nos. 44651 and 45702.

Supreme Court of Florida.
April 23, 1975.
Rehearings Denied

July 18, 1975;

Actions were brought involving consti
tutionality of Wrongful Death Act. The
Circuit Court in and for Duval County,

766

Fla.
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John J. Cox, J., upheld constitutionality of . wrongful death of decedent was reasonable
the Act and appeal was taken. The Cir alternative to dividing among sutv1vors:the
cuit Court in and .for ·Dade County, Fran -amount formerly recoverable .under sti.r.vi
·cis x: Knuck, J., certified question con- vor statute for decedent's pain and suffer
cerning constitutionality of the • Act. The ing and, therefore elimination· of! survivors'
Supreme Court, Overton, J., held that sepa right to recover for pain and suffering of
rate lawsuit for death-resulting personal
decedent was not unconstitutional. "West's
. injuries cannot be:J>roµg_ht---as a sucvival F.S.A. §§ 46.021, 768.16-768.27..
action but can be brought-in a-consolidated
form under the Wrongful Death Act; that 4. Death ,g::,93
title of the Wrongful Death Act provided
Punitive damages for negligently
sufficient notice of provision consolidation
caused death may be claimed when one- or
survival and wrongful death claims into
more of the elements of compen,s�tory
one action; · that right of surviving close
damages recoverable under 'wrongful
relatives to recover under the Act for
Death Act are established but there can be
their pain and suffering brought about only
one punitive damages recovery' for
by wrongful death of decedent is a reason
each death for which claims o'f survivors
a�le alternative to dividing among survi
may be instituted under the Act;-. survivors
vors amount formally recoverable under
are not entitled to individual claims-for pu- .�,�- _ •
survival statute for decedent's pain and
nitive damages. West's F.S.A. §§ 768.16suffering; and that punitive damages may
768.27.
·be claimed under the Wrongful Death Act
when one or more of elements of compen
5. Damages ,g::,s1(2)
satory damages recoverable under the Act
Punitive damages are recoverable· only
are established, but that there can be only
when
actual damages are shown.
•·. one ..punitive .damage._ recovery· for each
death.
Remanded.·

Charles P. Pillans, III, Bedell, Bedell,
Dittmar, Smith & Zehmer, Jacksonville, for
appellant.

I. Death ,g::,10

Separate lawsuit for death-resulting
personal injuries cannot be brought as a
survival action under . survival statute but
can be brought; ii;i a consolidated form, un
der the Wr�ngful D�atn·'Act: West's F.S.
A §§ 46.021, 768.16-768.27, 768.20.
2. Statutes �ll7(1)J•. •.·""·•" ,.,.·.:._., ..

Arnold R. Ginsberg, Fuller, Brumer,
Moss, Cohen & Rodgers, and Horton &
Perse, Miami, for petitione_rs.
Marion R. Shepard, Mathews, 0.s.b,<;>�ll.!j_,1
Jaclcj.
Ehrlich,
McNatt,. Gobelman & Cobb,
•
.. . ., �-.
,•.371�.
sonville, for appellee.
::
;/
, ;-,:ill
William E. Sadowski, Helliwell, Melr�f) ·
& DeWolf, Miami, for respondents.

Title of Wrongful b;atit' Act provided
sufficient notice· of 'in.tint' to -' consolidate
i�� ...¼1
survival and '' wrongful
··death claims into • . Robert Orseck, Podhurst�. ; qr�_1:cJs�
,
, 'd•!•,...., �---, 1,t• '•i ,
one action and led° one reasonably to in- Parks, Miami, . ..for. Academy. of_:,}i'lo,r,t
.
•. ')'
quire 'into body'�£ th'f\.fct>f1West's F.S.A. Trial Lawyer�,- :,imi�tts, curia�: >i�--� ';:1-';i
_..
• � �:{ /�t.>.:.
§§. 768J6-768.27,· 7�..z<(k( ,/ ,1
� ·:'i�,:t��·\;�
•

·,\.:,

3. Death ,g::,9

·:.:-Right of 'surviving ·dose ·relatives un
der :·wrongful · Death'.'.:Act to recover for
theit'p�1n· and 'suffering� brought· about by

•

..

�. \

,

,

•

�

!

·

.d-·H:l·.:

_oyERTON;
justice. • ,'. . _; ,.:.
-- - 1•,-; .. �: :� • , •

\•i L,�1�Dv1n.o:)

These s•two
cases• ,, concer11- 1v- t
constitutionality of Florida's new,, W.r.9·
ful Deathlt<��ct,.: Sections • 76$.}�Z-�:

Fla. 767
Cite as, Fla., 314 So.2d 765
f1Qr,{di!, 1StflttJte� (1973).1 : Specificallyf'/\'{e the: subject,. of>considerable litigatiori arid
�re:�*�d,;,Jl:�il p_etermine whether ;;,the ,/new judicial construction. ;-E;g;,. Stokes v; :Lib
4,�J.i!--�i�<!P����tj.on���Y,, elimi1_1at�d1--FJ�i,ns erty .Mutual,Insura_n�erCompany; 213 So.2d
1#)��:J,tb�;:.sq_ry.iv_al_;;statute;, Section -:46.021, 695 ·(FlaJ968) ;>' Sincfafr;,Refining Co...;,v:
fJpri'd�· 1St��tttes:;{1973); for (1) pain·. and Butler, 190 So.2d 313. (FlaU966); Unde.r
sufJ�rjng [of . a decedent and (2) punitive these prior statutory .provisions; two sepa
d�ges. pursuant to Atlas Properties, Inc. rate and'.. independent - causes .--:of ·action
could be brought for a negligently caused
v. Didich, 226 So.2d 684 (Fla.1969).
death. Ake v. Birnbaum,· 156 Fla. 735, · 25
In Martin · v. United Security Services,
So.2d 213 '-(1946); Epps v. Railway Ex
Inc., the Circ�it Court fo� Duval County
press Agency, 40, So.2d 131 (Fla.1949);
specifically upheld the constitutionality of
Shiver · v. Ses·sions; 80 ·so.2d . 905 (Fla.
Sectio�s -768.16-768.27, and, by gra�ting a
1955); Parker v. City of Jacksonville, 82
motion. to strike, denied the plaintiff-appel
So.2d 131 (Fla.1955).
lant's claim for punitive· damages. In
First, the administrator of a decedent's
Mobley v. American Bankers Insurance
Company, the Circuit Court for Dade estate could maintain a.survival action on
County certified the constitutionality of behaH of the d�ceased· under Section 46.these statutory provisions to this Court as 021, Florida Statutes. The elements of
a question of great public interest. In both damage recoverable under this statutory
cases jurisdiction vests in this Court pursu provision were the decedent's pain and
ant to Article V, Section 3(b), Florida suffering? medical expenses,3 loss of earn
i_ngs betw��n" the time of _the.-accident
Constitution.
and his deafh,4 and' funeral expenses:IS
We hold that Sections 768.16-768.27,
Punitive damages were also recoverable
Florida Statutes, are constitutional to the
under this statute.8
extent that they consolidate survival and
wrongful death actions and substitute for a
Second, ·a widow; a widower; a surviving
decedent's pain and suffering the survi child, a dependent, or an administrator
vors' pain and suffering as an element of could maintain a wrongful death action un
_ damages, We fµrther hold that punitive der· the prior provisions· of Chapter . 768,
damages are not eliminated by the Act and Florida Statutes. The elements of dam
may b� recovered once for each death in ages recoverable under these prior wrong
an action under said sections if the facts ful death statutory provisions were: A
justify the imposition of this penalty.
widow's claim 1or loss of support, future
MAR1IN,v. ·UNITED.SECURITY SERVICES,, INC.

. frior Statutory Actions Involving a Death
by Wrongful Act

- •-- ------

Prior to the enactment of the statutory
prov1S1ons now under attack, the sta_tutes
pc,:rtaining to negligent death cases we_re
I,. Chapter �. Laws of Florida, 1972.

2. Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 25 So.2d
213 (1946).

s: Id.
4. See Ellis v. Brown, 77 So.2d 845 (Fla.
-�-·: - 1900). ·
5.-- Sinclair Refining Co. v. Butler, 190 So.2d
313 (Fla.1966).

estate, comfort, companionship, protection,
and marital relations, together with the
loss of services in taking care of the
family 7 and loss of support for the minor
children; 8 a· widower's claim for loss of
hi� wife's consortium and services·; 9 a

6. Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich, 226 So.2d
684 (Fla.196:9).
7. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Martin, 56 So.
2d 509 (Fla.1952); Dina v. Seaboard Air Line
Ry. Co., 90 Fla. 558, 106 So. 416 (1925).
8. Slaughter v. Cook, 195 So.2d 6 (Fla.App.
2d 1967), cert. den., 201 So.2d 549 (Fla.
1967).
9. Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So.2d 776 (Fla.
1954).
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child's claim for the loss of support, care,
comfort, companionship, protection, educa
tion, and moral training of his parent or
parents; 10 a dependent's claim for loss of
support from the decedent; 11 the parents'
claim for loss of services of their child and
for their respective pain and suffering; 12
and the personal representative's claim by
separate action for loss -of future estate.13
See generally Sections 768.01-768.03, Flori
da Statutes (1971); Florida Civil Practice
Damages Manual, § IV (1967-1968).
New Consolidated Statutory Action for a
Death by Wrongful Act
The new statutes, styled the_ "Florida
Wrongful Death Act," 14 are a product of
the Florida Law Revision Commission 15
and -were intended -to merge the survival
action for personal injuries and the wrong
ful death action into one lawsuit. Section
768:19 16 of the new Act provides for a
cause of action in wording similar to that
of now repealed Section 768.01. Section
768.20, which is substantially different
from the predecessor statute, establishes
who may bring the action and the manner
I 0. Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 15 So. 876
(1894) ; Triay v. Seals, 92 Fla. 310, 100 So.
427 (1926).
11. Duval v. Hunt, supra note 10.
12. Williams v. Ugree, 206 So.2d 13 (Fla.App.
2d 1968) ; Covey v. Eppes, 153 So.2d 3 (Fla.
1963).
13. Ellis v. Brown,- 77' So.2d 845 (Fla.1955)
(adults) ; Hooper Const. Co., Inc. v. Drake,
73 So.2d 279 (Fla.1954) (minors).
14. § 7�.16, F.S. (1973).
15. The Florida Law Revision Commission
was created by the 1967 Legislature (§§ 13.90-13.996, F.S.). Section 13.96 provides-that
the functions of the council are to :
-- _, "(1) ',Examine · the' cominon law, consti-� '!.J. f
- ,t�tipl} and "s�at���s, ,ot ti;� ·,state and c�r. · rent' judicial - deci�ions' 'for· the purpose' 'of
. ;(,_dif!pqvering d�fects- an�tan_acllronisms in the
, \·;law'�
. and recommending-needed reforms;
'" "(2).• Recommend;· from - time to time, such
changes in the law ·as it deems proper 'to
modify or eliminate : antiquated'- and in-'
equitable rules; of·;law, - and to bring- the
I

1

"

'

•

'

"

' •

•,

/

•

!

in which it is brought. This provision is set
forth and analyzed in ·a subsequerit:--.p_air.t�. --,;-;:.,:�� '·
this opinion. Finally, Section 768.21,Jiere.
set forth in full, specifies the c:J.ten1�M-
damage recoverable·-under the-.new:. A�j:-,
- ",. _;:;��-'
� - -�
-

'

"768.21 Damages.-All potential bene
ficiaries of a recovery for wrongful
death, inclµding the decedent's- estat�; •---�-.-:
. shall be identified_. in the coriipt;irit�\1nd·���.2;_:t-:4
their relationship� to th�- deced_�i;,-t 'shail:- --- -- ·
f
be alleged. Damages may be awardec i;
follows:
" ( 1) Each survivor may recover' -tfu {

value of lost support and services from
the date of the decedent's injury to his'
death, with interest, and future loss .6£
support and services from the date of
death and reduced to pi;eserit; value.__ )ri. -�-- �
evaluating loss of support and 'services,
the survivor's relationship to the' decedent, the amount of the decedent's p_i:o!>_?.�
ble net income available_ for distribution
to the particular survivor, and ·the.. �e
placement value of the decedent's :-�iiv;
ices to the -survivor may be.. considered• .
. i�
thtcfuration-of fut�reTos�:,--

�o�puting-

law of the state into harmony with modem
conditions;
· , . .
"(3) Conduct such surveys or research of
the law of Florida as the legislature may re
· •"
quest."
The findings and ·recommendations . of. the
Commission with regard to the new Wrongful
Death Act were embodied in its pamphlet en
titled Fiorida' Law Revision · Oommi�h1'n;
Recommendations and Report · on,' ·-F:_loiida
--�r�gful IJea:h �t�!�tes _(1;>e.��be
r _���-

16. § 768.19, F.S.
_.,. , . ; _;v/,-tg
.. "Right of ac�ion.:-::-'\Yhen, thll. d,ea!�•.c{.�
person is caused by' the wrongful ac't','·negli: c-'
gence, ·default, or breach of contract or :war- ,: .._-ranty of any person, including tliose"occ,1#nnJ
on, na�gab1� "!Ate_rs,_ and t,he _ even�
have entitled the person- injurea'.to 'mliiiftaili''''•�-•-,-•
an action and recover damages -if)'deiith'!lfad
'.' ., z ........ '..,..,.'•·)·
··
not ensued, the -,person or watercl:J!;f�;
would have been":"liable in damagea-cif,t
had -- not
7• be- lJabl��or�_
ages as ·spec1f1ed .In· this act notwithl!,\�.-- _ ,. _
,
the death of. !he_ pe�o� in�ur�!�, ��9,W!1
�1='
_
_
· -<• ,
1•death-'was caused;nnde� ,CJ.rCUl!18,��•
·
. : ., .,., f'f:'J'
tnting a felony."
., _

��i.q!,,:;:

��ed.�!11�

MARTIN v. UNITED SEOURift,'SERVIOES, :mo.

Fla:'; 769.

Cite as, Fla., 314 So.2d 7615

·-es;.,the' joint' life expectancies -of the Sur- '
;0Vivor· an<rthe decedent and the·period:of
1
·, ·� -:-. �ihdfity, - in· the case ·of ;J1e!ifthy i 1mirior i
ered: , ; . i. , c,:r 1�J, ""
,4c'fiitd�eii;ifti:ay be consid
.
,·,
,,7 •1i:(r.... r ·
'""'·tf◄: .. \-__:./L-.'!·
-;•-, "(2). .The surviving spouse may also ..r!!-.
loss ·of the decedent'� ...cp�-.
...panionship and protection and for mental
, pai�'.a�d s�ffering fr�n{ th� 'date. of i�. jurr, ·.
•

;,ii;,y��.·;i9r.

'. : "(3) ·Minor children of tlie decedent
·"may ·also recover for lost parental comjianionship, instruction, and guidance· and
for mental pain and suffering from the
date of injury.

· �tprs \vho\nave toinpli�d with ·the•require. ments of :probiite·lii concerninjrclaims."··

�t..t�h"',1�1:=\!i'.:_;,(i;1mfJ"f-l J,r:,1{,r,�v·;. ff Y•H,1rt-':��\ ':i,r,d-�'
..the.�1,1�.r--:_:,--::-·
iitem� of
,.damage r.1,•""r
e:: _
.In.. summac_ y
-..,,nr;.;;��-..
.. 1..,�tlifr;;. .• · )/,,...
coverable.. "111,der., n�w..Section 768.21..allow, ·
each. specjfied. sur:vjypr to._ recqver. for_ (1) _
loss of p a§t, JP:d Jptu�� ��ppot'.!e3:P� .;�er�
ices; (2) loss of companionship_ and pro
tection; · and (3Y Jiis •Or her -own mental
pain; and· suffedng · from the date· .of' the
injury. The personal representative of the
estate may· :re.cover :,for. medical ex·pensesv ·
funeral expenses, ·and los� of earnings.
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In merging_ the .two prior actions, the
legislature transfern;d the items o.f damage
"(4) Each parent of a deceased minor for loss of- earnings, medical expenses, and
child may also recover for mental pain funeral expenses from the survival statute
to the new Wrongful Death Act. Th�
and suffering from the date of injury.
claim for p'ain and suffering of the dece- •·
"(S) Medical or funeral expenses due dent from the· date of injury tcfthe date of/
to the decedent's injury or death may be death was eliminated. Substituted therefor
___: __recovered · by a survivor- who -has -paid- was:�:clai�r pain-and-s_µffcrnng'9h:l<>se - them.
relati,ves, the ,clear p
_ urpose be!ng_ J�3:� any
recovery : should be f�r the living and not
"(6) The decedent's personal repre
for the dead.1:7 It is the alleged failure of
. sentative may recover for the decedent's
the Act .to provide precise. notice oL this
estate the following:
change that has caused .the claim of uncon
"(a) Loss of earnings of the deceased stitutionality.
=,.from •the date of injury to the c;late QL
death, less lost support of survivors ex
Constitutionality of the New· Wrongful
cluding contributions in kind, with inter Death Act>· Pain and Suffering Damages
.est. If the decedent's survivors include
a surviving spouse or lineal descendants,
The title of the new Wrongful Death
loss of net accumulations beyond death
Act, Chapter 72-35, Laws of Florida 1972,
. and_ reduced to present value may also_ be_ is;as follows:
recovered.
"An Act relati11g to wrongful death ac"(b) Medical or funeral expenses due
- tion;, api�ndiqg chapter 7,<>8, -. I;:lorida
· : t_o the decedent's. injury of death that
_St.iitt!.tes,_ ..by adding_ sections
__ 768.16,
.:
-· ...:�.-;
. 768.�, 768.21 . - . -. i;: J>_rovid
- --� .-have- become a charge against his-estate
or that were paid by or on behalf-of-deing for a right of action on behalf of the
cedent, excluding amounts recoverable
survivors and the estate by the perso�al
under subsection (S).
representative of a decedent whose death
is caused by the wrongful act, negli'.'(c) Evidence of remarriage of .. the_
. gence, 'default,
'breach of contract o.r
· ·: decedent's spouse is admissible.
wa�ranty
any. person; repealing sec
tions 768.0l, · 768.02, and 768.03, Florida
·· "(7) AU awards for the decedent's es
tate are subject to the claims of crediStatutes; 'providing an effective date."

of

17. Bee Florida Law Revision Commission,
Recommendations and Report on Florida
314 So.211-49

or

Wrongful Death Statutes, at 41-42, Item 8

(December.1969).
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It is contended that ( 1) the legislature
was misled by lack of notice in the title
that damages resulting from the decedent's
pain and suffering were being abolished in
the body of the Act, and (2) the legislature
cannot -eliminate an established right with
out providing- a«suitable alternative.
The first of these contentions turns ulti
mately upon our interpretation of that por
tion of Section 768.20 relating to the abate
ment of actions for personal injuries re
sulting in death. This is a crucial subissue
which we must resolve before considering
the sufficiency of the title of the Act.
Section 768.20 establishes the parties
who may bring the action, provides that
personal injury actions do not survive, and
retains the defenses that may be asserted
-to bar or reduce the recovery. __ It provides
in full as follows :
"Parties.-The action shall be brought
by the decedent's personal representative,
who shall recover for the benefit of the
decedent's survivors and estate all dam
ages, as specified in this act, caused by
the injury resulti11g--in-'- death. When a
personal injury to the decedent results in
his death, no action for the personal in
jury shall survive, and any such action
pending at the time of death shall abate.
The wrongdoer's personal representative
shall be the defendant if the wrongdoer
dies before or pending -the action. A de
fense that would bar or reduce a survi
vor's recovery if he were the plaintiff
may: be asserted against him, but -shall
not affect the recovery of any other sur
vivor."
[Emphasis supplied]
[1] The italicized s�ntence, which
- abates an "action for the personal injury,"
effectiyely provides that _no: separate statu
torY. action for personal injuries_ .resulting
in - :death. can survi�i:;)h�-;: :-��c�����•s
demis�.18 But it would be wrong to regard
•

�

'

,

•

•'

:l

.,.

•;

'

,, •

18. However, the survival- statute is still ap
plicable to preserve other actions which the

these words as a blanket abolition of sur
vival actions for personal injuries resulting
in death. From the immediately pri:!ceding _
sentence, it is clear that the essence -of-the- -
survival action, specifically tortfeasoT' an:-·
swerability in damages to the decedent's
estate for "injury resulting in death," Will
remain unimpaired by the new legisfation,
The primary difference is the merger of
the actions and the transfer of- pain artd:
suffering damage from the decedent to the_
survivors. The only. logical constructioi r
of the italicized sentence is that it expresses the legislative intent that a separate
lawsuit for death-resulting, personal inju:
ries cannot be brought as a survival action·
under Section 46.021. The action can be
brought, in a consolidated form, under the
new Wrongful Death Act. The purpose of
the italicized sentence is to implement the
consolidation. It, together - with the' prei--- -
ceding sentence and the rest of the Act,
conveys an unmistakable legislative intent
to incorporate into the new· Wrongfof-
Death Act the survival action formerly
maintainable under Section 46.021, · but
modified to substitute a survivor's pain and
suffering for a decedent's pain and-suffer.�:-_:_:-_
ing as an element of damages.
[2] Whether the title of the new Act
provides sufficient notice of these changes
is the next issue we must resolve. There
is no question that the title could 'have
been more explicitly drawn to include ·•�c
reference by section number to the survival
action statute, Section 46.021, Florida Stat� utes, under which damages for a decedent's
pain ap.d suffering were recoverable.,. IVs::
argued that the failure to state specifically"'
46.021 w�s-_:-: ,__ami�ct�:
in the title that Section
.
:�r� •.
ed, particularly in view of reference_ t_<?J�ifl:
amendment of Chapter 768 and the repeald..
of other specifically enumerated --stati{
renders the title constitutionally 1'defecfi
Article Ill, -Section 6,'.Florida :cgb,&ti,9.
Upon _ first impre_ssi6n;::this_ ari1mi ·,
r-.
pear� 'to
niirif·
•

'

:liav�'

•

' -• •

decedent_ may, b,ave
prior to his death.
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MARTIN v:-UNITED SEOURITY.:SERVICES/ INC.
" Cite iis, ·Fla.;:ii4So.2d

{ . .

765 - · ..�

Fla::

._.,
,,,,..
,, .• '.I.�-

.,��-: v.ttaD.l:!lint�byi':'.r99 ,EJa:i;i496, �126)v£o. .iU7·. wrongfuJ,death of a';decedent is'a reason::
,� .: <-;,; '· (WJ.Q��J�tate,�·:v>4'!f>t:ic!a .. Stcite. ul'.urnpike · able,a_l�e�\ti�€;,�O. �ividing::aIIl�>ng t_he sur-i 1
:·... brll�&:'so;24t.337\(Fia.i95Sj".' :i•How-1 vivorsc-,tlieJi'lamount'::,fo'rmerly ; recove'rable1
::.
: ey�r,1thet'tr!ab::�urt· found in the·;Martin• under Section 46.021;,,Florida· Statqtes, for.
ca�� !lH���e��re this Co,urt, an_d w� co?cur, the decedent's ·pain' ,and suffering,ri.if: any:
tf?f¾fr�tl� · �oes colitain a generaf 'de� The new·,item "Of, d�mage. -is much , more
::
germane both to Sec- susceptible of proof,.since the,party claimof matters
scnpbon
,
_1-t,r · , : r
tioits '. 46.021; the survival act, and to Sec- ing damage for ·the pain· and suffering is
ti?rii"768j(>.:.768.27, th·e Wrongful Death available -t1 o testify, while the claim form
ili · �b -. i.-·1
Act:· See Shepard v. Thames, 251 So.2d erly permitted under-Section 46.021 for the
�S} (F'1.tii°971); · Stokes v·. Galloway, 61 decedent's 'pain and: suff�ring had to ·be
Fi�-'_437.; :54·:so. 799 (1911). More specifi- based upon testimony of others.
cally, .the' '.following words are germane to
cif both acts; "providing for a Punitive Damages
tft�' !itlbJ"
�f·t ·action on behalf of the survivors
right
. '
The final issue requires us to determine
and the estate by the personal representatiJi:".of 'i 'decede�t whose death is caused whether the enactment of this new Wrong
by the wrongful act, negligence, default, or ful Death Act, and specifically of the itali
bre��h of contract or warranty of any per cized sentence of Section 768.20 quoted
son." It is our opinion that this clause previously, effectively r�pealed the authori
provides sufficient notice of the il}tent to ty to claim punit_ ive damages for a negli-_. - --_-- ·cimsolidate·::imryivaJ-- -and "wrungful death . gently caused• de-at11:---'Th1qmb1ic ·poticy ·au_..
cta�s-foto-one action; Sniith v. City of St. thority· to· recover. punitive· damages in cas
Petersburg, ·302 So.2d 756 (Fla.1974), and es involving a negligently caused death
that it leads one reasonably to inquire into was established by this Court in 1969 in
"· the·bodf of .the Act. State e.r rel. Buford Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich, supra.
v. Daniel, 87 Fla. 270, 99 So. 804 (1924). We find no valid reason to recede from
that opinion.
. If we construed the title to be defective
·'"�-��··and allowed separate survival action for
[4] It is our view that the logic and
tlte pain and suffering of a decedent, the reasoning of Justice Thornal are as valid
resµlt would be to permit claims both for under the new consolidated death act as
pain and suffering of the decedent under under predecessor legislation. To para
the survival act and for pain and suffering phrase Justice Thoma), it is difficult for
0£ the app_ropriate survivors under the new us to accept the proposition that the legis
.. , ..\ll{l'ongful" Death Act. This result would lature intended a tortfeasor to be punished
allow multiple actions and multiple claims for his malicious and reckless acts when
, _____ .. for .p�in.;and suffering contrary to the they maim another hut not for those same
,',t"�':cle_ar_ i.nt�nt_io_n of. the legislature. Either acts when they kill th·e victim. This Court,
:':�{'.J!te! _n�� J\rj:: is effective to consolidate the speaking through:· Justice Thoma), said:
· �-� :-7'""" acl:ions'·arid ·transfer' pain and suffering "
[S]uch a rule o(law cannot be
claims from the decedent to the survivors, allowed to exist." 226 So.2d at 688. Jus
. or· the new item of pain and suffering tice Thorrial's opinion was based on (I)
da,mage for the survivors cannot be al the aforementioned statement of why pub
·�:-<�Jowed. The former is correct and is in ac lic policy must allow recovery of punitive
cordance with our holding.
damages in wrongful death situations and
�- ' (2) the language of the survival, statute,
..
contention,
second
the
Concerning·
"ts}"
·
:
-�.:
46.021. The public policy reasons
Section
· ·
we believe that the new right of
still apply with the merger of the personal
close relatives to recover for their
injury survival action into this new death
pain and suffering brought about by
act. Cf. Wagner v. Gibbs, 80 Miss. 53, 31
. . • .!
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Fla.

So. 434 (1902) (death of injured party
does not terminate right to recover puni
tive damages from the assailant absent a
statute providing otherwise); .Swartz. v.
Rosenkrans, 78 Colo: 167, 240 P. 333 (1925)
(principles governing punitive damages are
fundamentally the same as if the decedent
were living) .. See generally McClelland
and Truett, SurJii,vi:il�-fij ?unitive;Damages
in Wrongful Death" Cases, 8 U.San- Fran-
cisco L.Rev. 585 (1974); Holthus, Puni
tive Damages in Wrongful Death, 40
Cleveland State L.Rev. 301 (1971).
The wisdom of the public policy reason
mandating the continued recoverability of
punitive damages in death cases is amply
illustrated by the facts in the Martin case
now before .this Court. The appellant,
Beverly ·Martin, administratrix of the. es
tate of Joyce C. Atchley, sued appellee,
United Security Services, in separate survival and wrongful de�th actions. · In, h.er _
survival action complaint under Sec.t_ion
46.021, appellant allege<l that United Se�urity bad hired an indivi<luaL�.amed David
.. , .o;_�Turner�whom.itprovided. with__a I>i_ st<>t
and a security guard uniform. Turner was
assigned to guard an apartment complex
known as University Club Apartments.
While on duty as a guard at the apartment
complex on October 21, 1972, Turner entered the home of Joyce Atchley, adjacent
to the apartment complex. The stated purpose was. to use her telephone to call his
employer and his wife. , While in the·
home, Turner allegedly assaulted -,:Mi;;s.
Atchley, attempted-to"rap_e ,hei:, aµd,:shot
and killed her .with the pistol owned and
provided him by United Security, Seryi�es,
Inc. . The complaint- further alleged that
United Security had b!,eri grossly negligent
in hiring Turner and· entru_siing him .with.,il
pistol, since .he· ,was a heavy drin�er- and,
haq il hi:;tory 9 f psy_cJ�,i._1.tric pr��l�µi��. · ._ t
#
1:�-,
,., >:
. ·: .�:;. �-'\�;.!; f;i ·;·r\f•� · · ::... ··t "f'T•�t!
. ':Clearly the·se>allegations, if establi�hed,,
Cc;>ll�d have P{;QVided_ ' �e' �asi� for a _p�ni-,
tive d��ag� . clai� if Mrs. Atchley had'
-. �
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lived. We see no reason why United Se
curity-should escape possible liability for·
punitive damages merely because. its. em-.
ployee killed rather than injured her.
·we rec�gnhe that this Court, in Florida
East Coast Railway Co. v. McRoberts, 111
Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933), held that pu
ni.tive damages were not to be considered
a� incide�t'to- damages ailowed for death·
u�der the .thex'i existing statute for wrong
ful death. At that time there was no sur.
vival statute, the public policy doctrine lat
er to be enunciated by Justice Thornal was
not considered, and the opinion reiterated
the doctrine that a common law action for
personal injuries died with an injured par
ty. It is our opinion that the subsequent
decision of this Court in Atlas
Properties,
,
Inc. v. Didich, supra, is controlling.
[5) Recognizing the rule that punitive
damages are recoverable only where actual
damages are shown, McLain v. Pensacola
Coa,ch Corporation, 152 Fla. 876 13 So.2d,
221 (1943),, we hold that punitive damages .
- may ,be.cl9-i_mecl when one or more _of tlie ..
elements of compensat�ry d�mages·-·re:: --
coverable under Section 768.21 of the new
Wrongful Death Act are established. In'
so holding, we emphasize that there can be
only one punitive damage recovery for•
each death for which claims of the survivors may be instituted under the Act. See
Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of
the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary, 262
N.Y. 320, 186 N.E. 798 (1933). The survi-•
vors are not entitled to individual claims
for punitive damages.
1

..Each of the above causes is hereby ·re�:
mantled to the· appropriate circuit court
for further proceedings and trial of the re-:
sp'ective causes not inconsistent with • thisi
opi�ion.

4 • ' t ...

ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS,.Bo'.Y:D· !:., .., .
a�� �cCAIN, JJ., concur. . . 1 •• rX�'l:r ..
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The Honorable RichMd A. Pet�igrew
Speaker, House of Representatives

May 7, 1971

Sir:

I am directed to inform the House of Representatives that
the Senate has passedBy Senator GunterSB 349-A bill to be entitled An act relating to drugs;
amending §398.02(13)(a), Florida Statutes, to clarify the defi
nition of narcotic drugs; providing an effective date.
By Senator GunterSB 362-A bill to be entitled An act relating t ? _ d angero_us
drugs; creating §404 . 042, Florida Statutes, to prohibit the �iv
ing or receiving of free samples of dangerous drugs; amendmg
§404.05, Florida Statutes, to prov�de for the _keeping of rec
ords of all such dangerous drugs given or received as samples;
amending §404.06, Florida Statutes, to provide for insp�ction
of such records by duly authorized law enforcement officers;
providing an effective date.
By Senator GunterSB 347-A bill to be entitled An act relating to narcotic
drugs; creating §398.031, Florida Statutes, �o prohibit the_ �iv
ing or receiving of free samples of narcotic . drugs; pr?vidmg
for the keeping of records of all such narcotic drugs given or
received as samples; providing for inspection of records by
duly authorized law enforcement officers; providing an effective
date.
-and requests the concurrence of the House therein.
Respectfully,
Elmer 0. Friday, Jr.
Secretary of the Senate

expungement of the record upon satisfactory completion of pro
bationary term of a person under twenty-one (21) years of
age, by the court; providing for increased criminal penalties
for second and subsequent offenders of any violation under
this act; providing for the forfeiture of any controlled danger
ous substance and all vehicles including, aircraft or vessels,
used or intended to be used in the transportation, sale or con
cealment of controlled dangerous substances; providing for
confiscation of all books, records, and research including formu
las and data intended to be used in violation of this act; making
a public nuisance all places where controlled dangerous sub
stances are illegally kept, sold or used; am.i!nding section 398.03,
Florida Statutes, to provide penalties for violation thereof;
amending section 404.02, Florida Statutes, to remove the un
lawful possession of dangerous drugs therefrom; and repealing
subsection 7 (c) of section 404.02, Florida Statutes; providing
for arrest for drug violations upon probable cause; providing a
severability clause; providing an effective date.
By Senator GunterSB 343-A bill to be entitled An act relating to drug whole
salers and drug manufacturers; adding subsections (22) and
(23) to §500.03, Florida Statutes; creating §�500.50 and 500.51,
Florida Statutes; defining drug wholesaler and drug manufac
turer; providing for permits for drug wholesalers and drug
manufacturers; providing for notification and renewal of per
mits; authorizing investigations by department of health and
rehabilitative services and department of law enforcement; pro
hibiting use of titles of "drug wholesaler" or "drug manufac
turer" without a permit; authorizing the revocation and sus
pension of permits; providing an effective date.
-and requests the concurrence of the House therein.
Respectfully,
Elmer 0. Friday, Jr.
Secretary of the Senate

SB 351, contained in the above message, was read the first
time by title and referred to the Committee on Criminal
Justice.

SB's 349, 362, and 347, contained in the above mess.age,
were read the first time by title and referred to the Committee
on Criminal Justice.
The Honorable Richard A. Pettigrew
Speaker, House of Representatives

May 7, 1971

May 7, 1971

Sir:

I am directed to inform the House of Representatives that
the Senate has passed as amendedBy Senator Ott-SB 351-A bill to be entitled An act relating to narcotics
and dangerous drugs; creating chapter
858, Florida Statutes,
_
to be known and cited as "The Florida
Unlawful Use or Pos
session of Controlled Dangerous Substances Act"; giving defi
nitions; making the unlawful manufacture, distribution or
production of a controlled dangerous substance or the unlawful
dispensing, delivering or selling of a controlled dangerous
substance or the unlawful dispensing, delivering or selling
to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years of a
controlled dangerous substance or the unlawful use or pos
session of a controlled dangerous substance or the unlaw
ful acquiring or obtaining possession by misrepresentation,
fraud deception or subterfuge of a controlled dangerous sub
stanc� or the unlawful conspiring to commit any act prohib
ited herein with a controlled dangerous substance or the
unlawful possession or sale of any device, instrument or para
phernalia used for the unlawful injecting, smoking-, or using
a controlled dangerous substance a crime and providing criminal
penalties therefor; making the use or possession of a small
amount of marijuana or the passing to another of a small
amount of marijuana for no remuneration a misdemeanor and
establishing the criminal penalty therefor; providing for the
withholding of the adjudication of guilt of a first offender and
placing said person on probation, further providing for the

SB 343, contained in the above message, was read the first
time by title and referred to the Committee on Health & Re
habilitative Services.
The Honorable Richard A. Pettigrew
Speaker, House of Representatives

May 7, 1971

Sir:

I am directed to inform the House of Representatives that the
Senate has passedCS for HB's 191 and 449
Respectfully,
Elmer 0. Friday, Jr.
Secretary of the Senate

The bill, contained in the above message, was ordered en
rolled.

Consideration of Consent Calendar
HB 120-A bill to be entitled An act relating to wrongful
death action; amending chapter 768, Florida Statutes, by adding
sections 768.16, 768.17, 768.18, 768.19, 768.20, 768.21, 768.22,
768.23, 768.24, 768.25, 768.26, and 768.27; providing for a right
of action on behalf of the survivors and the estate by the per
sonal representative of a decedent whose death is caused by
the wrongful act, negligence, default, or breach of contract or
warranty of any person; repealing sections 768.01, 768.02, and
768.03, Florida Statutes; providing an effective date.
-was taken up and read the second time by title.

JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

)lay 7, 1971

ent:
g
The Committee on Judiciary offered the followin amendm
30, and insert the following:
On page 5 strike lines 28, 29, andfor
any amount awarded for
protection
The court shall provide
a mi_nor child or an incompetent pursuant to the
the benefit of_
Florida guardianship law.

Mr. D'Alemberte moved the adoption of the amendment, which
was adopted.
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Representatives Fleece, Murphy, A. S. Robinson, and Winn
were recorded as voting Yea.
So the bill passed .
On motion by Mr. Zinkil, the rules were waived and the bill
was ordered immediately certified to the Senate.

were waived and
On motion by Mr. D' Alemberte, the rules time
by title. On
HB 120, as amended, was read the third
passage, the vote was:

HB 529_ was taken up. On motion by Mr. Gillespie, SB 1017,
a companion measure on the Calendar, was substituted for HB
529.

Yeas-77
J,lr.Speaker
Alvarez
Andrews
Baumgartner
Blackburn
Brown
Burke
Caldwell
Cherry
Clark, David
Clark, Dick
Clark,J.R.
Conway·
Craig
D'Alemberte
Danahy
Dixon
Dubbin
Earle
Elmore

SB 1017-A bill to be entitled An act relating to insurance·
amending section 624.0118, Florida Statutes by adding ne.;
subsect_io� (5) to pr?vide that an affidayit 'shall be filed by
do�est1c msurers which . sta!es that the directors and principal
officers h�ve read exammat10n reports; amending section 624.0119, Fl�rida Statutes, by amending subsection (1) to eliminate
the reqmrement that examination expenses paid to the depart
ment shall be at rates adopted by the national association of
insuran�e commissioners; by amending subsections (2) and (3)
to provide that all moneys paid by insurers for examination
shall be paid t� !he insurance commissioner's regulatory trust
fund and permittmg the department to pay to examiners such
expenses out of said fund; adding subsection (7) to provide
that the actual travel �xpenses, reasonable living expenses al
!owance _and compensati_?n of rate analysts and rate examiners
m the discharge of their duties under section 627.321, Florida
Statutes, shall be governed by the provisions of section 624.0119, Florida Statutes; providing an effective date.
-was taken up and read the second time by title.

Featherstone
Firestone·
Forbes
Gallen
Gautier
Gibson
Gillespie
Glisson
Gorman
Grainger
Har!lee
Hartnett
Hazelton
Hector
Hess
Johnson
Jones
Kennelly
Kershaw
Lancaster

Smith
Lane
Spicola
Libertore
Matthews, H. Sweeny
Thomas
Mattox
Melvin
Tillman
Milburn
Tittle
Mooney
Tobiassen
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Wolfson
Woodward
Rish
Robinson, J. W. Yancey
Santora
Zinkil
Shreve
Sims
Singleton

Nay s-None
Representatives Fleece, Murphy, A. S. Robinson, and Winn
were recorded as voting Yea.
So the bill passed, as amended.
On motion by Mr. D'Alemberte, the rules were waived and
the bill was ordered immediately certified to the Senate, after
engrossment.
�B 642---;A bill to b1; entitled An act _relating to municipal
utili� services; _amendmg §159.17, Florida Statutes, relating
to liens for service charges on lands served by such services
co nstructed through the issuance of revenue bonds, to limit the
lie l! of a municipality tor utility services to such SLrvices
"! hi c� are _rendered to the owner of the property upon which a
lien 1� clam_ie�, or rendered upon the written request of such
owner,
providmg an effective date.
-was taken up and read the second time by title.
On motion by Mr. Zinkil, the rules were waived and HB 642
Was read the third time by title. On passage, the vote was:
Yeas-75
Mr.Speaker
Alvarez
Andrews
:; Baumgartner
'" Blackburn
Brown
., Burke
Caldwell
Cherry
. Clar k, D avid
Clar k, D ick
' Clark,J.�.
Co
, er!i�ay

l>' Alemberte
. Danah
..Dixon Y
Dubbin
�le
_a1s-None

Elmore
Featherstone
Firestone
Gallen
Gautier
Gibson
Gillespie
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Gorman
Grainger
Hartnett
Hazelton
Hector
Hess
Johnson
Jones
Kennelly
Kershaw
Lancaster

Lane
Libertore
Matthews, H.
Mattox
McDonald
Milburn
Mooney
Moudry
Nergard
Poole
Poorbaugh
Reed
Reeves
Renick
Rish
Robinson, J. W.
Santora
Shreve
Singleton

Smith
Spicola
Stevens
Sweeny
Thomas
Tillman
Tittle
Tobiassen
Trombetta
Tubbs
Tyrrell
Westberry
Whitson
Wilson
Wolfson
Woodward
Yancey
Zinkil

On motion by Mr. Gillespie, the rules were waived and SB
1017 was read the third time by title. On passage, the vote was:
Yeas-81
Mr. Speaker
Alvarez
Andrews
Baumgartner
Blackburn
Brown
Burke
Caldwell
Cherry
Clark, David
Clark, Dick
Clark,J.R.
Conway
Craig
D'Alemberte
Danahy
Dixon
Dubbin
Earle
Elmore
Featherstone

Firestone
Forbes
Gallen
Gautier
Gibson
Gillespie
Glisson
Gorman
Grainger
Harllee
Hartnett
Hazelton
Hector
Hess
Johnson
Jones
Kennelly
Kershaw
Lancaster
Lane
Libertore

Matthews, H. Stevens
Mattox
Sweeny
McDonald
Sykes
Melvin
Thomas
Milburn
Tillman
Mooney
Tittle
Moudry
Tobiassen
Nease
Trombetta
Nergard
Tubbs
Poole
Tyrrell
Poorbaugh
Westberry
Reed
Whitson
Reeves
Wilson
Renick
Winn
Rish
Wolfson
Robinson, J. W. Woodward
Santora
Yancey
Shreve
Zinkil
Singleton
Smith
Spicola

Nays-None
Representatives Fleece, Murphy, and A. S. Robinson were
recorded as voting Yea.
So the bill passed and was ordered certified to the Senate.
Under Rule 7.11, HB 529 was laid on the table.
HB_ 232 A bill to '\)e entitled An act relating to jurors
and Jury -;lists; amendmg sections 40.06 and 40.11, Florida
Statutes, relating to transcription preservation and certifi
�ation o� jury lists by �ermitting us� of electronic data process
mg: eqmpment; al?endmg section 40.23, Florida Statutes, re
latmg t? summonmg of petit jurors, by providing that such
summonmg be done by the jury commissioner in counties using
data processing equipment; providing an effective date.
-was taken up and read the second time by title.
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REPLY TO:

Lakeland, Florida
April 26, 1971

Senator Louis de la Parte, Jr.
The Florida Senate
The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Re:

1288

92 LAKE WIRE DRIVE

Florida Law Revision Commission proposed reform of -wrongful death
statutes

Dear Louie:
I appreciate the vigor and skill with which you
persuaded the judiciary committee members to listen to
reasons and explanations before swinging scalpels and
meataxes.
The Florida Law Revision Commission has no ax
to grind, and is a conglomerate group trying to take a
broad look at statutory law on what Sandy D'Alemberte
calls "non-sexy" subjects. In a sense the Commission does
not care whether its proposals are enacted or not, but the
Commission does hope that legislators will actually listen
and consider the reasons and explanations for the proposals,
w hich are the product of a considerable amount of man-hours
by commission members, who receive not one dime for their
time, and by the commission's reporter and consultant, who
often has studied a subject with more depth and breadth
than perhaps any other single person in the state. Often
the Commission considers a subject, _only to conclude that
no revision is justified.
No one contends that the wrongful death proposal
cannot be improved, or that something may not have been
overlooked. But it was refreshing to learn that the,

Senator Louis de la Parte, Jr.
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judiciary committee did listen to an explanation of whether
a particular point had been considered by the draftsmen and
why they reached the conclusions they did.
A fact of life is that a lawyer, who makes his
living representing either plaintiffs or defendants, finds
it difficult to back off and take a disinterested look at
what a wrongful death statute is supposed to do.
I understand that the question arose as to whether
the act should apply only when the death occurs in Florida
or only when the wrongful action causing the death occurs
in Florida. The commission considered the various combi
nations of circumstances to which such a provision would be
relevant, and concluded that undesirable results could arise
if such a geographical specification were included. Con
flict of laws principles are better tools for dealing with
the many combinations of circumstances that may arise. Most
other states do not expressly limit their death acts to
deaths occurring in the enacting state.
Under general principles of full fai th and credit,
a state is required to entertain an action on a wrongful
death statute of a sister state if, at least, it is not an
inconvenient forum and has a wrongful death statute of its
own that covers local injuries. The law applicable to wrong
ful death is usually the local law of the state where the
injury (not necessarily the resulting death) occurred. And
this law determines the rights and liabilities of the-parties,
availability of defenses, statute of limitations, distribution
of recovery, measure of damages, and the proper person to sue.
Conflict of laws principles have developed so that many or
most courts (who have focused on the question) are willing
to apply the law of some state other than the state of injury,
if the other state has a more "significant relationship" to
the occurrence and the parties -- "the center of gravity"
idea -- and the applicable law may not be the same for all
issues. Accordingly, the law of the forum state may govern

Senator Louis de la Parte, Jr.
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pleadings, process, evidence, and trial procedure; the law
_of the ·state where the conduct and injury occurred may,govern
negligence, contributory and comparative negligence, last
clear chance, and assumption of risk; and the law of the
state where the decedent and the beneficiaries were.domiciled
may govern who is entitled to bring the action, the measure
of damages, and how the recovery is to be distributed.
Although I am not clear that our Supreme Court
of Florida has deviat�d from the traditional application of
lex loci delicti, I am sure that Florida will eventually
follow what looks like an overwhelming trend, and a good one.
I suppose that there will be considerable contro
versy on the question of whether a defendant should be
allowed to show that the decedent's spouse has remarried.
This does not go to the integrity of the commission's
proposal, and I hope that this issue can be handled on its
own merits, without having the entire bill dependent upon
the political disposition of this question. The commission
itself is neutral on the question, as it is neutral on .the
question of punitive damages.
Louie, I appreciate your time and effort, with full
realization of the overwhelming demands of your other legis
lative responsibilities. I feel a little guilty for drawing
you into the matter, but there were not a great number of
senators that I could think of, who would see that the
proposal was properly considered on its merits without a
bunch of impromptu changes by persons who had not listened
to the reasons and explanations. As you know, there are not
likely to be many lobbyists for a proposal such as this.
Sincerely yours,
Henry M. Kittleson
HMK/bc
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Messrs. Trawick, D'Alernberte ' Grissett
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Quarles and Powers
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REPLY TO:

0. BuR11E K1aLEA.m

LAKELAND, FLORIDA
September 15, 1970

Mr. Louis De La Parte, Jr.
Attorney at Law
725 East Rennedy Boulevard
Tampa, Florida 33602
� Re:

Florida Law Revision Commission
proposed revised wrongful death act

Dear Louie:
Pursuant to our telephone conversation a
couple of weeks ago, I enclose the proposed act in
Senate bill form (all prescribed six copies prepared in
Ernie Means' office). I enclose also two copies of the
Florida Law Revision Commission's report and explanation.
As you know, Dave McClain took his father's
seat on the Commission as a Senate member, and the
other Senate seat (formerly held by Lawton) is now
vacant.
You expressed an interest in this bill, and
a desire to participate in its pre-filing. May I dump
this in your lap, and ask that you collaborate with
Dave McClain on appropriate signers. I hope that the
signers can include five or six senators, from both
parties, who are lawyers and who are not all tagged
with pro-plaintiff's or pro-defendant's reputations.
A companion bill should, I believe, be pre
filed in the House without undue delay, also. Sandy
D'Alemberte and Joel Gustafson as House members of the
Commission, will sign the bill, and I hope that other
House members will also take a sponsoring interest.
Since you and Dave are in ready communication with
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Terrell, you might see if he would be willing to join.
I am sending the House companion bill to Sandy and
Joel, with the request that they also collaborate
with Dave McClain (and you) on appropriate House
signers. Sandy and Joel may wish to have someone
other than themselves sign on the first line, although
it may make no difference how the signatures are
arranged.
A wrongful death bill was introduced-in the
1969 session, but it was only an interim draft and did
not have the approval of the Florida Law Revision Com
mission. It got pretty far along in the legislative
process, but it received some justified opposition from
Dempsey Barron and others, and the Commission's legis
lative members realized that they were being charged
with responsibility for a bill that did not have
Commission approval. The subject was carried over
to the 1970 session, and the House and Senate members
of the Commission were ready with the Commission-approved
bill, so that it could be substituted for the unapproved
bill at the appropriate time. But the correct bill
(the one now enclosed) was never introduced or sub
stituted in the House or Senate, as far as I know.
The incorrect bill is being carried over to 1971 on the
House calendar, but Sandy and Joel will get it off�
. Several persons, primarily representing
insurance interests and railroad interests, expressed
concern this spring that the bill would allow juries too
much liberty in the size of verdicts. Also, some who
purported to speak as claimants' lawyers were concerned
about the bill's new approach to methods of compensation
for survivors. Both groups, I feel sure, understandably
and predictably considered th� bill only from a one
sided viewpoint and not from a·broader perspective.
The claimants' lawyers were happy to find in the bill
opportunities for larger verdicts, but they did not
want to trade these opportunities for anything else.
For example, they found it difficult to accept the pro
position that a wrongful death act is not intended to

Mr. Louis De La Parte, Jr.
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punish a defendant, but to compensate living persons
for financial detriment they have incurred and will
incur because of the untimely death of another person,
whose death was wrongfully caused by the defendant.
They found it difficult to accept the proposition
that the survivor's justified damages should have
little to do with the deceased person's pain, although
the justified damages could have a great deal to do
with the mental pain and suffering of the survivor
himself, attributable to the wrongful injury and
resulting death. The claimants' attorneys were happy
to see the latter added, but did not want t
. o give up
the fonner. The defense-oriented people, on the other
hand, apparently felt that they had developed a good
working knowledge of the gimmicks and strategies under
existing law, and were fearful of change. At the risk
of being cynical, I might suggest that the vague oppo
sition of both claimant-oriented and defense-oriented
persons could be evidence that the bill enhanced the
public interest.
Some of the criticisms, used to justify
opposition to the bill, were on details and peripheral
matters, and by no means challenged the central p�ilosophy
of the bill, which most everyone agrees is good. I have
heard absolutely no one seriously assert that our present
wrongful death statutes are not in need of reform. But
each lawyer who practices in the field has his own re
actions as to what is desirable or undesirable, and it
is difficult for a lawyer, who makes his living repre
senting either plaintiffs or defendants, to back off and
take a disinterested look at what a wrongful death
statute is supposed to do.
No one contends that the enclosed bill cannot
be improved, or that the draftsmen may not have over
looked something. But this bill can at least be a focal
point for a fresh look at wrongful death legislation, and
there is a good chance that most points of concern have
already been considered by the draftsmen, and the
draftsmen's position can be explained if they are given
a chance before someone starts to work on the bill with
both scalpel and meataxe •
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As you know, the Commission had the services
of Len Powers as reporter and chief draftsman for the
project, and Len did his job seriously and carefully.
I doubt that any one person has spent as much time
and study on the proper function of wrongful death
statutes in Florida. Len can probably be available,
on reasonable advance notice, to answer questions and
give explanations before the judiciary comm�ttee.
Louie, I ap�reciate your interest in this.
The Commission has no axe to grind, and is a conglomerate
group trying to take the broad look at statutory law.
In a sense, the Commission does not care whether its
proposals are enacted or not, so long as it feels that
it makes available to the legislature what is believed
to be an improvement in existing law.
Sincerely yours,
Henry M. Kittleson
HMK:JN
Enclosure
cc:

Mr. Henry P. Trawick, Jr.
Professor James c. Quarles
Professor Leonard s. Powers
Senator David H. McClain
Representative Talbot D'Alemberte
Representative Joel K. Gustafson

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
GAt i�ESVlLLE

February
16, 1970 ·
,....
..

Hr. Henry H. Kittleson
Holland• Knight
Post·"Offle• ·oraw•r B W

92 Lake Wire Drive

Lakeland, Florida

Dear

33802

Henry:

You wrote me sometime ago about some recent ca·ses dealing with the rights
of I I legitimate children under wrongful death sta'tutes. As you pointed
out In the letter, we considered this at ·the tlu the United States Supreise
Court decided �h• Levy and GJona cases. These cases ·dealt with the
Loulslena·,dhcrtm'lnatlon against 11 leg�tlmate· c;,hl ldren suing for the

wron9fu·1: death ...of�thetr··mothe'r. We concluded 'at that time that our pro•
"be subject to ·any attack on .the basis of those
posed 'Statuti would
cases, because our ac:t makes It very -�lear that :tt-i'e 111egftlute ehlldren
of a mother can recover for her wron�fuf''dMth •.

not

The later cases tha_t h,a�\:been dec:l_ded In New·�•·rs�y,·and New York do not
bother me much. Our pr�,.� Statute provides that the lllegltlmate child
of e father cannot~ -recover unless the father has ··recognized a responslbl1 lty for the child's support. There la no flat denial of recovery to
I Ilegitimate chi Id.ran for the wrongful death bf .thel'r father, and It seas
to • that • ·state Is entltled to set up ·some sort· of standard for deter
mining which llleghlmate chl1dren shall have·s·uch·a 1 ·r1ght In. tM case of
the death of the father. This probl• does not p'resent ltself.fto .the •extent where ··the death .of the mother Is .Involved. because presumably her
parental ·relationship with the chi Id would be wel J'-kliQwn. Bfrths are not
htghly secret events and are required to be record�d� On the other hand,
the father's connection with the birth of an lllegltlmate child Is usually
an event that Is not widely publlclzed and that would be difficult to
prove If It were disputed. Consequently. It seems to be quite ·reasonable
that a state would require that the father do somethln9 to recognize his
Illegitimate child during his lifetime In order for the child to share In
the c:ause of action for the fettwtr 1 1 wrongful death. Otherwise, we are
going to run Into the policy that lies behind th• Dud Man's Act. It Is ,
shocking to think of what might happen If the law permitted a purported
•
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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
TALL/\llASSEI� 32306
February 20, 1970

Henry P. Trawick, Esq.
Lawyers Professional Building
2051 Main
Sarasota, Florida
33577

Street

Re:

Illegitimate Children under
Wrongful Death Act

Dear Heney:
I regret that I must disagree with the views in Dean Powers' letter
of Februazy 16, 1970, concerning exclusion of "unrecognized" illegitimates
from the Wrongful Death Act definition of survivors. You may recall I
raised the-� and Glona _cas__es. in --· �11.e. of our drafting sessions many months
·· ... • ·· · :. !-. • '·,
• • ·-' •
.ago. :,
Our proposed statute _authorizes_.,any .re_covery for the fath�r-'s death.
only .ff· the fathe'r"·
r�c'ognized.•a· responsibility for the child's support. II
I do not know the meaning of this phrase, but the main problem is simply
that a support obligation exists whether or not a father has "recognized"
it. The legitimate child's recovery is not conditioned on any "recognition"
of support. The legitimate who has been abandoned all its life up to the
father's death is a "survivor"; but under our statute a deeply loved illegit
imate would have no recovery if the father (by reason of economic adversity
otherwise)had never provided support or, perhaps by an act such as acknowl
edgment, "recognized'_' a support responsibility.

"has'

or

i am convinced that such disparity violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I think Justice Douglas would have a field day with such a case,
Many cases n'ow hold that 'the' inter ·vi�os legal support ·obligation of
parents must be the same for illegitimates and legitimates. See R v. R, 431
S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968); Storm v. None, 291 N.Y.S.2d 515 (NY Fam.Ct. 1968);
Munn v. Munn, 450 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1969),

._...;-

'ft!'-•, ..

....
t.

Henry P. Trawick, Esq.
February 20, 1970
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The fact that the illegitimate may recover for the mother's death, as
mandated by�, is irrelevant. The Schmoll case from New Jersey makes
that clear. Schmoll also rejected out of hand the fear of spurious claimants,
noting that the spurious claimant rarely would be able to meet the statutory
dependency requirements for recovery. I would think the same would be true
under our proposed Section 768.21. Doubtless Florida juries would not be
over-generous to the alleged illegitimate who has had virtually no relation
ship with the decedent. and has received no support.
I wish to stress that I am not saying illegitimates must be treated as
survivor13;_.they must, however, be treated as legitimates are treated in the
Wrongful Df;!ath Act. One solution would be to impose the "responsibility for
support''. requirement on both classes. Another would be to amend Section
768.18(1) to eliminate statutory distinctions between legitimates and illegit
imates.
Parenthetically,� i� now being used to overturn inheritance statutes
that restrict or deny an interstate share to the illegitimate. See for
example, Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1968); contra: Succession
of Vincent, 229 So.2d 449 (La. App. 1969). Our own F.S. 731.29 may be
challenged on this basis.
Best regards·,

David F. Dickson
Associate Professor of Law
DFD/jes
cc: Mr. Henry M. Kittleson
Mr. James C. Quarles
Dean Le9nard S. Powers
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February 5, 1971

,

Mr. Henry M. Kittleson
P.O. Drawer BW
Lakeland, Florida 33802
Dear Henry:
Concerning the question that you have written to me about before dealing
with the distinct'i6n we made in the recommended Wrongful Death Act between
the illegitimate child of a mother and the illegitimate child of a father,
I hope you will read In re Estate of Pakarinen, 178 North Western Reporter
2d 714 (Minn. , 1970). This case deals with the constitutionality under
the equal protection clause of the 14th anendment of a Minnesota statute
providing as follows:
An illegitimate child shall inherit from his mother the same
as if born in lawful wedlock, and also from the person who in
writing and before a competent attesting witness shall have
dectared himself to be his father, provided such writing or an
authenticated copy thereof shall be produced in the proceed
ing in which it is asserted; but such child shall not inherit
from the kindred of either parent by right of representation.
This statute has to do with the right to inherit and not any right to the
wrongful death action but the problem is the same. You will note it makes
a distinction between an illegitimate claiming from an alleged mother and
an illegitimate claiming from an alleged father. The statute was held
constitutional.
Please note this language from«.se, which is essentially the reasoning
contained in my letter to you of February 16, 1970:
It is apparent that the legislature determined that illegitimate
children usually stand as close to the affection and concern of
their mothers as do legitimate children. This determination is
incorporated in§ 525.172, which permits illegitimate children
to inherit from their mothers the same as legitimate children.
This provision negates a legislative intention to invidiousl,y dis
criminate solely on the basis of legitimacy.
[3) Since the section, however, does impose limitations on ille
gitimates inheriting from a claimed father, the question arises as

Mr. Henry M. Kittleson
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to the justification for the different treatment afforded this
classification of illegitimates. Even a superficial inquiry re
quires recognition that there are significant differences between
an illegitimate child's relationship to his mother and the person
he claims to be his father. First and most obvious is the differ
ence with which the certainty of the blood relationship can be
determined. While the identity of the mother of an illegitimate
child is usually, if not always, easy to establish, even the mother
is not always sure who the father is. Where a putative father denies
paternity, no method of proof we are now aware of exists by which
fatherhood can be conclusively established. Nothing--not a blood
test, nor a judgment of paternity after trial, nor a voluntary plea
of guilty to a charge of paternity in open court--proves with ab
solute certainty the paternity of the father. And while a written
attested declaration of paternity does not provide absolute proof,
it does offer the most persuasive proof available (short of mar
riage to the mother) of the pivotal element: An unequivocal ac�
knowledgment of paternal affection and concern for the illegiti
mate child. Unlike a plea of guilty, which may be made to avoid
the expense and embarrassment of trial in a paternity suit, a
voluntary written statement which manifests the man's desire to
accept this child as his own is such an acknowledgment and, from.
the public view, establishes both a biological and legal relation
ship to him • • • .
Even though some better way might be devised to further mitigate
the inhuman effect of the common-law rule, we are compelled to hold
that the challenged provision of§ 525.172 is constitutional, for
it cannot be said that the line it draws between the right of le
gitimates and illegitimates seeking to inherit from a father is
irrational or bears no intelligible proper relationship to the pur
poses sought to be achieved by this and other sections of our Pro
bate Code governing the descent of property upon death.
Affirmed.
If you read this case, you will note that in distinguishing the Levy and
Glona cases, the court points out that different considerations might ex
ist with the Wrongful Death Statute. I really don't see that distinction
myself, and I feel that the Minnesota court was simply trying to take ad
vantage of an obvious difference between the case before them and the cases
involving the Louisiana Wrongful Death Statutes that were decided by the
United States Supreme Court recently.
I still think we are on firm ground here, but it is possible, of course,
that the United States Supreme Court will see it differently. I recently
had an opportunity to check on whether the Supreme Court of the United
States has done anything on this question of illegitimates since the Levy
and Glona cases, and I can find nothing. I do not believe we should draft

February 5
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legislation in anticipation of what the Supreme Court of the United
States might do provided, of course, our proposals stand the test of
reason. Obviously, the Supreme Court of Minnesota unanimously agrees
with my position. It is certainly nice to have some company.
Please come to see us whenever you can.
Sincerely,

�rs

Professor

